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Preface 
 
When I started this project in 2006 I was not aware that it would be finished on the 
60th anniversary of Israel’s Declaration of Independence, almost to the day. Now, 
after two and a half years of work, it seems that it could not be otherwise. It is as if the 
events are inescapably tied. Much in the same way as the history of 1948 is tied with 
the present situation in the Middle East. In Israel this is a year of celebration, in the 
Palestinian camps around the region it is yet another year of mourning. The past 
carries on into the present. The history of 1948 is more than the history of 1948, it is 
part of the explanation of why the present is the way it is. History is the story of dead 
men, but it is also the story of living events.  
 Many people have helped me reach this conclusion, just like many people 
have inspired me to endeavour to comprehend the Israel-Palestine conflict. I cannot 
list them all, but some cannot go unaccounted for. I owe gratitude to Jack Ullman – 
the first of many great history teachers I have had over the past years. His classes 
were more inspiratory than I could have imagined at the time. Likewise, my advisor, 
Hilde Henriksen Waage, has been a great source of inspiration. I am grateful to her for 
all the time and energy she has invested in my project. I could have expected nothing 
more from an advisor. Her research assistant, Marte Heian Carlsen, has been helpful 
throughout, providing comments that have helped improve my thesis immensely. 
Gratitude must also be given to the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(PRIO) for all the support this fantastic institution has given me. I am especially 
thankful for the faith PRIO put in my project by allowing me to receive the student 
scholarship and for letting me participate in The Missing Peace SIP. It is hard to 
calculate the value of being invited, as a young master student, to discuss the Middle 
East with some of Norway’s best scholars on the field. I would also like to thank the 
Nobel Institute’s head librarian Anne C. Kjelling, who, together with the PRIO 
librarian Odvar Leine, have provided service that borders on the unimaginable.  
 Ellen Fadnes and Mariá Hernández Carretero deserve special mention for 
having shared office with me for almost a year, bearing with me. I wish you best of 
luck with your theses.  
 Beyond the academic I would like to thank my friends, too many to mention, 
for all their support and patience. I cannot even begin to postulate how many hours of 
your time has been dedicated to listening me blabber on about a conflict that, I have 
 x
come to realize, is not the centre of gravity for most people. Tore Holberg and 
Johannes Due Enstad stand out in particular. Gratitude also goes to my parents, and 
brother, who share my passion and have nurtured it throughout.  
Lastly I would like to thank my Palestinian friends in exile who have made me 
understand how imbued their past is in their present. I hope you one day will have a 
state. For Palestinians and Israelis alike there is a future where both people live in 
peace. 
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1. Introduction 
 
20 July 1951 an enraged Palestinian nationalist named Dr. Musa al-Husayni shot and 
instantly killed the Hashemite King of Jordan, Abdullah ibn Hussein, as he was 
attending the Friday prayer at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The reason given for 
the murder was that he “was a traitor who served the interests of the British; and the 
peace that he was on the point of making with Israel would have removed any chance 
of realizing the aspirations of the Palestinians.”1 The Israeli reaction to this fatal 
shooting was, in the words of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion: “We did have one 
man about whom we knew that he wanted peace with Israel, but the British interfered, 
until a bullet came and put an end to the business. With the removal of the Abdullah 
factor, the whole matter was finished.”2  
 Two years prior to the shooting, 3 April 1949, Israel and Jordan had signed an 
armistice. This armistice was negotiated both under the scrutiny of the UN at Rhodes 
and in secret between the two countries without external interference at King 
Abdullah’s palace in Shuneh. The armistice ended the 1948 War and was followed up 
by negotiations for a peace settlement. The peace talks were initiated, but never 
concluded. Officially Israel and Jordan remained at war until King Abdullah’s 
grandson King Hussein signed a peace treaty with Israel 26 October 1994.  
 The bullet that removed the “Abdullah factor” can be seen as decisive, but that 
would be to overly simplify a complex political situation that deserves a thorough 
investigation. Peace between Israel and Jordan remained elusive for another 45 years. 
The aspirations of the Palestinian people remain unfulfilled to this day.   
 The signing of the Israeli-Jordanian armistice was an historical event in its 
own right, bar the fact that it did not lead to peace. It was the culmination of the Arab-
Israeli war of 1948. A war that within the short time span of one year changed the 
geopolitical makeup of the Middle East drastically. In early May 1948 there was a 
Palestinian Mandate, administered by Great Britain, bordered by Transjordan, Egypt, 
Syria and Lebanon. By April 1949 Transjordan had become Jordan, the Palestinian 
Mandate had ceased to exist, replaced by the fledgling state of Israel (77%); the West 
                                               
1
 Shlaim, Avi: Collusion Across the Jordan. Oxford 1988, pp. 607-608. 
2
 Shlaim 1988, overleaf backside. 
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Bank (22%), annexed by Jordan; and Gaza (1%), occupied by Egypt.3 The Holy City 
of Jerusalem had been divided in two. Of the 900,000 Palestinians who had inhabited 
the part of Palestine that became Israel, approximately 750,000 became refugees. To 
this geographical and demographical makeover was added the failure of the UN to 
solve one of the first big crisis the young organization was asked to handle. Likewise, 
the war illustrated that Britain had lost most of its influence in the Middle East. The 
Arab states failure in protecting the Palestinians was made worse by the very same 
states’ inability to present their populace with anything but propaganda regarding the 
success of the war in which so much political capital had been invested. This 
unfortunate combination had far reaching repercussions which, within a few years, led 
to revolutions, assassinations and coup d’etats throughout the Arab world.4 
 The war that took place in the period between November 1947 and March 
1949 was pivotal in the history of the modern Middle East. The war also created 
conflicting discourses.5  
For Israelis the war is known as the War of Independence. In this version of 
events the young Jewish state was outflanked and outnumbered by war-mongering, 
anti-Semitic Arab states that sought to strangle the Jewish state as it was being born. 
Thus the Israeli victory over these hell-bent enemies was one of legendary heroism – 
a battle fought between the Israeli David and the Arab Goliath. In this version the 
Palestinians fled because the Arab states had asked them to, so that the land could be 
cleansed of Jews without the risk of Arab fatalities.6 Israel then sought peace, but 
found no partner.7  
                                               
3
 Thomas, Baylis: How Israel Was Won. Lanham/Oxford 1999, p. 89; Roy, Sara: The Gaza Strip: The 
Political Economy of De-Development, Washington DC 2001, p. 65. 
4
 Rogan, Eugene L. and Shlaim, Avi (eds.): The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. 
Cambridge 2001, p. 1. 
5
 A more thorough discussion of historiography will follow later in this chapter. 
6
 This call was supposedly made over radio, but as has been shown by research done mainly by Israeli 
“New Historians”, no evidence of any such broadcasts exists. In fact more evidence shows that rather 
than encourage the departing Palestinians, broadcasts were made urging them to stay. Morris, Benny: 
The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge 2004, p. 180; Hitchens, 
Christopher: “Broadcasts” in Said, Edward W. and Hitchens, Christopher (ed.): Blaming the Victims. 
London/New York 2001, pp. 73-83; Lockman, Zachary: “Review: Original Sin” in Middle East Report,  
No. 152, The Uprising, May-June 1988, p. 59; Finkelstein, Norman G.: Image and Reality of the Israel-
Palestine Conflict. London/New York 2003, pp. 56-60; Khalidi, Walid: “Why did the Palestinian 
Leave, Revisited” in Journal of Palestinian Studies Vol. 34, no. 2, Winter 2005, pp. 42-54; Morris, 
Benny: 1948 and After. Oxford 1990, pp. 17-18.  
7
 For a critical look at the Zionist version see: Shlaim, Avi: The Iron Wall. London. 2001, p. 34; 
Flapan, Simha: The Birth of Israel. London/Sydney 1987; Shlaim, Avi: ”The debate about 1948” in 
International Journal of Palestinian Studies 27, no. 3, Aug. 1995; Pappe, Ilan: The Ethnic Cleansing of 
Palestine. Oxford 2007, p. xiv; Morris 1990, pp. 1-34. 
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The Palestinian narrative is radically different. The Israeli War of 
Independence is the Palestinian Catastrophe, or al-Nakbah.8 In this version the 
Palestinians were never asked to leave. Rather they were driven out by an Israeli army 
that wanted to ethnically cleanse the former British Mandate so that a purely Jewish 
state could be established. In this version the Palestinian cause was betrayed by all 
parties: the UN, Great Britain and the US. But most of all the Palestinians thought 
themselves betrayed by the surrounding Arab states who had promised to liberate 
Palestine. Rhetoric did not match up with action and the Arab states sent only 
symbolic forces, well knowing that these would be inadequate for anything more than 
holding onto small pieces of land – areas that would be incorporated into the relevant 
Arab countries, rather than becoming an independent Palestinian state.9  
There are elements of truth in both the Israeli and the Palestinian versions. 
One of the most interesting aspects that is uncovered when comparing the two 
versions is the Transjordanian paradox. Transjordan sacrificed the Palestinian cause 
on the altar of self interest and fought bloody battles against the Israeli army. 
Transjordan broke ranks with the other Arab armies and led those same armies into 
battle, taking responsibility for the brunt of the war’s important actions. Transjordan 
adhered to its pre-war agreement with Israel and openly broke it. Transjordan acted as 
the insurance plan for the UN and the British Government in ensuring the success of 
the Partition Plan and went behind the backs of both, negotiating directly with Israel. 
Transjordan was the main protector of the Palestinian people and responsible for the 
death of the short-lived All Palestine Government.10 It is necessary to investigate 
these paradoxes if one is to understand Transjordan’s role in the 1948 War. Perhaps 
the most vital question is – if there was an amicable atmosphere between Transjordan 
and Israel after the war, why did the armistice not become a peace treaty? Or 
alternatively, the flip-sided version of the same question – if Israel and Transjordan 
were sworn enemies, why did they choose to hold negotiations primarily on a bilateral 
basis rather than through the third party apparatus that was made available by the UN? 
Negotiations through the UN was, after all how Israel negotiated with its other Arab 
neighbours; Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. 
                                               
8
 Shlaim 1988. As for the expression al-Nakba, and most other Arab phrases, there is a wide variety of 
methods for transcribing from Arabic. I have not followed a particular school of transcribing, but rather 
the rule of consistency, unless forced to break this through the use of quotes. 
9
 Shlaim 1995. 
10
 These paradoxes are all complicated matters and will be discussed further in the following chapters.  
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There has also been a long held understanding that the appearance of the 
armistices was due, almost single-handedly, to the genius of the UN Acting Mediator 
Ralph Bunche. Despite the bitter enmity between the parties, he managed, by virtue of 
his diplomatic talent, to bridge the gap and settle, albeit not solve, the conflict.11 In the 
case of the Israeli-Transjordanian armistice, however, Ralph Bunche received credit 
for the armistice, yet he had not attended the most important negotiations – the secret 
bilateral talks that took place at King Abdullah’s palace in Shuneh, as well as in 
Jerusalem. In fact Bunche’s role, in the Transjordanian-Israeli context, was to give 
international legitimacy to a treaty mainly negotiated elsewhere.12 This version of 
events can hardly be blamed for crediting Ralph Bunche. Bunche was undoubtedly a 
gifted negotiator and what we can term the “negotiations of substance” in Shuneh was 
an unknown fact for a long time. The significance of these substantial negotiations has 
to this day not been adequately researched.13 These negotiations are the major focus 
of this thesis. 
Sources 
 
In order to rectify these different versions of history, and investigate the negotiations, 
it is necessary to understand the historical background, as well as the regional and 
international context in which the developments of 1947-1949 took place. In order to 
closely analyse the armistice negotiations it is necessary to examine a series of 
sources. The primary sources, that is the first hand, unedited material, and the 
secondary sources, that is the edited material produced by the participants. In the first 
category we find the British archives, the UN archives, the Israeli archives, the US 
                                               
11
 Næser, Ingrid: Right Versus Might. Unpublished Master Thesis, University of Oslo 2005, pp. 7-8; 
Touval, Saadia: The Peace Brokers. Princeton/New Jersey 1982, p. 54. Interestingly this interpretation 
of Bunche’s success inspired Gunnar Jarring, the UN Middle East mediator between 1967 and 1971, to 
attempt to copy the mediation techniques of Ralph Bunche. Mørk, Hulda Kjeang: The Jarring Mission. 
Unpublished Master Thesis, University of Oslo 2007, pp. 46-47. 
12
 See Chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
13
 Although several books have been written on the Israeli-Transjordanian relationship, the double 
nature of the armistice negotiations has not been fully researched. The connection between Ralph 
Bunche and the Shuneh talks have not been adequately studied. Næser 2005, p. 111; Shlaim 1988, p. 
425; Urquhart, Brian: Ralph Bunche: An American Life. New York/London 1993, p. 216. My extended 
investigation is largely based on the excerpts from the Ralph Bunche diary found in Brian Urquhart’s 
private collection in the UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections, Collection 364 (UCLA). It 
is unclear whether the excerpts of the diary that are found in Urquhart’s private collection are the 
complete diary notes or whether Urquhart made a selection to be kept in the archives. I did not 
personally gather these diary excerpts and I am greatly indebted Ingrid Næser who kindly gave me 
access to the photocopies she took of these when writing her master thesis on the Israeli-Egyptian 
armistice.  
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archives and the Ralph Bunche diary.14 Among the latter we have a series of 
biographies and memoirs. 
Primary Sources: 
 
The Jordanian archives are a great unknown. It is unclear whether they exist, and if 
they exist, they are not available. This applies to all the Arab archives. As far as the 
other archives are concerned, I have mainly accessed the British archives as well as 
some of the UN archives, along with the available sections of the Ralph Bunche diary. 
Together, these compose the main bulk of my research material. The Israeli archives 
are fully available, but they are composed of documents of which some are in English 
and some are in Hebrew. This posed a large problem. However, some of this material 
has been published in the series Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel.15 This 
was a highly valuable source of information despite its somewhat fragmentary nature. 
The British archives are highly relevant because Great Britain was highly 
involved in Transjordanian affairs, and so in effect the British Government, and its 
representatives, functioned both as actors and observers. The British Minister to 
Amman, Alec Kirkbride, was a close friend of King Abdullah and was considered his 
confidant.16 This is also true for John Bagot Glubb, also known as Glubb Pasha. He 
was both the leader of the Arab Legion, the Transjordanian army, and a retired British 
officer who retained strong contact with the Government that all but officially 
employed him. As with Kirkbride he was a confidant of King Abdullah.17 However, 
they both had a strong loyalty to the British Government. They reported everything 
that happened directly back to the British Foreign Office (FO).18 Furthermore, the 
Transjordanian Government was so highly dependent on British aid and military 
                                               
14
 Public Records Office, British National Archives (PRO). Documents here belong to two categories: 
Foreign Office (FO) and Colonial Office (CO); UN Archives and Record Management Section, 
Collection 0618 (UNA); UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections, Collection 364 (UCLA); 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949 Vol. VI. Washington 1977; Freundlich, Yehoshua 
(Ed.): Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Volume 2: October 1948-April 1949. Jerusalem 
1984; Freundlich, Yehoshua (Ed.): Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Volume 3: December 
1948-July 1949. Jerusalem 1983. 
15
 Freundlich (Ed.) 1984; Freundlich,(Ed.) 1983. 
16
 Wilson, Mary C.: King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan. Cambridge/New 
York/Melbourne 1999, p. 149; Robins, Philip: A History of Jordan. Cambridge 2004, p. 57; Nevo, 
Joseph: King Abdallah and Palestine. Ipswich 1996, p. 54.  
17
 Morris, Benny: The Road to Jerusalem. London/New York 2003, p. 207; Rogan, Eugene L.: “Jordan 
and 1948: the persistence of an official history” in Rogan and Shlaim (eds.) 2001, p. 106. 
18
 For Glubb Pasha see Morris 2003 p. 5. In Kirkbride’s case this is more obvious as he was the 
Minister to Amman and reporting to the Foreign Office was his duty. 
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assistance that the British Government had a great say in Transjordanian affairs. It has 
been pointed out that King Abdullah at times kept secrets from the British 
representatives.19 In many of these cases one can assume that the large network of 
contacts established by the British Minister made the information available despite 
King Abdullah’s attempts at the opposite.20 One can assume, however, that some 
information did not reach the British channels. This is a weakness regarding the 
Foreign Office archives that one must be acutely aware of. In order to rectify this 
weakness, literature based on the Israeli archives is used throughout. Most valuable 
amongst these are Avi Shlaim’s Collusion Across the Jordan and Uri Bar-Joseph’s 
Best of Enemies.21 The use of the document collections Foreign Relations of the 
United States and Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel has helped bridge this 
gap.22 
 As far as the UN and Ralph Bunche documents are concerned, these are highly 
valuable in one sense, but problematic in another. On the one hand these cover all the 
official negotiations at Rhodes, but they do not cover the secret Shuneh talks.23 As for 
the US archives it is worth noting that the US representatives had good access to 
information on the ground. However, compared to the British, the US Government 
was to a lesser extent an active actor in the negotiations, and thus the US sources have 
functioned as complementary to the British archives.24         
Secondary Sources 
 
Considering the relatively limited amount of actors in the armistice negotiations there 
exists a surprisingly large oeuvre of memoirs: King Abdullah’s My Memoirs 
Completed; David Ben-Gurion’s Israel: A Personal History and My Talks with Arab 
Leaders; Moshe Dayan’s Story of My Life; Abba Eban’s An Autobiography; Walter 
Eytan’s The First Ten Years; John Bagot Glubb’s A Soldier with the Arabs and Peace 
                                               
19
 Pundik, Ron: The Struggle for Sovereignty. Oxford/Cambridge (US) 1994, pp. 67, 114. 
20
 Pundik 1994, pp. 171-172.  
21
 Bar-Joseph, Uri: The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948. London 1987; 
Shlaim 1988. 
22
 FRUS, 1949 Vol. VI. Washington 1977; Freundlich (Ed.) 1984; Freundlich, (Ed.) 1983. 
23
 Ralph Bunche mentions the Shuneh talks, but he does not cover them. 23 Brian Urquhart’s private 
collection in the UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections, Collection 364 (UCLA), Excerpts 
from Bunche Diary, UCLA 364/8-7. 
24
 FRUS, 1949 Vol. VI. Washington 1977. Lundestad comments on intelligence cooperation between 
the two states: “In the intelligence field American-British cooperation was far more extensive than 
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in the Holy Land; Sir Alec Kirkbride’s From the Wings and A Crackle of Thorns; and 
Golda Meir’s My Life.25 These memoirs have some things in common. Since they are 
all edited in one way or another, it is symptomatic that they all contain reflections 
which were made possible at a later point. This raises the problem of proximity to 
truth. Since most of these actors had an interest in creating a good reputation for 
themselves, many of the memoirs are charged with intent to save face.26 These must 
therefore always be investigated with a critical eye, and the statements must as far as 
possible be compared to what is found in the archival material. The secondary sources 
have a hidden advantage in that they all, to some extent, show how their authors 
thought it was important to portray the story. They represent an ideal in a sense, and 
though they cannot always be counted on to show exactly what happened, they do 
illustrate what the actors wanted their audience to believe had happened. Most of 
these autobiographies can be supplemented by biographies and other historical works 
written on the subject/person in question.27  
Literature 
 
As with all research done on the history of the state of Israel, the 1980s represented a 
watershed. In 1978 the Israeli archives were opened, shortly followed by the British 
archives. History was opened for reinvestigation. What was discovered was that, as 
with most national histories, the national myths were not as truthful as suggested. The 
historians reinvestigating the national Israeli history referred to themselves as the 
“New Historians” or “Revisionist Historians”.28 The results of this historical 
reinvestigation gave at times shocking results. Their main scholarly objective was to 
                                                                                                                                       
between any other major powers.” Lundestad, Geir: The United States and Western Europe Since 1945. 
New York 2003, p. 98. 
25
 Abdallah, King of Jordan: My Memoirs Completed: “Al-Takmilah”. London/New York 1978; Ben-
Gurion, David: Israel: A Personal History. Tel Aviv/New York 1972; Ben-Gurion, David: My Talks 
with Arab Leaders. Jerusalem 1972; Dayan, Moshe: The Story of My Life. New York 1976; Eban, 
Abba: An Autobiography. New York 1977; Eytan, Walter: The First Ten Years. London 1958; Glubb, 
John Bagot: A Soldier with the Arabs. London 1957; Glubb, John Bagot: Peace in the Holy Land. 
London/Sydney/Auckland/Toronto 1971; Kirkbride, Sir Alec Seath: A Crackle of Thorns. London 
1956; Kirkbride, Sir Alec: From the Wings. London 1976; Meir, Golda: My Life. New York 1975. 
26
 This seems to be particularly true for Ben-Gurion’s accounts. Morris, Benny: “Falsifying the Record: 
A Fresh Look at Zionist Documentation of 1948” in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 
Spring 1995. 
27
 Morris 2003; Shalom, Zaki: David Ben-Gurion, the State of Israel, and the Arab World, 1949-1956. 
Brighton/Portland 2002; Urquhart 1998; Wilson 1999, et al.  
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demythologize the national history, and reinvestigate it through a non-ideological 
lens.29 In this process they ended up with the “slaughtering of sacred cows.”30 The 
book that opened the debate that has been running ever since was Simha Flapan’s The 
Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, printed in 1987.31 
As far as the relationship between Israel and Transjordan goes, the research 
done by the British-Israeli historian Avi Shlaim and the Israeli historian Uri Bar-
Joseph are by far the most important. Avi Shlaim’s grandiose historical study 
Collusion Across the Jordan is the most thoroughly investigated study of the 
relationship between Israel and Transjordan in its whole (ca. 1920-1951), whilst Uri 
Bar-Joseph’s work Best of Enemies is the most detailed in its account of the relevant 
period (November 1947-April 1949). These works rely on large amounts of archival 
research as well as interviews.32  
Despite the depth of analysis in these books, they have left some stones 
unturned. The intent of this study is to look in great detail at the relationship between 
the unofficial Shuneh and the official Rhodes negotiations. In terms of contributing to 
the scholarly work of these two individuals, my greatest asset has been the fact that I 
have accessed the available fragments of the Ralph Bunche diary. These were not 
available when the two books were written. By investigating these I have been able to 
add insight to previous in-depth analyses.  
Although Avi Shlaim and most of his fellow “New Historians” have not been 
refuted as such, their findings created a debate that still continues. Amongst those who 
have positioned themselves strongest against them, Professor Efraim Karsh stands 
out. In his book Fabricating Israeli History he claims that the findings of all the 
“New Historians” border on fabrication. His polemic is so strong, however, 
introducing chapters by quoting George Orwell’s 1984, that it is hard to take his 
criticism seriously.33 For a dismissive criticism of Karsh it is worth quoting Benny 
Morris: “Karsh resembles nothing so much as those Holocaust-denying historians 
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who ignore all evidence and common sense in order to press an ideological point.”34 
Karsh may be an extreme example, but illustrative of the proportions that these 
debates reached is the fact that Avi Shlaim felt forced to change the name of his work 
to The Politics of Partition, a change he later regretted.35  
 Along with Avi Shlaim and Uri Bar-Joseph there are a series of other 
historians, mainly Israeli, who refute the national myths that lasted up until the late 
1980s. All the works that are based on archival research are of great value. These 
include, amongst other, the works by Benny Morris, Joseph Nevo, Ilan Pappé, Ron 
Pundik, Itamar Rabinovich, Eugene Rogan, David Tal, Mary C. Wilson as well as 
Jordan specialists such as Philip Robins.36 New research on the Rhodes negotiations 
done by Ingrid Næser, in her Master Thesis at the University of Oslo, is clearly of 
importance as it, to my knowledge, is the first historical paper that focuses exclusively 
on one of the armistice negotiations. Although her focus is on the Egyptian 
negotiations the setting has many of the same characteristics as the Israeli-
Transjordanian armistice negotiations and is therefore of great relevance in terms of 
contextualizing the negotiations.37 
Theoretical Approach 
 
As with most cases of diplomatic and geopolitical history there must here be a focus 
on actors in both a broad and a narrow sense. By this it should be understood that 
nations, international and regional organizations etc., are considered actors in the 
broad sense, whilst persons, such as heads of state, UN mediators, diplomats etc. are 
termed actors in the narrow sense. As with most conflicts the historical period that is 
investigated is dominated by strong personalities. On the Transjordanian side we find, 
amongst others, King Abdullah; Prime Minister Abul Huda; field commander and 
negotiator Abdullah al-Tel; and General Glubb Pasha (also a British actor). On the 
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Israeli side we find Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, negotiators Walter Eytan, 
Moshe Dayan, Elias Sasson, Reuven Shiloah. On the UN side we find Ralph Bunche, 
and on the British side we find Minister in Amman Alec Kirkbride, Foreign Minister 
Ernst Bevin and Glubb Pasha.  
These actors, in the narrow sense, however strong they were as individuals, 
could not override the international structures as put down by the interaction of the 
actors in the broad sense. King Abdullah had to balance his personal interests between 
what the Arab League permitted, what the military positions on the ground dictated, 
the interests of his government, popular sentiment, the “rules” of the UN, and the 
demands of the British, which to a certain extent could be enforced through the threat 
of subsidy withdrawal. Likewise, the UN Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche might have 
liked to put pressure on the negotiating parties, but without strong support from the 
US, with Britain losing its colonial hold, and with Transjordan and Israel participating 
in secret bilateral negotiations no such support was to be found. Further, although the 
special relationship between Britain and the US was good, the Middle East was the 
greatest area of contention.38 This created a situation that can be described as a power 
vacuum. There was a clear lack of international pressure towards the involved parties. 
The result of this was that the power on the ground dictated. This must be investigated 
in light of the regional imbalance of power between Israel and Transjordan. 
 The specific historical literature has been complemented with literature on 
negotiating theory, analysis of the significance of power balance and on the larger 
geopolitical structure/situation. Negotiation theory combined with power structure 
analysis has been a highly useful tool. The asymmetry of power theory, used in other 
studies of Middle East negotiations, has also been highly applicable.39 
Some attention has been paid to the legalistic differences between truce and 
ceasefire. However, it seems that by 1949 there was still no clear border separating 
these. The UN apparatus had not at this time a clearly developed terminology and 
there is some confusion both in the literature and in the source material.40 
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Value of Research in a Broader Perspective 
 
Why is there no peace in the Middle East? The answer is as elusive as the peace itself. 
Before the outbreak of the 1948 War Britain, the UN and the US all had proposals for 
how the division of Palestine could be implemented. After the 1948 War the armistice 
negotiations were completed and some moves towards a lasting peace were made. The 
war itself was riddled with truces and ceasefires. In more modern times we have had 
the Camp David agreement, the Madrid conference, the Oslo-accords, the Camp 
David II accords, the Roadmap, the Madrid+15, the Arab Peace Initiative and a 
wholes series of UN Resolutions – the list is long, yet there is no peace. In order to 
understand this discrepancy, between the large series of peace efforts and the lack of 
peace, it is vital that each and every attempt at reaching a peaceful solution is 
thoroughly investigated. This thesis is part of such a Herculean task. Through such a 
systematic approach, requiring the ardent work of many participants, it should be 
possible to reach some conclusion as to the reasons behind this endemic history of 
failure. This specific case study has been part of the Strategic Institute Project at the 
Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) – The Missing Peace: Conflict Resolution 
and Peacebuilding in the Middle East. This project has set out to answer the question: 
What lessons do we have from the past concerning international mediation in the 
Middle East conflict? What follows is an attempt to investigate one of these mediation 
efforts: The Israeli-Transjordanian armistice negotiations of 1949 
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2. Partitioning Palestine and the Abdullah-Zionist Collusion 
1915 – October 1948 
 
The circumstances that surrounded the 1948 War and the negotiations between Israel 
and Transjordan had roots going back to the second decade of the twentieth century. 
The special relationship between King Abdullah and the Zionists was created long 
before the outbreak of the 1948 War. In order to fully comprehend the diplomacy 
between the two states, as it developed in the late 1940s, it is vital that one 
understands how inerasably tied the partition of Palestine was with the Abdullah-
Zionist relationship. Both these phenomenon were equally connected to British 
policies in the Middle East. Contextually one must therefore look at the premises that 
created the intertwining of British policies, Zionist aspirations, King Abdullah’s 
untraditional diplomacy and the partition of Palestine. 
Many Promises, Little Land 
 
When the First World War broke out in 1914 the Ottoman Empire was in political 
turmoil, heavily affected by local strands of nationalism, burdened by foreign debt 
and had suffered a series of coups and semi-revolutions within a short time span.1 
Great Britain was intent on defeating the Ottoman army, destroying its empire and 
dividing it into slices that were to be harvested once the war was over. In order to 
ensure the success of this plan, a series of conflicting promises and treaties were 
made. Between late 1915 and early 1916 a correspondence was kept between Sharif 
Husayn of Mecca, the Hashemite notable who was the father of the later King 
Abdullah of Transjordan and King Faisal of Iraq, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British 
High Commissioner to Egypt. The Hashemite family claimed decadency from the 
prophet Mohammed, and had a prominent political position in the Middle East. The 
British wanted to put this position to use. In return for instigating an Arab uprising 
against the Turks, the Hashemite family was to be given a leading role in the shaping 
of the Middle East once the war was over.2 The Hashemites were granted Iraq, led by 
Faisal, and Transjordan, ruled by his brother Abdullah. As the Hashemite family saw 
it, however, this was less than had been promised them. This was especially true in 
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the case of Abdullah and Transjordan as Transjordan was an economically non-viable 
state that was completely dependent on British assistance.3  
The ink had hardly dried on the last letter in the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence when Great Britain decided to divide the coming spoils with its 
European ally – France. In a clear breach with the promises given by McMahon, the 
infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement was negotiated and signed by Sir Mark Sykes of the 
British Foreign Office and George Picot from the French Foreign Ministry in May 
1916. By this agreement the Middle East was to be divided between the two colonial 
powers.4 As if two conflicting promises were not enough, the British Government also 
approached a third actor – the international Zionist movement. The Zionist movement 
had, since its foundation, sought the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. That 
the Zionist Movement had such a goal was no surprise. That the British Government 
decided to support it, on the other hand, was.  
As with most empires, the British’ was not one dominated by sentiment. 
Support for a Jewish homeland was British Realpolitik. As the British Foreign Office 
saw it, Jews could play a vital role in influencing Britain’s allies. In Russia several 
Jews, especially among the Bolsheviks, were thought to have important positions and 
a high degree of influence. According to the British analysis these Jews were Zionists 
and would therefore urge Russia to support Britain in order to obtain a homeland. In 
hindsight this analysis turned out to be wrong. The assumptions of the Foreign Office 
was based on two fundamental flaws, that is the extent of Jewish influence on national 
politics and the influence of Zionism on the relevant Jews. The Jewish influence on 
the Tsar, for one, was completely overestimated. Furthermore the Foreign Office had 
also failed to realize that most of the relevant Jews amongst the Bolsheviks were 
internationalist rather than nationalist in their political outlook. A similar error was 
made when analyzing the policymaking institutions in the US. Here the influence of 
American Jewry on the decision making bodies was highly overestimated.5 Given the 
British misunderstanding of the political importance of Jews in these two countries, 
the Balfour declaration was a logical political decision. The Balfour declaration was 
issued in November 1917, stating that “His Majesty’s Government view with favour 
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the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use 
their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object”.6   
 With all the promises given during the war it was evident that at least one of 
those promises had to be held. Reality was quickly catching up with politics. One 
crucial question remained however: Who was going to get Palestine? The Hashemites 
– as stipulated by the Husayn-McMahon correspondence? The Yishuv (the Jewish 
society in Palestine) – as put forth in the Balfour Declaration? The local Palestinian 
population – based on Wilsonian principles of self determination? Or was Britain to 
hold it against the will of all the three interested parties? Initially it seemed that self-
interest won out. When the war ended, Great Britain created the Mandate of Palestine 
as stipulated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 
However, Britain was not alone in shaping the future of Palestine. The 
interested parties started making political moves that contributed in shaping the future 
of Palestine. In March 1921, in a meeting with British colonial secretary Winston 
Churchill, King Abdullah of Transjordan suggested that Transjordan should annex 
Palestine. He did not receive any positive response, however, and this was therefore 
not a realistic option at that point in time.7 1921 also saw the dawning of Palestinian 
diplomacy. A delegation elected by the Fourth Palestinian National Congress was sent 
to London to express their fear for the consequences of a British pro-Zionist policy. 
24 October 1921 the delegation sent a letter to Winston Churchill stating clearly that: 
“The Palestinian people will never admit the right of any outside organization to 
dispossess them of their country, and to threaten their very existence as a people 
economically and politically.” This first visit to London by the Palestinian delegation 
was followed by three others in the period 1921-1930, but as with the solution put 
forth by King Abdullah, they were not heeded.8  
Despite being turned downed by Winston Churchill, King Abdullah nurtured 
his relations with the Zionists. By the 1930s he had developed a good personal, 
diplomatic and economic relationship with several important members of the Jewish 
community in Palestine, the Yishuv, allying with them against their common enemy – 
the Mufti of Jerusalem.9 
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The Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, had long been one of King 
Abdullah’s enemies. The Mufti was a radical nationalist Palestinian leader who 
represented one of the most influential Palestinian families and led the largest 
Palestinian party – the Arab Party. He was also the chairman of the Arab Higher 
Committee. His popular reputation and leadership skills made him a political threat to 
Abdullah. The Mufti became one of the leaders of the Arab Revolt in 1936 and was 
therefore cast into exile. This strengthened his reputation, but equally weakened his 
real power.10 The long term result of this was that the Palestinians lacked political 
leadership by the outbreak of the 1948 War.11 
Navigating Troubled Waters 
 
In April 1936 the Arab Revolt broke out in reaction to Zionist policies, the influx of 
European Jewish refugees and the British mismanagement of the Palestinian 
Mandate.12 This event represented a watershed in the political outlook of all the 
involved states. For the first time Ben-Gurion became aware of “the national character 
of the Arab opposition to Zionism.”13 Transjordan on the other hand had repeatedly 
reported to Britain about the ensuing dangers of a possible revolt. The British 
Government had not heeded his warning, and when the revolt broke out Abdullah was 
given the mission of quelling the disturbances and uniting the Arab nations. Abdullah 
worked towards this end with the hope of gaining support for his territorial ambitions, 
that is Greater Syria, or if that turned out to be impossible, Palestine.14 Britain, despite 
the Transjordanian help, was unable to stop the revolt which continued until 1939. 
 In August 1937, in response to the Arab Revolt, the British Government 
appointed a Royal Commission. This commission, led by Earl Peel, was to investigate 
the roots of the uprising in Palestine, and use his findings to come up with a viable 
solution to the problem.15 The investigation was concluded and released its findings in 
July 1937. The proposal laid forth was a Partition Plan dividing the British Mandate 
of Palestine into three parts. One section was to become a Jewish state; a second, 
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including Jerusalem, was to remain a mandated zone; while the third, the larger part 
of Palestine, was to befall Transjordan.16 
 The findings of the Peel Commission unsurprisingly created further tension in 
Palestine. King Abdullah was delighted, but out of tact attempted to conceal this 
reaction. The Zionists rejected the plan, yet were open for negotiations with the 
British. The Arab Higher Committee rejected it completely.17 Britain was completely 
unable to appease all three interested parties.  
Although Britain was no longer the superpower it once was, it was still 
capable of assisting Transjordan militarily and economically. As a reward for the 
wartime effort, Transjordan was granted independence in March 1946 and was 
officially named “The Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan.” Though independence 
was granted, it was clear who was the retainer.18 Since 1921 Britain had paid for, 
trained and maintained the Transjordanian army – the Arab Legion. This was the best 
trained military force in the Arab world, but it was heavily controlled and used by 
Great Britain.19 With independence came a new Treaty of Alliance. In this Britain was 
to defend Transjordan if the kingdom was attacked. The treaty only applied if 
Transjordan’s borders were breached.20 The treaty was slightly altered in March 1948, 
but the alterations were purely cosmetic in nature, designed to make Transjordan look 
less dependent on Great Britain while retaining the same amount of support. The 
updated Treaty included an article stating that if either country was engaged in war, 
the other would come to its aid. This created quite a bit of confusion, especially for 
Israel who assumed that the British army could on this basis intervene in Palestine 
during the 1948 War. However, the British signatories interpreted this article only as a 
defensive one, which was only valid if Transjordan proper was invaded or if Britain 
needed assistance.21 
While the British were on amicable terms with the ruler on the east side of the 
river Jordan, their position within the Palestinian Mandate deteriorated rapidly. The 
active Zionist animosity against the British administration had taken a break during 
the Second World War, but it had returned with a vengeance once the war ended. 
During World War II Ben-Gurion had stated: “We will fight with the British against 
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Hitler as if there were no white paper; we will fight the white paper as if there was no 
war.”22 From late 1945 the official force of the Jewish Agency – the Haganah, as well 
as Jewish terrorist organizations such as Irgun and the Stern Gang, led a campaign 
against the British Mandate. This bore with it high costs for both sides.23   
Israeli independence however, could not be won with arms alone. The good 
relationship the Yishuv had had with King Abdullah in the 1930s was pursued. 12 
August 1946 the Jewish-Arabist Elias  
 met Abdullah in the King’s summer palace at Shuneh, just across the border, 
on the Transjordanian side of the river Jordan. King Abdullah laid forth his support 
for partition, on the condition that the Arab part of Palestine would befall Transjordan. 
He explained that he personally thought it would be better for all parties if a 
federation with the Jewish area of Palestine was created as an autonomous region 
within Greater Transjordan. He expressed that if this was impossible, however, he 
would go along with the partition as put forth in the report of the Peel Commission. 24  
In terms of Abdullah-Zionist relations the period that followed this meeting 
was one of further secret meetings, bribery and pragmatism. Several of the Zionist 
leaders were realizing the importance of working together with King Abdullah. Ben-
Gurion’s description of the two planned states as “Judea and Abdallia” aptly summed 
up the basis for the talks.25 However, the situation in which the talks took place was 
radically changed when Britain threw in the towel and gave up responsibility for the 
Mandate, handing this over to the UN. This decision was made final by Foreign 
Secretary Ernst Bevin 18 February 1947.26 The British Government had had enough. 
It could no longer politically and economically defend the validity of having 80-
100,000 troops stationed in Palestine. If things got worse, which the British assumed 
they would, the cost would put further pressure on an already collapsing British 
economy.27 Bevin put much of the blame for the increasingly difficult situation on US 
President Truman, who kept undermining the British efforts by supporting large scale 
Jewish immigration and partition.28 It was also clear that one of the reasons for giving 
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up on the Mandate was the success of Zionist terrorism. The main symbol of this 
campaign was Irgun’s terrorist attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946. 
The explosion killed a total of one hundred Britons, Jews and Arabs.29   
When the British gave up, the responsibility for the Palestine Mandate befell 
the UN. The newly founded organization was thus handed a problem which rather 
quickly developed into a major headache. During the internal British debate prior to 
the handover of responsibility, several possible alternatives for the Palestinian 
Mandate were discussed. One of those included giving the Arab parts of Palestine to 
Transjordan. However, no official stance was taken. The result was that the UN 
received the problematic issue with no recommendations from the state that had had 
the most experience with the problem.30 If the British Government could offer no 
advice, what hope was there for the UN to find a reasonable solution before the 
British troops were to pull out a year later?  
With the problem in the hands of the United Nations all the parties faced a 
new reality. How was the UN going to treat the Mandate? No matter the outfall of 
these changing realities, King Abdullah had to make new considerations.31 First of all, 
he had to make sure his policies were well co-ordinated with Great Britain. Further, 
he had to conceal his true intentions from the other Arab states and the Palestinians, 
creating a political situation where his outwardly mouthed intentions contradicted his 
real plans. This had to be made clear to the Zionists. King Abdullah was in other 
words performing a balancing act on a political razorblade. To make matters worse, 
Transjordan was not a member of the UN, and the dependency on Great Britain was 
thus, rather ironically, enhanced by the British handover of Palestine.32  
The inter-Arab political situation in the late 1940s was a major complicating 
factor. All the Arab politicians, bar King Abdullah, were united in their opposition 
towards the idea of a Jewish state. However, the Arab League was also split into a 
pro-Hashemite group and an anti-Hashemite group. Transjordan was supported by 
Iraq, a country run by another Hashemite, whilst the anti-Hashemite group was led by 
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Egypt and Saudi Arabia.33 Transjordan was thus placed in an awkward situation. The 
country’s alliance with Britain placed it in a vulnerable position, paving the way for 
accusations from the other Arab states, as well as from the Zionists, who often uttered 
suspicion towards what they characterized as a British conspiracy. Transjordan was 
perceived by all parties as pro-British in a period when Zionists thought the British 
Government was anti-Zionist and the Arab States thought the British Government was 
pro-Zionist.34  
Which Partition? 
 
Once the British had set a date for their withdrawal from Palestine, the UN was given 
the impossible task of quickly finding a viable solution.35 Working against both a tight 
schedule and past experience, the task was one which the newly founded UN 
apparatus was inadequately prepared for. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground had 
developed into a fledgling civil war.36 In April-May 1947 the UN General Assembly 
established the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Based on a series of 
meetings with representatives of the two communities during the summer of 1947, 
UNSCOP issued two reports. These were known as the majority report and the 
minority report, named after the amount of representatives in the UNSCOP-team that 
supported each. These were the Partition Plan and the Federal Plan, respectively. Both 
plans demanded that the parties worked together.37 This was a highly optimistic pre-
requisite and one that failed.38 The geographic structure of the two states, as drawn up 
in the Partition Plan, earned it such dubious names as “Two Fighting Serpents” or 
“Picture by Picasso”.39 In the Partition Plan the Jewish state was to be composed of 
the Negev, a coastal strip stretching from just south of Jaffa to just north of Haifa, and 
the eastern Galilee. The Arab state was to be composed the Gaza district, the bulk of 
central Palestine and the western Galilee including the coastal line by Acre. The area 
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around Jerusalem and Bethlehem area was to become an International Zone.40 The 
fact that the majority report supported partition was to a large extent the result of the 
combination of successful Zionist lobbying and the Arab Higher Committee’s boycott 
of the UNSCOP hearings. The plight of the Jewish refugees had also had a profound 
emotional effect on the committee.41   
 Once UNSCOP had issued the two reports the problem was handed over to the 
UN General Assembly. Both the US Government and the USSR supported the 
Partition Plan, but a two-thirds majority was needed in the General Assembly and 
many of the smaller nations were not swayed. Due to last minute lobbying, 
blackmailing and outright threats, as exercised by the Zionists and the US 
Government, enough support was gathered for the Partition Plan.42 The UN Partition 
Plan, known as Resolution 181, was passed 29 November 1947. Britain abstained 
from voting.43 The passing of this Partition Plan had dire consequences. In the words 
of Avi Shlaim, it “provided not just international legitimacy for creating Jewish and 
Arab states, but unintentionally the signal for a savage war between the two 
communities in Palestine.”44  
 During the second week of December 1948 the Arab League convened in 
Cairo.45 For them the creation of a Jewish state was anathema and had to be stopped. 
This was at least their outward stance. The inner politics were far more complicated, 
and the solidification of the Arab states in their fight to strangle the Jewish state at 
birth is one of the great Zionist myths in the history of the establishment of Israel. The 
“New Historians” have tried to look into, demystify and to reveal these inner 
workings amongst the Arab states.46 Their findings are revealing. King Abdullah, for 
instance, had originally planned to support partition and declare that Transjordan 
would take over the Arab-designated areas. He was talked away from this by the 
British Minister in Transjordan, Alec Kirkbride, as such a stance would have 
completely isolated Transjordan.47 The outward stance of absolute non-acceptance 
won the day as the unreconciling rhetoric was as enticing as it was unrealistic. None 
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of the Arab states were adequately militarily prepared, nor were they willing to 
cooperate with each other, yet one country after another added fuel to the fire with 
every speech. It was as if they were outbidding each other in high pitched 
impotence.48 Originally the Arab League seemed only willing to send in small arms 
and officers that were to train the Arab resistance. This took the form of the Arab 
Liberation Army (ALA) – an army as powerless as its name was powerful.49 This 
discrepancy between representation and reality was a reoccurring symptom of Arab 
politics in the late 1940s.50  
War in Palestine 
 
The outbreak of the war between the Arabs and the Jewish forces is usually dated to 
15 May 1948, the date of the Arab invasion. There had been an ongoing civil war in 
Palestine for at least half a year prior to this.51 Some historians therefore divide the 
war into two phases. The first phase lasted from November 1947 to 14 May 1948, and 
the second phase lasted from 15 May 1948 to the end of hostilities in 1949.52 The first 
round of fighting was one in which the Jewish armed forces (Haganah, Irgun and the 
Stern Gang) fought against Arab volunteers, Palestinian resistance fighters and 
conducted an ethnic cleansing of areas with Palestinian inhabitants within the areas 
envisaged to be the Jewish state.53 The civil war ended with the establishment of 
Israel. The war then became one between states.54 In general the civil war did not 
affect the covert diplomacy between Transjordan and the Zionist leadership which 
continued until May 1948. The violence in Palestine made such diplomacy more 
difficult, but it did not end it.    
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 One event of the civil war, however, demands particular attention, namely the 
Deir Yassin massacre. The event had major political implications. The massacre 
stands above all other events in the civil war, in the sense that it radically increased 
the political pressure on King Abdullah because it sent a jolt of fear through the 
Palestinian population.55 Deir Yassin was a small village close to Jerusalem. Its elders 
had made an agreement with the Haganah, who had promised to spare the village. 9 
April 1948 this promise was broken by a small force composed of Irgun, the Stern 
Gang and Haganah troops. When the Palestinians resisted, all restraint vanished from 
the Jewish ranks. The exact number of murdered civilians is hard to estimate, and the 
numbers vary from 93 to 254.56 Whatever the real figure, the massacre at Deir Yassin 
became the symbol of the Nakbah due to its brutality.57 This was far from the only 
such massacre committed against the Palestinian population, but it has retained a 
symbolic status as the massacre. The Deir Yassin massacre is important for us due to 
its double significance. First and foremost the massacre, and the fear it spread 
throughout Palestine, radically increased the pressure on King Abdullah. This 
pressure was brought on him both through the Arab League and through the lobbying 
of Palestinian notables who demanded that Transjordan send its Legion to the defence 
of the Palestinian villages.58 Secondly the massacre, rather surprisingly, serves to 
illustrate the importance held by the Jewish Agency towards the special relationship 
with King Abdullah as the Jewish Agency acted with urgency in an attempt to calm 
King Abdullah. Such a move was not made towards the other Arab governments. 
Shortly after the massacre took place the Jewish Agency sent a letter to King 
Abdullah condemning the “incident”.59 The response from Abdullah was filled with 
bile and contained a clear threat of “terrible consequences” if such a massacre was to 
re-occur.60 In a statement to the press he added that: “Instead of awaiting till the 15 of 
May next the Jews have seized the opportunity of attacking peaceful Arabs at Deir 
Yassin, Tiberias, Haifa and other places which fact alone is sufficient reason to 
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compel Arab states to send their troops to Palestine.”61 In his report to the Foreign 
Office, Kirkbride described King Abdullah as close to having a nervous breakdown. 
“I wish he would stop making these statements to the press but some outlet for his 
fury seems to be essential.”62 The political pressure hanging over King Abdullah was 
clearly enormous.  
Collusion and Confusion 
 
The special relationship between Transjordan and Israel, or more correctly between 
King Abdullah and the higher echelons of the Jewish Agency, was one that had been 
fostered since as early as 1922.63 This relationship, however, didn’t develop into 
collusion until 1947.64 Between those dates the various overtures came in jolts. At 
times the relationship was kept warm by a continuous series of meetings, while at 
other times there were lulls lasting several years.65 A detailed account of these various 
overtures with their ups and downs would serve no purpose here, suffice to say that 
this relationship had a long tradition and was not something that appeared out of 
nowhere as the Mandate approached its endgame. When these talks evolved into a 
serious form of diplomacy around 1946 one man came to the fore – Elias Sasson. 
Sasson was the leading Arabist in the Jewish Agency and became vital in engineering 
the collusion. One of his contemporaries described his role thus: 
 
Until Sasson went into talks with Abdullah, there was only stammering from our side. 
Sasson knew how to talk to Abdullah […] The way in which Sasson worked with 
Abdullah was diplomatic activity of the first order. It led to the fact that we did not 
have to fight the Arab Legion. […] He was the architect and he was the builder.66 
 
With the entrance of Sasson the talks between King Abdullah and the Zionists picked 
up pace. 17 November 1947, less than two weeks prior to the passing of the UN 
Partition Plan, King Abdullah met with Golda Meir – acting head of the Political 
Department of the Jewish Agency. In this meeting it was agreed, though not 
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formalized, that the Arab Legion would capture the Arab part of the Mandate, 
something the Zionists would accept, and in return King Abdullah would not oppose 
the declaration of the Jewish state.67 Elias Sasson was one of the two Jewish Agency 
Arabists that accompanied Golda Meir. His role was that of a translator, but his 
presence in the meeting should nonetheless be seen as important.68 Kirkbride, who 
knew King Abdullah intimately, pointed out that the Jewish Agency made a grave 
error in sending a woman – he was concerned about King Abdullah’s conservative 
views. Furthermore, he was worried by the fact that Golda Meir knew no Arabic and 
had little experience in dealing with Arabs.69 Despite this, the agreement was reached. 
The largest problem was not what the agreement contained, but what it left out, 
namely Jerusalem. Jerusalem was to be a corpus separatum according to the Partition 
Plan. Although both the Jewish Agency and King Abdullah agreed that Jerusalem 
could not be internationalised, they failed to discuss how the city was to be treated.70   
Although King Abdullah had received support from the Jewish Agency for his 
plan to take over Arab Palestine, such an action was still highly controversial as it 
went against the UN Partition Plan which envisaged a Jewish State and a Palestinian 
State. It was therefore of great importance for King Abdullah that he obtained some 
form of clearance from the British Foreign Office. 7 February 1948 Prime Minister 
Abul Huda and the British commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb, who 
acted as translator, met with British Foreign Secretary Ernst Bevin in London where 
they discussed the idea of a Transjordanian takeover of Arab Palestine once British 
forces retreated. Bevin’s response could hardly have been clearer: “It seems the 
obvious thing to do, but do not go and invade the areas allotted to the Jews.”71 This 
decision was kept secret from the US Government, and as late as 10 May 1948 Bevin 
was vague regarding Abdullah’s intentions in the upcoming war.72   
In the highly volatile situation that was building up in the weeks before the 
end of the Mandate Golda Meir sent several messages to King Abdullah asking for an 
assurance that he was going to keep his promise. To one of these letters Abdullah 
responded that Meir must “remember three things: that he was a Bedouin and 
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therefore a man of honor; that he was a king and therefore doubly an honourable man; 
and finally, that he would never break a promise made to a woman.”73 This did not 
quell the Jewish Agency’s doubts. A last meeting was arranged between King 
Abdullah and Golda Meir. Golda was again sent across the river Jordan to make sure 
that Abdullah would stay the course. She was, in this final and most vital meeting, not 
accompanied by Elias Sasson. The reasons for him not joining her are unclear as it 
seems he simply failed to show up in Haifa where they were supposed to meet prior to 
departure.74 The meeting, which took place 10 May 1948, has been the focus of much 
historical discussion, yet its contents remain elusive.75  
 Golda Meir reported that the meeting had been a complete failure, that 
Abdullah had changed his mind, and that he had viewed war as the only remaining 
option. The previous deal had been forged in a situation where Transjordan stood free 
from the other Arab states. In May 1948 this was no longer the case. King Abdullah 
told Golda Meir that he could not stand against the tide: “When I made that promise, I 
thought I was in control of my own destiny and could do what I thought right, but 
since then I have learned otherwise […] I am now one of five.”76 Taken literally this 
implied that the Israeli and Transjordanian representatives parted as enemies. 
However Meir’s literal understanding of the meeting was perhaps part of the 
problem.77 Abdullah made it clear that the war could not be avoided if the Jewish state 
was proclaimed – a proclamation he hoped could be delayed for the sake of finding a 
solution. He was perhaps not as precise in his reiteration of the Arab Legion’s plan to 
restrict itself to the areas allocated by the UN Partition Plan to the Arabs, and that it 
would refrain from engaging in battles with the Jewish army, but as his actions in the 
war would show, King Abdullah remained true to his word. “Part of the problem was 
that ‘Abdullah had to pretend to be going along with the other members of the Arab 
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League […] Their plan was to prevent partition; his plan was to effect partition.”78 
The point was that the Israeli-Transjordanian Partition Plan had not changed nature, it 
was merely necessary for Abdullah to make cosmetic changes in light of the new 
realities. As the meeting ended King Abdullah and Danin, the Arabist who had 
replaced Sasson, had a short conversation that was rather surprising if Abdullah really 
had changed course completely. “”I hope we will stay in touch even after the war 
starts,” Danin said. “Of course,” Abdullah answered. “You must come see me.” “But 
how will I be able to get to you?” asked Danin. “Oh, I trust you to find a way,” 
Abdullah said with a smile.”79 It was clear that King Abdullah did not view their 
differences as insurmountable. 
 The Zionists paid no heed to Abdullah’s advice of postponing the Declaration 
of Independence, and 15 May 1948 the State of Israel was proclaimed. Exactly as had 
been forewarned by King Abdullah, the Declaration of Independence was followed by 
a declaration of war.  
Recognition of Israel 
 
The United States Government recognized Israel just eleven minutes after the 
Declaration of Independence was issued by Ben-Gurion.80 The speed with which this 
recognition was issued came as a shock to most of the involved parties.81 Due to the 
fact that this was one of President Truman’s pre-planned personal secrets, it even 
came as a political shock to the US State Department and the British Foreign Office.82 
This prompted the following joke throughout the Arab world: “[A] new aeroplane had 
been invented which would go so fast that it equalled the speed with which the United 
States of America recognized the State of Israel.”83 In comparison, the US recognition 
of Transjordan had the speed of a donkey. Transjordan received de jure recognition 
by the United States 1 February 1949, three years after Transjordan had become an 
independent state.84 USSR also extended recognition of Israel on 18 May 1948, yet 
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did not recognize Jordan until 1955 as it considered Transjordan to be a British 
puppet. That Transjordan was not recognized as a state by the two superpowers 
clearly placed the country at a diplomatic disadvantage as it was denied UN 
membership.85 Another effect of this was that a significant form of pressure was 
removed from Israel. The superpowers could no longer make such suggestions as – 
we will recognize you if …, or we won’t recognize you unless …. This form of 
pressure was still available against Transjordan.  
War in Palestine – Round 1: 15 May – 11 June 1948   
 
15 May, as had been promised, the last British soldiers withdrew from the Mandate 
and the Arab armies invaded.86 The first thing to be noted is that the Arab armies 
acted differently than their original war plans suggested, while at the same time they 
were unable, or unwilling, to coordinate the new developments amongst each other. 
Transjordan changed its stated war plan into one that fitted well with its “promise” to 
Israel – a takeover of what is now known as the West Bank.87 Egypt saw this as a 
Transjordanian land-grab and responded by changing its war plan into one where it 
would lead a two-pronged attack of which one moved up through Beersheba and north 
towards Jerusalem. The rational was that by grabbing parts of the West Bank Egypt 
could limit Transjordan’s gains. The war was thus more of a classical example of 
inter-Arab strife along the traditional Hashemite/anti-Hashemite lines, rather than one 
of Israeli strangulation.88   
 The Arab Legion entered Palestine and quickly moved forward into the West 
Bank with the aim of taking control of and holding the Arab areas. Jerusalem was to 
be by-passed, but the Haganah had, in the period 13-18 May taken over all British 
compounds in the city, and as a result King Abdullah was forced to act. 17 May he 
ordered John Bagot Glubb to occupy and protect the Old City.89 The battle for the Old 
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City started 19 May and lasted until 28 May when the Jewish Quarter fell to the 
Legion.90  
 Meanwhile the Egyptian army moved northward, occupied the Gaza strip and 
moved as far north as Isdud, some twenty miles south of Tel Aviv, and north-eastward 
to Beersheba, through Hebron and Bethlehem. By 23 May the Egyptians had reached 
just south of Jerusalem. On all fronts the Egyptian army dug in.91 
 The Iraqi army launched a farcical first round offensive, attempting to break 
through to Haifa, but was repelled as it was unable to successfully besiege Kibbutz 
Gesher just across the river Jordan. 22 May saw the Iraqi army withdraw across the 
river, only to receive reinforcements and return to a position of defence by holding the 
Arab-held “triangle” – Nablus-Tulkarem-Jenin – the northern section of the West 
Bank.92 Here the Iraqis dug in and remained mostly inactive for the duration of the 
war, despite the fact that the Iraqi contingent was the numerically largest Arab force 
in Palestine, numbering a total of 18,000 troops.93 Their presence here, however, 
developed into a major problem by the early months of 1949 as the Iraqi Government 
refused both withdrawal and negotiation. 
 The Syrian offensive was perhaps the least successful. Entering Palestine a 
day later than planned, the Syrian army initially only occupied a former British fort as 
well as some abandoned settlements. With one exception the Syrian army was 
repelled in all its attacks. The small areas in which the Syrian army had success were 
just enough to give the Syrians a tiny foothold in Palestine, which thus offered them a 
bargaining chip, however modest.94 The Lebanese army hardly joined the war at all.95 
The alleged Arab unity had proven itself to be a farce, as had the stated plan to 
wipe out the infant Jewish state with a strike “which will be spoken of like the 
Mongolian massacres and the Crusades.”96 The complete failure of the Arab armies 
cannot disclose the fact that in this first phase of war the Haganah was in a dire 
situation. The Israeli army was better trained and coordinated than the Arab armies, 
and the soldiers had a morale that was equal to none. However, the army lacked heavy 
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armaments and it was fighting on small strips of land often without the advantage of 
height. Despite this, the first four weeks of the war was mostly an Israeli victory.97 
The first truce, which came 11 June 1948, only tipped the military balance further to 
Israel’s advantage.  
The First Truce: 11 June – 8 July 1948 
 
The UN Security Council had, only five days after the outbreak of the war, appointed 
Count Folke Bernadotte as “special mediator” for Palestine. He had a dual mandate: 
To end the fighting and to find a comprehensive solution acceptable to both sides. His 
effort at finding a quick end to the fighting was crowned with momentary success 
when a truce covering all fronts was agreed 11 June. The second half of his mandate 
was somewhat of a mission impossible. The truce, rather ironically, made the war a 
walkover for the Israelis. The Arab states were heavily affected by the international 
arms embargo that was set to work. Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan had all tied their 
armies to Britain, which ardently upheld the arms embargo.98 Beyond that the Arab 
states were increasingly incapable of coordinating their war effort.  
In stark contrast, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), as the Haganah was named 
31 May, used the truce to massively strengthen their fighting capabilities. In terms of 
arms, Israel was able to acquire large amounts from Czechoslovakia in blatant breach 
of the arms embargo. In terms of manpower, the IDF combined large-scale training 
camps with the influx of Jewish immigrants, enabling an increase of forces from ca. 
35,000 to ca. 65,000 in the period 15 May – 9 July. In terms of organization, the IDF 
became more streamlined as both the Stern Gang and Irgun were mostly disbanded 
and integrated into the IDF.99  
 Bernadotte issued his first proposal for a solution to the conflict 27 June 1948, 
stipulating a division of Palestine into two sections – one Jewish state and one Arab 
state united with Transjordan.100 This proposal was rejected by both sides. In an act of 
folly the Arab states refused to extend the truce and warfare was resumed 8 July.101 
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War in Palestine – Round 2: 8 – 18 July 1948 
 
The second round of the war broke out 8 July and lasted until 18 July the same year. 
The fighting was initiated when the Egyptians launched a strike against the IDF in the 
south at dawn the 8 July. 
 On the southern Egyptian front the ten days were indecisive, though it can be 
said that the IDF suffered the fewest losses and dealt the heaviest blows. On the 
Syrian front in the north the IDF suffered heavy losses without achieving decisive 
victory, but the Syrian force was cut in half and the back was broken of the northern 
Arab Liberation Army (ALA) strongholds. On the Central Transjordanian front Israel 
took Lydda and Ramle after Glubb Pasha ordered the Legion troops to withdraw in 
order to be able to defend the rest of the West Bank, especially the area around 
Latrun.102 The IDF secured the road connecting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.103  
Second Truce: 19 July – 15 October 1948 
 
A second truce was initiated 19 July and lasted until 15 October 1948. As with the 
first truce the Arab states were unable to benefit from the respite in the fighting, 
whilst the IDF added further military might to the scales. Meanwhile Bernadotte’s 
mission impossible continued. He had finished his final report, known as the 
Bernadotte Plan, and had handed it over to the UN when on the 17 September 1948 he 
was murdered by the Israeli terrorist group known as the Stern Gang.104 The Swedish 
Count left a lasting testimony and a looming shadow that his successor Ralph Bunche 
had to try to fill.105 The Bernadotte Plan envisaged an UN administered Jerusalem and 
the creation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC).106 Lastly, the 
Bernadotte Plan included a tit-for-tat alteration to the Partition Plan whereby Israel 
would get the Galilee and in return the Arabs would get the whole Negev.107 This was 
rejected by Israel who insisted on both tit and tat. Bernadotte also ardently insisted on 
the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees.108 Also this demand was rejected by 
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Israel.109 The plan as a whole was rejected by Egypt, and the Arab League made it 
clear that unless the refugees were allowed to return there could be no negotiations.110  
 Once again King Abdullah stood out as the exception He made public 
statements against the Bernadotte Plan, yet made it clear that he would abide by it if it 
was accepted by the UN.111 In retrospect the Israeli ambassador to the US and the UN, 
Abba Eban, used the Arab stance towards the original Partition Plan to argue in 
support of the Israeli rejection of the Bernadotte Plan: “We would meet the Arab 
invaders on their chosen ground. Since they had decided to reject the 1947 
delimitation in favor of a verdict by arms – so be it.”112 The legitimacy of this logic 
can be questioned, but it was cleverly used in a way that allowed Israel both to have 
the moral high ground while at the same time conquering territory.   
Towards the Best Animosity 
 
It was during this second truce, while acting mediator Ralph Bunche took over for 
Bernadotte, that the special relationship between Israel and Transjordan started re-
emerging.113 It took a while from re-emergence to full fledged dedication, and Israel 
spent much of the second truce planning an attack on the Arab Legion and the Iraqi 
troops in order to take over the West Bank.114 The special relationship won out in the 
end, and it was Egypt who received the brunt of the Israeli attack in the third round of 
the war. This was done with Transjordanian consent. This choice of strategy 
represented “the elimination, at least temporarily, of the option of a political 
settlement with Egypt, in favour of a settlement with Transjordan.”115 In the short 
term this was a clear advantage to Transjordan. The risk was of course that Israel 
would turn on Transjordan once Egypt had been defeated. In October 1948, this was a 
risk Transjordan was willing to take. 
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3. Israeli – Transjordanian Contact Regained 
August – November 1948 
 
By November 1948 any observer would have considered it highly improbable that 
Israeli and Transjordanian diplomats were holding bilateral talks behind the scenes. 
The two countries had, only months previously, fought over Jerusalem and other areas 
in central Palestine. Officially King Abdullah was still the commander of the invading 
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Arab armies. The previous bilateral talks between the two states were well guarded 
secrets. Even those few who had known of the secret talks between Israeli and 
Transjordanian representatives in 1947, and the early months of 1948, would have had 
no reason to expect the two warring parties to re-approach each other. Despite this 
apparent implausibility, that is exactly what they did. In fact the diplomatic 
relationship between the two states had re-developed over a longer period of time. 
Before we delve into the detailed accounts of how this special relationship 
reappeared on the diplomatic horizon it is necessary to take a step back and consider 
how a diplomatic approach was possible at such a point in time. The greatest 
hindrance for such talks was, rather obviously, the ongoing war. For Transjordan’s 
part this was made more problematic by the atmosphere in the Arab world – one filled 
with unrealistic war rhetoric and propaganda; internal political turmoil fuelled by the 
Palestinian refugees and an Arab unity that both shunned all deviation and was split 
into a pro-Hashemite and an anti-Hashemite camp.1 In this atmosphere it could have 
been considered political suicide to open talks with the Israelis.2 There were other 
factors at play however; factors that helped explain why Transjordan chose to break 
with the unwritten protocols of Arab unity.  
One of the main factors was the long dawning realization that although the 
Arab Legion had obtained and fortified significant territorial acquisitions, this strength 
was highly temporal. The longer the war would have lasted, the more unable the 
Legion would have been to hold the areas it controlled. Its lines were extended 
beyond breaking point and the supplies were becoming desperately low.3 The 
international arms embargo had adversely affected the military balance in Israel’s 
favour. Transjordan, economically controlled by Britain, was completely sealed off, 
whilst Israel was able to acquire arms and ammunition in a clandestine manner from 
other sources, mainly Czechoslovakia.4 This dire situation was made worse by the fact 
that one of the last shipments of ammunition from Britain that was to come through to 
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Transjordan was “hijacked” by Egypt as the cargo passed through the Suez.5 The 
Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance only applied to Transjordan proper, and hence 
there could be no British guarantees against Israeli aggression.6 This was a fact that 
caused much embarrassment to those British citizens embedded in the Transjordanian 
Government – especially the British Minister Alec Kirkbride and John Bagot Glubb.7 
The British Ministry of Defence did take the step of discussing the issue with the US 
administration, but the case was not pushed further after the US had responded to the 
negative.8 
A final factor pushing King Abdullah into opening diplomatic talks with Israel 
was perhaps the reappearance of Elias Sasson, the leading Israeli Arabist who had 
been one of the masterminds behind the Golda Meir-King Abdullah talks. In June-
July 1948 he was given the responsibility of attempting to open diplomatic channels 
with Arab leaders, particularly King Abdullah.9 One would be gravely 
underestimating King Abdullah if one put too much weight on this argument, but it 
cannot go unaccounted for. During the Abdullah-Meir talks Sasson had played a vital 
role, and there had developed a great sense of trust between the two men. When, on 
the brink of war, 10 May 1948, Sasson had not shown up for the last meeting, the 
friendly atmosphere that had existed broke down.10 It would be a massive 
exaggeration to state that this was the only reason, but it seemed to have weighed 
heavily for King Abdullah.11 During one of the December meetings, which will be 
discussed later, King Abdullah’s physician and close confidant Dr. Sati commented: 
“Golda Meir was dry during her interview with His Majesty before the troubles. If 
your excellency [Sasson] had visited yourself, it would have been possible to arrive at 
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a better understanding.”12 Sasson’s role in rejuvenating the amicable atmosphere 
between King Abdullah and the Israeli representatives might have added that last 
necessary pro that tipped the balance.  
From the Israeli viewpoint several other arguments appear. Although the war 
was going well, the young state could not sustain the cost of war perpetually. The 
West Bank was a tempting prize, but the cost would have been high. The southern 
parts of Palestine were far easier to conquer. To ensure such a conquest, which 
involved an all out attack on the Egyptian army, it was vital to pacify Transjordan and 
the Arab Legion, especially on the Jerusalem front. The interests of Israel and 
Transjordan coincided as Egypt posed one of the gravest threats to Transjordanian 
interests.  
For Israel to attempt to conquer both central and southern Palestine 
simultaneously would have been costly and a large military risk. Furthermore, an 
outright attack on areas not allotted to Israel in the UN Partition Plan would have 
implied risking a conflict with the great powers. This was a possibility that especially 
worried Foreign Minister Shertok.13 Confrontation with the British was a great worry 
for the Israeli Government, especially given that Ben-Gurion was unaware of the fact 
that the Treaty of Alliance between Britain and Transjordan only applied if 
Transjordan’s official borders were breached, and that the treaty therefore did not 
apply for the West Bank.14 Thus, ironically, the Treaty of Alliance was a reason for a 
peaceful approach for both parties, but for completely different reasons. For 
Transjordan due to lack of protection, for Israel due to lack of information. 
The choice to leave central Palestine for later was not an easy one.15 In a sense 
the Israeli Government had to fight the Israeli sentiment at the time, so aptly described 
by Ben-Gurion: “Our public is drunk with victory – out of ignorance, just as a year 
ago it was frightened of the Arab armies, out of ignorance.”16    
A last factor in explaining the renewed contact between Transjordan and Israel 
is the importance of the pre-war “deal” between the Zionist leadership and King 
Abdullah. On face value the deal was null and void. Upon closer examination, 
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however, “Abdullah remained remarkably loyal to his original understanding with 
Golda Meir.”17 Although the Arab Legion was the Arab army that conquered the 
largest parts of Palestine, fought some of the bloodiest single battles against the Israeli 
army and ended up possessing half of the war’s greatest prize, Jerusalem, the pre-war 
understanding was “breached” only four times. In all of these cases there was a clear 
sense of either necessity or accident. Put differently, none of the four cases were fully 
planned acts of aggression. The four cases were Gush Etzion, Jerusalem, Latrun and 
Lydda/Ramleh. With the exception of Jerusalem, which was outside the 
understanding, all of the remaining points of conflict were within the Arab sector, as 
defined by the Partition Plan.18 
Gush Etzion was a small settlement bloc near Jerusalem, but located within the 
sector of Palestine allotted to the Arabs in the Partition Plan.19 The story of the fall of 
Gush Etzion is a tragic one as it resulted in a massacre of the Jewish settlers, but the 
battle was not one initiated from above. Rather the attack was launched as a 
spontaneous action from the young and ambitious field commander, Abdullah al-
Tel.20 After Gush Etzion, but not because of it, al-Tel was quickly promoted and 
became a leading figure in both the fighting in Jerusalem and the Jerusalem 
negotiations that took place in November 1948.21  
The battle for Jerusalem was heavy, with many casualties on both sides. The 
city became one of the greatest sticking points for the negotiations, but within the 
context of the relevant argument, Jerusalem was never mentioned in the Abdullah-
Meir agreement. The battle for the Holy City was one that could not be avoided if one 
army made a move. The status and symbolic importance of Jerusalem for both sides 
was such that it was a definite either-or. Either both sides had to leave it to be 
internationalized or both sides had to engage in street fighting. Once the Israeli troops 
had entered the city, the die had been cast.22  
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In the case of Latrun the Haganah launched a series of attacks despite the fact 
that Latrun was both held by the Legion and was within the boundaries of Arab 
Palestine. The reason for this was the logic of war itself, as the Legion had occupied 
Latrun to block the road connecting Tel Aviv with Jerusalem. The Legion managed to 
hold onto Latrun despite repeated Israeli attacks.23  
Lastly, the case of Lydda and Ramleh was one of Transjordanian withdrawal 
and to a very little extent an actual battle.24  
As Jerusalem was unmentioned in the pre-war agreement and the remaining 
three battles were all fought in Arab areas there was no actual territorial breach of the 
understanding by the Arab Legion. All territorial breaches of the pre-war 
understanding were done by the Israeli army.25 King Abdullah made it clear to the 
Israeli leadership that he had entered the war because of the Deir Yassin massacre and 
the Israeli breach of the Jerusalem ceasefire.26 The point here being that, with the 
exception of Gush Etzion, all the battles fought between Israel and Transjordan were 
initiated by Israel. King Abdullah’s adherence to the pre-war understanding was 
surprisingly strict, indicating that he had never perceived it as broken.   
As one can see, there were a whole series of reasons for King Abdullah to 
reinitiate talks with Israel. Militarily Transjordan was extremely weak and needed to 
end the war. This would explain the need for talks, but not the need for secret bilateral 
talks. In terms of explaining this it is far more relevant that the pre-war understanding 
was still perceived as valid by King Abdullah, despite the few breaches mentioned 
above. King Abdullah regarded personal relations higher than other forms of 
diplomacy.27 This preference was strengthened by the fact that Transjordan was not a 
member of the UN as the country had been recognized neither by the US nor the 
USSR.28 Both parties also disliked the inefficient nature of UN negotiations.29 
Added together the above-mentioned factors would, for the most part, explain 
the interest Transjordan had in negotiating with Israel, and vice versa, but they do not 
adequately explain why Transjordan was willing to take the political risk of 
negotiating with Israel. The explanation for that can only be found in the political 
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developments within the Arab world. It was, after all, the political atmosphere and 
tensions within the Arab world that made negotiations such a political gamble for 
Transjordan. 
 
Claiming the Palestinian Cause: Egypt and the All Palestine 
Government 
 
By the end of the summer months of 1948, the alleged Arab unity was increasingly 
showing itself to be a series of empty words. Transjordan was becoming the scapegoat 
for the Arab states failure to “liberate Palestine”.30 This development could seemingly 
not be avoided. If worst came to worst, King Abdullah could have been blamed for 
losing all of Palestine, and if King Abdullah got his way and annexed the West Bank, 
then he would be blamed for having personal interests in the war rather than rallying 
for the Palestinian cause.31 In a personal (and secret) telegram to Head of the Foreign 
Office’s Eastern Department, Bernard Burrows, J.B. Glubb worded this inter-Arab 
animosity expressed rather bluntly:  
 
The internecine struggles of the Arabs are more in the minds of Arab politicians than 
the struggle against the Jews. Azzam Pasha [General Secretary of the Arab League], the 
Mufti and the Syrian Government would sooner see the Jews get the whole of Palestine 
than that King Abdulla[h] should benefit.32  
 
In this context the All Palestine Government (APG) was a serious threat to 
King Abdullah’s Palestinian ambition. The All Palestine Government was created 22 
September 1948 and, although it was seated in Gaza, proclaimed itself as the only 
rightful government for the Palestinian people and cause. The All Palestine 
Government was an Egyptian invention that received support from the Arab League.33 
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The Egyptian intentions were twofold: By supporting such a government Egypt 
sought to protect itself from the accusation that it was acting against the interests of 
the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the mere existence of such a government put 
spokes in the Transjordanian wheels.34 This combination would also make it easier for 
the Egyptian army to withdraw from the Palestine quagmire without losing too much 
face.35 
As long as the ad-hoc government in Gaza existed, it was impossible for King 
Abdullah to promote himself as the sole representative of the Palestinian cause. The 
old conflict between the Grand Mufti and King Abdullah had once again come to the 
fore. Neither Egypt nor any of the other Arab states wanted to put the Mufti back in a 
powerful position, but after the release of the Bernadotte Plan, which ceded the Arab 
areas of Palestine to Transjordan, the Arab League’s anti-Hashemite bloc felt that 
even an unattractive solution was better than letting King Abdullah get all of Arab 
Palestine.36 In terms of obtaining Arab Palestine, King Abdullah’s main enemy was, 
rather ironically, not Israel, but the Grand Mufti-Egyptian alliance.37  
The establishment of the All Palestine Government was more than a mere 
symbolic matter, or a so-called war of hearts and minds. The Egyptian army actually 
sought to arm Palestinian anti-Hashemite elements, especially in the Bethlehem 
area.38 The logical extension of this would be that Egyptian defeat was in the interest 
of Transjordan. Both in terms of weakening an enemy, but more importantly in terms 
of increased political manoeuvrability. The US Minister in Israel noted as much when 
the IDF was about to launch its campaign against Egypt in October 1948. The Israeli 
campaign would destroy the fledgling government in Gaza, and remove the Egyptian 
power in the Bethlehem-Hebron area, thus enabling Transjordan to negotiate and 
make gains with greater ease.39 To quote Glubb Pasha: “[I]f the Jews are going to 
have a private war with the Egyptians and the Gaza government, we do not want to 
get involved. The gyppies and the Gaza government are almost as hostile to us as the 
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Jews!”40 Glubb Pasha was not so naïve as not to realize the obvious danger of such a 
game. In the same note he claimed: “The Jewish offensive […] may finally knock out 
the Gaza government […] it will make the Jews even more arrogant, and if they 
knock out the Egyptians they may turn on us.”41 The inter-Arab animosity was not 
improving, and as a result King Abdullah had become increasingly politically 
outflanked. In view of this, and the obvious impossibility for the Arab Legion to 
engage in open conflict with the All Palestine Government, the rational behind 
holding the talks secret is more evident. King Abdullah had become increasingly 
isolated in the Arab world and the Egyptian stance had pushed things so far that direct 
talks with Israel could not create a wound that was not already there – it could only 
infect it.  
Operation Yoav: 15 October – November 1948 
 
The Israeli army launched Operation Yoav, or the Ten Plagues, on 15 October 1948. 
This operation, which was masterminded by Yigal Allon, struck at the Egyptian 
forces at several locations, splitting up their troops and forcing withdrawal. Most of 
the Egyptian troops either retreated to the Gaza strip or held on in what was to be 
known as the “Faluja pocket”. In an attempt to save the Bernadotte Plan, and to make 
sure the Negev was retained by Transjordan, Great Britain tried to pass a UN 
Resolution threatening sanctions unless Israel withdraw to the lines of 15 October. 
Such a resolution was stopped by US President Harry S. Truman because the 
president feared the consequences of positioning himself too strongly against Israel 
during a presidential election.42 Although the British and US Government shared an 
understanding of the conflict, the two governments were at loggerheads over how to 
handle the situation.43 The British Government was willing, but unable to pressure 
Israel, whilst the US Government was able, but not willing. 
 While the Israeli forces attacked Egypt in Operation Yoav the Arab Legion 
stood idle. Once the operation was completed however, Legion troops filled the 
military vacuum that had been created by the Egyptian withdrawal from areas such as 
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those surrounding Hebron and Bethlehem.44 Operation Yoav was highly illustrative in 
many ways. Firstly it proved, if there had ever been any doubt, that the alleged Arab 
unity was baseless. Secondly, it was a clear manifestation of the Israeli Defence 
Force’s military superiority at that point in the war. Thirdly, it made it evident that the 
All Palestine Government was nothing more than an empty shell. Once the Egyptian 
sphere of influence had been removed, so too was the influence of the All Palestine 
Government.45 The result was more dramatic than could have been expected, as by the 
termination of Operation Yoav, the whole All Palestine Government had fled Gaza, 
leaving not a single representative on Palestinian soil.46 
Claiming the Palestinian Cause: Transjordan and the Jericho 
Conference 
 
To make sure that the political benefits gained by the fall of the All Palestine 
Government was not squandered, and in order to create legitimacy for himself as a 
true warrior of the Palestinian cause, King Abdullah began rallying vocal Palestinian 
support. As early as 1 October 1948 the Transjordanian regent had arranged a meeting 
in Amman where he gathered Palestinian notables in what was dubbed the “First 
Palestinian Congress”.47 This first attempt took place as a clear competitor to the All 
Palestine Government, but as it was badly prepared and had a low level of attendance, 
the “Congress” had little impact.48 The attempt at competing with the All Palestine 
Government was evident to all as Abdullah’s Congress was held only a day after the 
All Palestine Government had first convened the “Palestinian National Council” in 
Gaza.49 Also this meeting was marred with low attendance – a fact that could mostly 
be blamed on the Arab Legion who, in cooperation with the Iraqi forces, had hindered 
many of the invited notables from going to Gaza.50 The First Palestinian Congress 
issued the following statement: “The Conference places responsibility for any 
disasters or calamities which befall Palestine from now on, on the shoulders of those 
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Arab Governments who support the Government of Gaza.”51 The venom in the inter-
Arab relationship could not have been clearer. 
The second Abdullah-supported Palestine Conference was held after the fall of 
the All Palestine Government, 1 December 1948 in Jericho. On this occasion the King 
had a much greater success. Once the All Palestine Government had been destroyed, 
the stage was set for King Abdullah to win the war of hearts and minds. In reality the 
odds were against him and history was to prove the project a failure, but at the time 
the Transjordanian option had been reduced to the only option available to the 
Palestinian populace. The Jericho Conference was dubbed the “2nd Arab Palestinian 
Conference”. It was attended by ca. 3000 Palestinians, including several important 
Palestinian notables. Although the purpose of the Conference was to give the 
impression of a Palestinian grassroots support for King Abdullah, it was obvious for 
many that this was not quite so. The Conference was called for by the regent himself, 
and for the most part the attendants didn’t show up on their own initiative. They were 
recruited and sometimes even bribed or threatened. Many of those that did attend on 
their own accord were long time supporters of King Abdullah.52 The very fact that the 
Conference was held in Jericho carried with it a certain symbolism – Jericho is within 
the borders of Mandate Palestine, but also a mere 10 km from Transjordan.53  
The Conference issued a declaration that stated: “[T]he Conference decides 
that Palestine and the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan should be incorporated into 
one Kingdom and acknowledges His Majesty King Abdulla[h] ibn Hussein as the 
Constitutional King of Palestine.”54 The advertisements for the meeting, as well as 
this final declaration was aired by Radio Ramallah which was a radio station 
controlled by King Abdullah.55 
Despite this clear vocal support for the King, things took a slightly different 
twist than he had planned. Due to an odd combination of King Abdullah’s personal 
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ambition and the stalwart anti-Hashemite attitude of the Arab League, as led by 
Egypt, the Jericho Conference turned out to be both a bigger success and a greater 
failure than King Abdullah had expected. Because of the opposition the Arab world 
mustered against the planned annexation of the West Bank, doubled up by British 
advice of postponement, the King gave in to the massive pressure.56 Prime Minister 
Abul Huda issued the following statement at a press conference: “[H]is government 
has decided not to implement its decision and that of the parliament to adopt the 
resolutions of the Jericho Conference for the present, although these resolutions are in 
complete agreement with the policy of the Jordanian government.”57 The annexation 
was postponed indefinitely – until April 1950 as it turned out. In exchange for the 
delay of the annexation, the other Arab states withdrew their support for the All 
Palestine Government.58 In others words the Jericho Conference actually allowed 
King Abdullah a limited coup of the Palestinian cause. He was awarded the title of 
legitimate representative for the Palestinian people, but was not allowed to annex the 
very area his title had given him. His political manoeuvrability was increased without 
him having to face off neither Egypt nor the Mufti. The latter was somewhat 
discredited by chance, when rumour emerged in late November 1948 that the Mufti 
had negotiated with Britain in support of the Bernadotte Plan and hence in support of 
partition. The rumour was false, but the Mufti, for reasons unknown, didn’t publicly 
deny it.59  
The fact that King Abdullah was pressured into not immediately annexing 
the West Bank could have been said to have pushed him into the hands of the Israeli 
negotiators. King Abdullah’s ambition was not to be hindered this time, as it had been 
before. If the Arab countries weren’t willing to give him Arab Palestine, the King 
would acquire it by talking to the Israelis. 
Secret Channels: Paris and Jerusalem 
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It was only in November 1948 that secret talks between Israel and Transjordan picked 
up pace, but as early as June-July 1948 Elias Sasson had been sent to Paris in order to 
find and groom possible Arab contacts.60 By then he had become head of the Middle 
East Department at the Israeli Foreign Ministry. During July and August he sent out 
diplomatic overtures to representatives of Arab countries. By early August the bait 
was swallowed by Transjordan. Contacts were established between Sasson and the 
Transjordanian Minister to London, Abdul Majid Haydar.61 Their first meeting was 
held on 3 August 1948 marking the establishment of the so-called Paris-channel.62 A 
parallel channel was created in Jerusalem with Belgian diplomat Jean Neiuwenhuys as 
the currier. One of the reasons for the creation of this Jerusalem-channel was King 
Abdullah’s desire to keep political developments as close to himself as possible.63 
There were few concrete developments in either Paris or Jerusalem, but the mere 
opening of these two cannels marked the beginning of a new phase in the diplomatic 
relations between the two states. 
In late August the media got hold of reports stating that Israel and Transjordan 
were conducting talks in a European capital. The leak seems to have been an Israeli 
slip, but it nonetheless frightened the Transjordanian regent who demanded total 
secrecy. The result was that King Abdullah temporarily closed down the Paris-
channel and increased the focus on the Jerusalem-channel.64  
On the 21 October an American UN Truce Commission representative was 
asked by King Abdullah if he could “request his government to inform the Jewish 
authorities that Transjordan had been forced by circumstances to take part in the 
hostilities in Palestine and would, when conditions permitted, be ready to come to 
some reasonable settlement in regard to Palestine.”65 On the morning of 3 November 
1948 the British Foreign Office received a report from Amman that King Abdullah 
was communicating with Israeli representatives with the Belgian Consul-General in 
Jerusalem Jean Neiuwenhuys as a go-between. The brief telegram stated dryly that 
“Nothing positive has emerged”, adding also that the Prime Minister of Transjordan 
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was unaware of these talks.66 Despite the British attitude, it was evident that what was 
emerging was far more serious than the original Paris-channel. For instance, in what 
was a goodwill token, Abdullah promised Israel free passage on the Latrun road if this 
was requested.67 Israel never made the request for such a passage because Ben-Gurion 
wanted all of Latrun.68 
By 5 November Transjordanian Prime Minister Tewfik Abul Huda had gained 
knowledge of the secret talks and gave these an approval of sorts. He made it clear 
that only some weeks earlier he would have demanded that such talks be put to an 
end, he now “felt that they might be useful.”69  
Two weeks later the Prime Minister of Transjordan was shocked to discover 
the actual depth of the covert talks. Via a Palestinian named Abdel Ghani el Carmi, 
who was the personal envoy of King Abdullah, the Transjordanian Minister in 
London received a message from the Israelis. The message was a blueprint for what 
was on the table: “[T]he Jews will make no concessions over the Negeb but are 
prepared to let Transjordan have the Hebron Ramallah and Nablus districts and to add 
the strip of Palestine territory east of the Jordan and Lake Tiberias and north of the 
Yarmuk.”70 When this message reached the Transjordanian Prime Minister he reacted 
much as was expected of a Prime Minister who had been kept in the dark on such a 
serious issue. He made it clear to King Abdullah that he had not authorized 
negotiations and demanded that the King’s emissary (Abdel Ghani el Carmi) be 
recalled.71 King Abdullah also played the part that was expected of him. He seemingly 
obeyed his Prime Minister yet, secretly, followed his own agenda of continued talks.72 
Just days after King Abdullah had agreed to put the talks on hold, the 
Transjordanian Minister to London had a meeting with officials in the Foreign Office 
where he informed them of his orders to maintain contacts with the Israeli delegates. 
The orders had been given from King Abdullah himself. The officials at the Foreign 
Office made it clear that “there would be no harm in and possible advantage in his 
trying to discover from the Jews what they have in mind without committing himself 
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in any way or entering into negotiations.”73 He was also warned of all the dangers 
posed by serious talks. For the British Government anything beyond testing the waters 
was going too far. Britain supported the Bernadotte Plan and wanted to buy time so 
that this plan could be given a chance in the UN. The US Government, however, was 
already faltering in its stance, and as a result, so was the British’.74 The British 
support for a UN plan that had lost most of its support, and the resulting inability to 
discuss the UN situation with Transjordanian representatives, must have further 
weakened King Abdullah’s trust in the organization.  
Abdullah’s distrust for the UN was also further strengthened by his ardent 
anti-communist sentiment.75 He clearly feared that too heavy UN involvement would 
mean that the USSR, due to its permanent membership in the Security Council, would 
get too much of a say in the Middle East.76 
Abdullah Goes it Alone 
 
By mid November 1948 an intriguing dynamic had developed. Within Transjordan 
there were three approaches to negotiations. One group of politicians would never 
accept talks taking place, whilst others accepted limited talks, but not all out 
negotiations. The most important representative for this second group was Prime 
Minister Abul Huda. The last approach was mainly represented by King Abdullah 
who supported these talks to the full despite the will, and at times behind the back of 
his Prime Minister, and against the advice of the British Foreign Office.77 The fact 
that King Abdullah made political decisions contrary to the expressed will of his 
government was nothing new. That he simultaneously decided to go against the 
advice of the British Foreign Office was much more unusual considering 
Transjordan’s dependency on British economic and military assistance.78  
The reasons for British opposition to these talks were based on the twin 
arguments that such talks would undermine the UN and that secret bilateral talks 
would dangerously isolate Transjordan in the Arab world.79  
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A further argument put forth by the British against the bilateral talks was the 
internal dynamics of the Transjordanian Government, especially with respect to the 
Prime Minister who personally preferred the UN line as he hoped the Bernadotte Plan 
would win through. Much of his opposition towards direct talks was therefore based 
on the argument that one should wait for a UN decision rather than rush things.80 In 
one of the telegrams from Kirkbride, dated 8 November, the British Minister made it 
clear that King Abdullah had lost faith in the UN and the he looked “directly to His 
Majesty’s Government for help.”81 This would imply that King Abdullah wanted the 
best of both worlds and was seemingly convinced that he could obtain it. On the one 
hand he wanted British guarantees and on the other he wanted to by-pass the 
perceived inefficiency of the UN, which, despite its limitations, was one of the few 
arenas where the British Government could exercise the kind of power that 
Transjordan needed.   
 Just as King Abdullah started losing his faith in the UN and the secret channel 
became more serious, the UN Security Council passed the two Resolutions that were 
supposed to form the guidelines for ending the conflict. The resolutions, passed on 4 
and 16 November, respectively, called for the withdrawal of forces to the lines of 14 
October, those prior to Operation Yoav, and for the parties to engage in armistice 
negotiations under the supervision of the acting mediator.82 Despite the clarity of 
these resolutions they did not alter King Abdullah’s distrust of the UN. After all, the 
question remained – who was going to enforce these resolutions? 
The Jerusalem Truce 
 
Although the Transjordanian Prime Minister Abul Huda from the outset was rather 
sceptical towards the direct talks, he quickly became personally involved. By 
November 1948 he was exchanging telegrams with Elias in Paris.83 Sasson was tired 
of King Abdullah’s staling tactics. In previous exchanges Abul Huda had been held in 
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the dark. Thus, every time things were revealed to him, there was a pause in the talks 
as King Abdullah and Abul Huda had a facedown. By contacting Abul Huda directly 
this delay could be avoided.84 
By late November serious negotiations were developing in Jerusalem. Two of 
the prominent military leaders from the war, Abdullah al-Tel and Moshe Dayan, had 
started having meetings discussing a Jerusalem truce.85 Dayan, much like al-Tel, was 
a military leader whose political position was out of proportion to his rank. Dayan was 
Ben-Gurion’s man.86  
 By the 28 November 1948 a truce covering the Jerusalem area had been 
agreed upon. The truce was valid from 7 a.m. 29 November, with both parties 
seemingly optimistic.87 One of the greatest worries was a clause whereby Transjordan 
was to take responsibility for the actions of both local Arab militias and Egyptian 
forces. The danger was obviously “that certain irregular or Egyptian elements might 
break the truce deliberately in order to embarrass Transjordan.”88 This threat had 
obviously been greatly reduced by the Israeli success in Operation Yoav, a success 
which also cleared King Abdullah’s back politically, making the outcry in the Arab 
world much less vocal when he engaged in these ceasefire talks.89 
30 November 1948 a further meeting was held between commanders from the 
Arab Legion and the IDF. The result was an extension of the truce so that it covered 
the “whole Arab Legion front from Bethlehem to Latrun.”90 The truce, and its 
extension, seemed to have appeared out of nowhere, but it was the result of almost 
two weeks of secret negotiations under the scrutiny of a small UN team.91  
If Moshe Dayan’s own account of the Jerusalem truce talks is accurate, the 
developments in the talks were surprising to all those involved: 
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During the negotiations which preceded the “sincere” cease-fire agreement, I got 
fed up with the “mediation” of the U.N. representative […] At one of the meetings 
[…] I turned to Abdulla[h] el-Tel and suggested that the two of us adjourn to 
another room. He agreed, […] we upped and left. At our private consultation, the 
two of us settled our differences very quickly. We returned to the meeting and 
reported our agreement, which was read into the protocol. […] el-Tel had agreed to 
my proposal that we establish a direct telephone line between us without having to 
go through the U.N. exchange.92 
 
The friendly tone, as recalled by Dayan, is confirmed by Kirkbride who commented in 
a telegram that “Arab Legion representative reports his opposite number was 
unexpectedly friendly and forthcoming”.93 The experiences from the Jerusalem 
meetings could be seen as vital in understanding the later choice of bilateral talks 
rather than following the UN line.  
 It is difficult to pinpoint how, when and to what extent the UN was by-passed 
in these early Jerusalem negotiations. According to Moshe Dayan’s memoirs the by-
passing started almost by chance in one of the meetings, whilst other sources indicate 
that by-passing was the Israeli intention all along.94 This last theory, of the intended 
by-pass, seems to lose some credibility in that certain sources pinpoint the starting 
point of these talks to a personal initiative by UN staff in Jerusalem.95 However, there 
is not necessarily a contradiction here. The fact that one can find evidence of an 
Israeli desire to by-pass the UN does not necessarily reflect the order of events. It 
would have been difficult for Israel to take a clear initiative on “serious ceasefire” 
talks covering Jerusalem, but once the local UN staff took the initiative to such 
meetings, the ice was broken and the opportunity to by-pass arrived. It would have 
been difficult to deny the opportunity and then approach Transjordan directly, but one 
could attend these UN hosted meetings and then break away into direct talks as a 
protest to the supposed inefficiency of the UN. Whether the UN really was inefficient 
or not is not the point here. The point is that both Dayan and al-Tel viewed it as such 
and this suited Israel well as it provided an adequate excuse that both parties could 
accept. That al-Tel and Dayan found such a good tone probably came as a pleasant 
surprise to both parties – a surprise both parties also sought to benefit from. 
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The success of the Jerusalem truce talks can be said to have undermined the 
argument for UN mediation, and it created the kind of personal relationship that King 
Abdullah so highly valued. By opening the direct phone line Dayan and al-Tel had 
created the logistical bridge that was necessary to intensify the bilateral talks. This 
was perhaps the greatest manifestation of the growing tendency to skip the UN 
apparatus.96 The direct phone line was used repeatedly, and was especially used to 
solve smaller problems, such as those caused by smaller gun battles in the city. Dayan 
and al-Tel also managed to agree on a sizable prisoner exchange. Transjordan released 
670 Israeli POWs in return for a release of less than a dozen Transjordanian POWs.97 
The success of these bilateral talks between al-Tel and Dayan bolstered King 
Abdullah’s belief that personal ties could serve his needs far better than the UN.98  
 Although the talks, to a lesser or greater extent, had continuously been taking 
place since August 1948, the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, had been 
seemingly undecided as to whether negotiations was the correct choice. The strategic 
thinking behind Israeli diplomatic and military actions was dominated by two schools. 
On the one hand there were those who propagated a take-all solution, urging a 
complete military victory over all the Arab states and extending the Israeli borders to 
the Jordan River. On the other hand there were the more pragmatic thinkers, urging a 
combination of military and diplomatic tracks and hence allowing Transjordan to 
retain most of the West Bank.99 Representatives of this second school should not be 
taken as doves however, but rather as more pragmatic realists who realized that facing 
down the whole Arab world was more risky than a divide and conquer tactic.100 The 
Israeli Government, dominated by David Ben-Gurion, continuously shifted between 
these two options. By late December 1948, however, he “leaned towards the option of 
attaining minimal objectives through negotiations rather than far more expansive ones 
through war. The concrete expression of this tendency was to be found in the secret 
negotiations he entered into with King Abdullah.”101 
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By-Passing the UN – Sidelining the British 
 
In his preference of diplomacy based on personal relations King Abdullah failed to 
realize that he was, in effect, making it increasingly more difficult for the British 
Government to provide him with support. As the UN was by-passed, the British 
Government’s ability to exert pressure on Israel waned. This was especially true in 
terms of Britain’s capability of exerting influence and pressure within the UN arena. 
The arms embargo, which was strictly adhered to by the British Government, as well 
as the limitations posed by the fact that the Treaty of Alliance only covered 
Transjordan proper, rendered British military support within Palestine impossible. 
They could only offer advice. Given that King Abdullah often refused to listen to that 
advice, the British Government was made powerless almost by default. The might of 
the British Empire in the Middle East was reduced to a fata morgana. This 
powerlessness further tilted the balance of power in Israel’s favour. This was one of 
the foundations for the further developments in the talks between Israel and 
Transjordan.102  
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4. Crushing the Ringleader: Removing Egypt and 
Isolating Transjordan 
December 1948 – January 1949 
 
By December 1948 the Arab forces in Palestine had been all but decimated. The 
Egyptians controlled pockets of resistance, as well as a small belt on the border 
between Egypt and Palestine. The West Bank was divided between the Arab Legion 
and the Iraqi army. Both were under-manned and lacked ammunition. The supply 
lines were overstretched and neither of them could afford another round of fighting. 
The Syrian contingents, as well as the Arab Liberation Army had been routed. It had 
become evident that sooner or later the involved parties would have to negotiate. 
Transjordan, as we know, had been negotiating with Israel for some time, and King 
Abdullah was anxious to get these negotiations underway lest the balance of power 
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shift further to his disadvantage as time passed. There were, however, certain 
problems that stood in his way. These problems can be divided into two categories. 
The first were those posed by the inter-Arab rivalry and the others were those posed 
by Israel. 
In terms of the inter-Arab policies, Transjordan, unlike Egypt, did not have the 
adequate amount of moral weight that was required in order for it to be the first Arab 
country to break ranks. Furthermore, the Iraqi forces which occupied the northern 
section of the West Bank had, both for themselves and Transjordan, created a 
complicated situation. Iraq was in a much weaker position than Transjordan, but had a 
less pragmatic outlook. The result was that the Iraqi army would neither fight, 
negotiate nor withdraw. This Iraqi intransigence developed into one of the largest 
problems for Transjordan in the forthcoming negotiations as it befell Transjordan to 
negotiate on behalf of Iraq.1  
Israel had, as a result of having had such success in the war, become a more 
demanding “partner”. Sure enough Israel had driven Egypt out of the West Bank, and 
this had coincided with Transjordan’s interests, but this had simultaneously left 
Transjordan in a vulnerable position.  
 
Talks Upgraded Under Pressure 
 
In December 1948, despite the changing situation, King Abdullah intended to 
continue talking with the Israeli delegates in the same manner as he had in November. 
By use of his trusted envoy, Abdullah al-Tel, the regent intended to continue talks 
with Israel on singular issues, making partial arrangements, as had been the chosen 
method of negotiating following the ceasefire signed with Israel fino November 
1948.2 This “bit by bit” way of handling things, however, was not in tune with Israeli 
intentions.3 Elias Sasson sent a letter to Transjordanian Prime Minister Abul Huda 
expressing his “hope that this first step [Jerusalem truce] would pave the way to 
general peace.”4 The same message was conveyed, albeit in a different tone, by Ben-
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Gurion who made it clear that he wanted a full-fledged settlement, as partial 
arrangements would only create more problems.5 This was not only a disagreement in 
terms of procedure; it was a clear signal from the Israelis. King Abdullah understood 
the implication of Ben-Gurion’s message – upgrade the negotiations, or face the 
consequences. It was an ultimatum of either peace or war.6 
From Amman the logic was that although the destruction of the Egyptian 
forces had been good riddance, the lesson was that unless Transjordan complied with 
the Israeli demands, they could well be the next victims. The Israeli army could easily 
strike at the Iraqi forces and then Transjordan would be completely isolated, left at the 
mercy of Israel. The Israeli demand of upgrading the negotiations was granted, and 
King Abdullah gave Abdullah al-Tel a much greater mandate, that of being his 
personal representative. The regent knew that the premier would be against such 
intensified talks, and as a result Prime Minister Abul Huda was left in the dark. The 
Prime Minister none the less intercepted the information. He was clearly distraught 
and unsure as to whether he should have another bout with the King.7 This 
development started in early December, at which point the Israeli willingness to show 
strength had not yet reached its zenith. If Operation Yoav, that is the Israeli 
destruction of the Egyptian forces stationed around Bethlehem in October 1948, had 
been perceived as a dangerous double edged sword, which indeed it was, much worse 
was to come. 
Inter-Arab Developments 
 
Prior to the final Israeli military coup de grace against the Egyptian forces, there was 
a political shift in Egypt. The new Egyptian Prime Minister, whose predecessor had 
been one of the most ardent advocates of shunning talks with Israel, sent a letter to his 
Transjordanian colleague in the second week of December asking for his opinions on 
signing an armistice (and possibly even a final settlement) treaty with Israel.8 Abul 
Huda replied that Transjordan was already committed to negotiating an armistice with 
Israel. The conclusion drawn by Abul Huda was “that Egypt was no less anxious than 
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Transjordan to find a way out of the present difficult position.”9 What this also meant 
was that the political animosity between the two Arab states seemed to be fading, and 
that there now was an opportunity for diplomatic cooperation. If this was obtainable, 
it could strengthen both countries’ hands in upcoming negotiations. The idea that the 
gap was narrowing, as we will see, was overrated. The problems of inter-Arab 
relations were still a complication, and although the old enemies were reconciling, 
Transjordan’s ally, Iraq, was becoming more of a nuisance.  
In Iraq the suspicion that Iraqi forces had become mere tools for King 
Abdullah’s expansionist policies had been long brewing. Combined with a volatile 
political situation in Iraq, it was difficult for the Iraqi Government to make 
concessions in Palestine that were bound to infuriate the Iraqi public.10 Acting 
Mediator Ralph Bunche commented that he “had never been able to come to an 
understanding with the Iraqis and […] doubted if anybody else would be able to do 
so.”11 Iraq was not only unwilling to reach an understanding, but seemed also to be 
somewhat out of touch with reality. For instance the Iraqi Government sent a message 
to Abul Huda in mid-December in which he was asked about “particulars of the 
permanent armistice which Transjordan had concluded with the Jews”.12 The issue of 
how the parties were going to handle the stubborn Iraqi position developed into one of 
the greatest sticking points in the armistice negotiations. It was assumed, from an 
early point, that Transjordan was responsible for the Iraqi forces. However, as we will 
see, Iraq refused to allow King Abdullah to negotiate on its behalf, just as the Iraqi 
forces refused to withdraw, and the Iraqi Government refused to negotiate.13    
While the differences in the approach to Palestine between Egypt and 
Transjordan seemed to get smaller, and the differences between Iraq and Transjordan 
grew, so too did the difference in opinion between the Transjordanian regent and 
premier. Abul Huda was clearly interested in an UN administered armistice whilst 
King Abdullah came to rely more and more on personal relationships.14 The premier, 
on occasion, even threatened to resign, but was always talked out of it.15 The rift 
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between regent and premier was not properly healed until February 1949, when the 
premier gave in under much pressure from the King.16 
 The regent’s preference of bilateral negotiations was also Israel’s, and 
attempts were made to get the Prime Minister on board. Elias Sasson made his way to 
Jerusalem. 11 December 1948 he contacted Abdullah al-Tel and informed him that he 
would like to meet Abul Huda. This was a meeting the Transjordanian premier was 
not ready for, and he insisted that the talks remained of a purely military nature.17 
After Sasson’s attempt failed, the same overture was made when, the next day, the 
military leaders of the two parties met in Jerusalem in a continuation of the truce 
talks.18 The Israeli negotiation team suggested that the talks be upgraded to that of a 
general armistice. Al-Tel found that this was outside his mandate. The Transjordanian 
team turned down the offer and insisted that from that point on the talks “must be held 
in secret and without press representation”.19 The official reason that was given for 
this need of secrecy was that they wanted to avoid slandering in the Israeli press for 
having refused to negotiate towards a solution, but it is equally likely that the demand 
for such a closure was to protect King Abdullah from the Arab audience.20 Over the 
next few days the pressure increased as both Dayan and Sasson met with al-Tel, 
making it clear that “unless Transjordan was prepared to talk business there was no 
purpose in continuing the contacts and that the Israeli Government would in fact insist 
on their ceasing.”21 Dayan also made a series of phone calls, on the direct line 
between al-Tel and himself that had been established in mid-November, pressing al-
Tel to answer as quickly as possible.22  
The British Foreign Office followed these developments closely. Britain had 
clear interests in the region and it was seen as vital that Transjordan came out of the 
war in as good a position as possible. The Foreign Office was getting worried at the 
pace and nature of the talks – deeming them too fast and too bilateral. The advice 
given to Transjordan was therefore that al-Tel should ask for a draft version of an 
armistice suggestion from Dayan. This drafting process would enable Transjordan to 
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gain valuable time while still preserving ties with Israel. Prime Minister Abul Huda 
agreed to this procedure.23  
From a British standpoint negotiations through the UN was still the desired 
way to go, but there was no harm in Transjordan engaging in confidence building 
measures and investigating where Israel stood.24 The president of Lebanon urged 
Britain to press this point on Transjordan as he felt that any personal negotiations, not 
led by the UN, would only bolster extremist elements in the region.25 This was also 
the argument put forth from the British High Commission in Cairo, where the 
understanding was that both Transjordan and Egypt would have a stronger hand in 
negotiations if they worked together, a cooperation that could only be made possible 
if talks took place under the UN.26 The goal was to bring Egypt and Transjordan 
together as one negotiating partner with Israel. The advantages of such an approach 
were twofold. On the one hand it would even out the balance of power vis-à-vis Israel. 
On the other hand Egypt and Transjordan would lend each other much needed moral 
legitimacy. The process of bringing the two countries together started in late 
December when it had become evident that Transjordan was willing to negotiate an 
armistice with Israel, and it was simultaneously understood that this lone effort posed 
a grave danger both to Transjordan and, by association, to Great Britain. The reason 
for this was obvious at the time: “Since unilateral action by Transjordan would be 
universally condemned by the others [Arab states] as treachery His Majesty’s 
Government [UK] would be tarred with the same brush.”27 The conclusion, drawn in 
the same telegram, was posed as a rhetorical question: “Would it not be better for us 
to do all we can to discourage unilateral action by Transjordan and work for joint 
peaceful action between Transjordan and Egypt.”28 Egypt, after all, still held a leading 
role in the Arab world and it would have been much harder for the other Arab 
countries to condemn Egypt and Transjordan than it would have been for the Arab 
world (including Egypt) to condemn Transjordan. The idea of a unified negotiating 
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team was therefore debated in various forms and the possibilities explored.29 In the 
end, however, nothing came of it as an understanding emerged that the armistice had 
to be made by all the Arab countries on an individual basis, but that once these were 
completed the Arabs could have a unified negotiation team at the Palestine 
Conciliation Commission.30 
King Abdullah supported the Foreign Office’s argument of using the UN as an 
apparatus to fend off Arab criticism, but he was unsure about the prospects of 
negotiating together with Egypt. He made some attempts at bringing the Arab states 
together, but when these failed he left it at that.31  
King Abdullah’s acceptance of the advice from the Foreign Office regarding 
UN negotiations is not to say that he agreed with the British viewpoint that such UN 
negotiations were the preferred route. Rather, as later developments would show, he 
understood the value of allowing official negotiations to be facilitated by the UN, 
while keeping the more substantial negotiations secret and bilateral.32 The official 
statements made by Transjordan were well in line with this understanding. When, in a 
press conference in Cairo 21 December, the Transjordanian spokesman was asked 
about the UN talks he confirmed these, but when asked about direct talks he simply 
brushed these off, stating that “no permanent truce had been arranged between them 
[Transjordan and Israel]” and that the only thing that had been discussed was “certain 
points of local interest”.33 As we know from the analysis of the talks in Jerusalem in 
November the real progress had been made when the UN was excluded, and further, 
many of the themes discussed went far beyond “certain points of local interest”.34 
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From a purely diplomatic viewpoint, ignoring the political context, the idea of 
a unified Arab negotiation team under UN scrutiny was highly rational. There was, 
however, a political context that rendered the British plan unattainable. From the Arab 
perspective the gap was too wide to bridge, despite certain overtures.35 Egypt and 
Transjordan were still nemeses in the Arab world despite the changes in Egypt. 
Reconciliation between the two would have demanded an amount of time that none of 
the actors had on their hands. From an Israeli perspective the attempt to bring Egypt 
and Transjordan together as a single negotiating partner would have been a non-
starter. The chosen Israeli method was to pick off one enemy at a time, be it through 
war or negotiations.36 It was clearly advantageous for Israel to face several weak 
opponents rather than one unified Arab alliance. Israel, therefore, skilfully used the 
inter-Arab discontent to its advantage.37 
 
Operation Horev: 22 December 1948 - 12 January 1949 
 
For Egypt the first three weeks of December 1948 could be described as a lull before 
the storm. The Egyptian forces had previously been expelled from the area 
surrounding Beersheba and forced out of most areas of Palestine. The remaining 
Egyptian forces were entrenched in the so-called “Faluja pocket” and Gaza, as well as 
a belt of the western Negev.38 Although the military threat posed by the Egyptian 
forces was minor, the Israeli Cabinet saw it as vital that Egypt was driven out.39 The 
“Faluja pocket” was an odd “island” of resistance inside the expanded Israeli borders. 
Furthermore, the Negev was seen as a vital asset for the Zionist project.40 The area 
had been allocated to the Jews in the 1947 Partition Plan, but had been “taken away” 
by the Bernadotte Plan. The Gaza strip was of minor importance for Israel, but the 
destruction of the Egyptian army was seen as necessary in order to force Egypt to the 
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negotiating table. Once Egypt, often seen as the Arab ringleader, had agreed to an 
armistice, the other Arab states would follow.41 
Ben-Gurion made this connection clear when he stated: “[W]e are going ahead 
with the operation in the Negev … and holding talks with Abdullah”.42 The complete 
destruction of the Egyptian forces had been the goal of the previous operation, Yoav, 
but the task had not been completed.43 Therefore, by 19 December, the Israeli Cabinet 
had made up its mind, and the decision to strike hard at the remaining Egyptian forces 
was taken. The attack, which was lead by Yigal Allon, was initiated on the night of 22 
December.  
In military terms the attack was an astounding success for the Israeli Defence 
Force. A diversion was first launched with an attack on Gaza, followed by a major 
fully mechanized attack in the Negev against which the Egyptian forces were 
inadequately prepared and defeat was inevitable. Followed by this initial success, in 
which the IDF had defeated all the Egyptian forces inside Palestine, except for those 
in the Gaza strip and the completely isolated “Faluja Pocket”, the Israeli army crossed 
the Egyptian border on 28 December in what was characterized as “an accident” by 
Israeli President Chaim Weizmann; a “hot pursuit” by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Moshe Shertok; and as a “maneuver” by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.44 Ben-Gurion 
claimed on 29 December that the forces had been ordered to withdraw. It was even 
claimed, 3 January, that all the troops that had entered Egyptian territory had 
withdrawn.45 All these claims by the Israeli leadership were blatant lies.46 A thorough 
analysis of the planning behind the operation leaves no doubt as to the pre-meditated 
nature of crossing the international borders.47 This Israeli military action made it 
clearer than ever that the balance of power was to Israel’s advantage. The ease with 
which Israel decimated the Egyptian army and invaded Egyptian territory was an eye-
opener. 
 Once the Egyptian border had been crossed a new set of rules immediately 
applied. The British Government was bound by its defence treaty of 1936 with Egypt 
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and the possibility of a military confrontation between Britain and Israel loomed as a 
possibility.48 Such a confrontation, however, was dependent on Egypt invoking the 
treaty. This was problematic as the Egyptian Government seemed unwilling to 
undertake “the shame of appealing to us [the British Government] for help under a 
Treaty which they vilified in public”.49 Despite this it was quite clear that the 
requisition for lifting the arms embargo was a screaming demand.50  
In what was a vocal outcry from both the US State Department and President 
Harry S. Truman, a clear cut message was conveyed to the Israeli Government:  
 
Reports indicate that this is not an accidental maneuver but a deliberately planned 
military operation. […] British Government has officially notified this [US] 
Government that it regards situation with grave concern that unless Israeli forces 
withdraw from Egyptian territory the British Government will be bound to take 
steps to fulfill their obligations under Treaty of 1936 with Egypt. […] ill advised 
action PGI [Provisional Government of Israel] may not only jeopardize peace of 
Middle East but would also cause reconsideration of its application for membership 
in UN and of necessity a reconsideration by this [US] Government of its relations 
with Israel. […] Immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory 
appears to be minimum requirements.51   
 
The unified stance here shown by the US and British Government was unusually 
clear, but cross-border incursions was obviously a red line. The UN Security Council 
passed a resolution 29 December demanding that Israel withdraw from Egypt and 
called for the initiation of armistice talks.52 According to the British Middle East 
Office the UN Resolution contained no sanctions that could “be expected to deter the 
Israeli authorities in their present mood and strength.”53 The effect such a lack of 
pressure had on Israeli behaviour was made evident when Israeli forces remained on 
Egyptian soil until after the ceasefire was declared 7 January 1949.54 By that time 
Egypt had, for fear of military annihilation and due to pressure from London, 
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complied with the agreement that the two countries would engage in armistice talks if 
Israel halted its attack.55 In a last British show of force, which will be more closely 
analyzed shortly, reinforcements landed in the Transjordanian port city of Aqaba to 
enforce the already existing British garrison there and bolster the defence of 
Transjordan.56  
 The regional actors could draw several lessons from Operation Horev. Firstly 
it was made clear exactly how far Israel could go – border crossing was a red line 
agreed upon by both the British and the US Government. Despite this fact, the 
incident also showed that neither the British nor the US were quick to react, and harsh 
rhetoric was not matched by actions. The arms embargo on Egypt was not lifted and 
the invading troops were never fired upon by the British troops who stood in Egypt. A 
second lesson was that the Arab armies no longer worked together at all. The Arab 
Legion had sat idly on the sideline and watched the spectacle. A third lesson was that 
the British Government had become almost impotent in its Middle East policies. For 
although Israel was clearly in the wrong and London was obliged to aid Egypt, 
London applied pressure on Egypt to enter into armistice negotiations in return for an 
Israeli halt in military actions.57 In other words, Israel, who was the aggressor, was 
aided in achieving one of the main goals of the offensive (armistice talks) by the very 
country (Great Britain) that had an obligation to protect Egypt. A fourth lesson was 
the inability of the UN to react in such instances.58 The US Government had 
threatened to cease supporting Israel in the UN, but there had been no lifting of the 
arms embargo and the Security Council Resolution did not impose sanctions on Israel, 
thus allowing the belligerent to hold its position for over a week after the resolution 
was passed.  
Operation Horev must have strengthened King Abdullah’s understanding of 
the political situation and that going it alone was the only feasibility. He already 
perceived the UN as a hopelessly slow apparatus. The organization’s inefficiency in 
halting Israel during Operation Horev must have made him even more convinced of 
                                               
55
 FO 7 Jan. 1949, FO371/75380, Cairo to FO, Cypher No. 32; Morris 2001, pp. 246-247. 
56
 Morris 2001, pp. 247-248, 459; FO 3 Jan. 1949, FO371/75293, Ministry of Defence to G.H.Q, 
M.E.L.F., COS(ME) 309. 
57
 Morris 2003, p. 196. 
58
 Iraq’s reaction is illustrative. The Iraqi Premier told the representatives of the Acting Mediator that: 
“Egypt’s acceptance of the armistice had not prevented the Jews from launching their latest attacks. 
When the Security Council was in a position to prevent Jewish aggression he would be willing to listen 
to the Mediator’s staff.” FO 30 Dec. 1948, FO371/68644, Bagdad to FO, Cypher No. 1210.  
 62
the need to by-pass the UN.59 That the British Government was unable to provide real 
assistance even as Egypt’s borders were breached, must have frightened the regent 
into realizing that outside help was not going to materialize and that he had to depend 
on keeping a good diplomatic relationship with Israel.60 
Britain Shows Muscle: Defensive Troops to Aqaba 
 
The British Government knew there that one more failed standoff would lead to a 
complete loss of political credibility in the region. If the defensive treaties with 
Britain could not be trusted, then was it worth being allies? This question was on most 
lips in the Arab World. It was also a question the British Foreign Office feared.61 
True, Egypt never invoked the defensive treaty, but they had asked for arms, and the 
British Government had been unable to comply.62 Transjordan, however, was 
admittedly much more willing to ask for direct aid by British troops.63  
The British Minister in Amman, Alec Kirkbride, observed this development 
close hand, and was clear in his perturbed warning to the British Foreign Office:  
 
Every delay so far has ended in advantage to the Jews. They were ready to negotiate 
before the first Egyptian defeat and again after it but now they are in a position to 
dictate. […] the Arab Legion should be replenished immediately […] King 
Abdullah should be allowed to make the best terms he can with the Jews without 
further restrictions on our part.64 
 
The assessment by a British representative in Beirut was even starker:  
 
I share […] doubts as to whether the supply of arms which is so essential, may any 
longer be enough. In their present arrogant mood it […] looks as if nothing will 
hold the Jews except British intervention for the enforcement of the Security 
Council resolution of November 4th and for assistance to Transjordan and the Iraqi 
forces if attacked in the areas allocated to the Arabs.65  
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The Foreign Office did not agree with what in their view was a drastic conclusion.66 
The furthest the Foreign Office was willing to go was to move arms and ammunition 
to the British bases in Transjordan, and to prepare for a movement of troops to Aqaba. 
The ammunition could only be released to the Arab Legion if the international border 
was crossed by Israeli forces and the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty was invoked.67 
This did not even approach what Kirkbride had asked for. The immediate threat, as 
everyone knew, was on the West Bank and in Jerusalem, and not in Transjordan 
proper. The fact that the Foreign Office made a point of the willingness to uphold its 
treaty with Transjordan was a clear symptom of the faltering British might. 
2 January 1949 Transjordan invoked the Anglo-Transjordan treaty in a call for 
aid.68 No particular reason was given for invoking it at the exact moment, but it had 
been expected as Transjordan felt increasingly threatened by the Israeli strength and 
its isolated position in the Arab world. The British decision to heed the call was made 
immediately, and the order to move troops to Aqaba was given as early as the 
following day.69 The troops were to have a purely defensive purpose and were on no 
accounts to cross the international border unless this “became tactically necessary in 
the event of a Jewish attack.”70 The troop movement was to be a secret and was not to 
be publicly announced until after the troops were in place.71 The United States was 
not to be informed of the troop movements until just prior to official statements. The 
official reason for this secrecy was that one feared a leak, but leak is exactly what the 
information did and the US Government discovered the secret almost immediately.72 
The troops arrived 8 January and this was announced publicly at midnight the same 
day.73 The British Foreign Office knew that this movement of troops was going to be 
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a contentious issue and sent out a pre-emptive telegram to all relevant embassies in 
which all arguments defending the British action was put forth. The telegram was also 
a staunch attack on Israel, firing back rhetorically claiming that “[s]ince October the 
Jews have launched three military operations in violation of the truce […] They have 
so far failed to comply with Security Council Resolutions of November 4th and 
December 29 which have been accepted by the Arabs.”74 The telegram was issued not 
a day too soon, as complaints were posted both to Ralph Bunche and the President of 
the Security Council the very same day.75 The arguments in the complaint shed light 
on the Israeli understanding of the conflict at the time: “[T]he presence of British 
troops at Aqaba can have no purpose but to threaten Israel’s territory in the southern 
part of the Negev.”76 The Israeli claim over the Negev was a clear example of the 
Israeli method of changing argument to their advantage according to what the 
situation demanded. Israel did not control the southernmost section of the Negev (an 
area patrolled by the Arab Legion), but claimed it by reference to the UN Partition 
Plan. However, when the negotiations concerned the areas not included in the Jewish 
state in the same Partition Plan, Israel posted the argument that negotiations had to be 
based only on standing force and not on any of the UN plans.77 Israel played this 
game of contradictory arguments well.  
The Israeli complaints concerning the movement of British troops to Aqaba 
initially had the intended affect, and the issue was supposed to be discussed in a 
Security Council meeting 13 January. The meeting, however, was cancelled.78  
Egypt to Rhodes 
 
12 January 1949 the Egyptian and Israeli delegates started meeting at Rhodes under 
the scrutiny of Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche. The Israeli tactic of forcing the Arab 
ringleader to the negotiating table had worked.79 
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The classical understanding of the relevance of removing Egypt from the fold 
is that this broke the ice and opened up for armistice negotiations between Israel and 
the remaining Arab states. Such a reading of events concludes that it was of a clear 
advantage to Transjordan that Egypt was defeated because it allowed Transjordan to 
negotiate with Israel without being the first Arab state to give in – thus neutralizing 
Arab criticism which had to target Egypt instead.80  
This common understanding must be reviewed, as the removal of Egypt from 
the fold was clearly a double edged sword. It is true that once the ice was broken, as 
Egypt agreed to go to the negotiating table with Israel, Transjordan was given the 
“moral high ground” over Egypt, and was thus free to engage in talks with Israel.81 
However, in that same sweep, Transjordan was left more isolated than ever, and the 
possibility of a total Israeli takeover of Palestine was a looming possibility. Once 
Egypt had given in, King Abdullah was less politically threatened by the other Arab 
states. However, he became more prone to Israeli aggression. In other words the cost 
of gaining an increased inter-Arab manoeuvrability was that the power balance 
between Israel and Transjordan was radically upset in Israel’s favour. As the Foreign 
Office saw it: “Jews have now agreed to negotiations with Egypt for an armistice; and 
we have every reason to fear that, if and when this is achieved, they will attack 
Jerusalem or Transjordan or both”.82 
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5. The Road to the King’s Palace  
January – March 1949 
 
In early January, while Israel was dealing the deathblow to the Egyptian forces in 
Palestine through Operation Horev, the diplomatic contact between Israel and 
Transjordan increased. This was a continuation of a process that had been going on 
since November 1948, and the Israelis had gradually becoming more demanding. 
King Abdullah had been somewhat indisposed to the Israeli approach which was far 
more ambitious than his step by step approach to the talks. By January 1949 Israel 
was more intent on such full scale talks, and King Abdullah saw no other way out. 
The tension between Transjordan’s King and Prime Minister continued to grow over 
the nature of these negotiations. As a result, King Abdullah increasingly sidelined 
Abul Huda, keeping him uninformed of the latest diplomatic developments. In a 
manoeuvre of personalizing the negotiations the regent completely closed down the 
Paris-channel which had existed since early August 1948, and moved everything to 
Jerusalem where two of his most trusted men, Abdullah al-Tel and Dr. Showkat es 
Sati, were set to lead the talks.1 Abdullah al-Tel was already playing a major role in 
the Jerusalem talks, but the King’s personal physician, Dr. es-Sati, was a new 
inclusion in the negotiations. 
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Stalling: Waiting for the PCC 
 
The most significant development since the onset of Operation Horev was a 
strengthened Israeli self-confidence. The Israeli team of diplomats (Elias Sasson and 
Moshe Dayan were the most prominent) threatened King Abdullah and refused to talk 
with Transjordan’s representatives if UN observers were present.2 Through al-Tel, the 
King was given an unequivocal message from the Israelis: “Transjordan’s game was 
to gain time but they [Israel] were not prepared to play any longer. Transjordan would 
have to realize that it was not on the winning side in this particular war and must now 
choose between peace or war.”3 Israel also practically demanded of Transjordan that 
Britain be kept uninvolved and uninformed of the talks.4 Israel clearly felt that Britain 
stood in the way of an armistice with Transjordan. This was both because Britain had 
political influence in Transjordan, and because Britain could, in theory, give 
Transjordan military aid which would have made Transjordan less willing to give in 
to Israeli pressure.5 Transjordan, however, had no intention of keeping Britain 
uniformed. The fact that Israel could put forth such a demand was in itself indicative 
of how the special relationship between Israel and Transjordan had developed into 
personal relationship at gunpoint. Gone was the amicable atmosphere that had existed 
between Israel and Transjordan in November 1948.6 
The Foreign Office recommended that King Abdullah attempt to stall the 
negotiations. This approach had two goals. The first was to make sure that no 
negotiations were concluded before the PCC arrived, and the second was to find out 
what the Israeli negotiation positions were. It was thought that it would be difficult for 
Israel to make demands towards Transjordan if the PCC was present. For the British 
Foreign Office it was therefore seen as pertinent to simultaneously work for a speedy 
arrival of the PCC.7 The PCC’s arrival, however, could not be hastened. On the 
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contrary, it was continuously delayed.8 Meanwhile, the UN observers, who were 
present in Palestine under the authority of Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche, were 
quickly loosing their significance as they were barred from the areas of combat in the 
Negev.9 The combined delay of the PCC and the waning of UN influence on the 
ground ensured that the British tactics of stalling the talks became pointless. Slow 
winded talks could only succeed in finding out what the Israeli intentions were.  
Ironically Ben-Gurion also sought to delay the talks as he presumed that the 
Israeli elections would give him a majority government, and hence greater political 
manoeuvrability. Ben-Gurion’s analysis of the balance of power was much in tune 
with that of the British Minister in Amman, Alec Kirkbride, who strongly advised 
against the Foreign Office’s tactics of stalling. Ben-Gurion knew, as did Kirkbride, 
that time was on Israel’s side and that Israel’s military power increased at a much 
faster rate than did Transjordan’s.10  
Al-Tel’s meeting with and Shiloah 1 January 1949 gives several interesting 
insights into the negotiation’s developments.11 The Israeli representatives clearly set 
the agenda, stating that the armistice talks should not be based on either the Partition 
Plan or the Bernadotte Plan, but rather on the existing military position: “Their 
attitude […] was that they intended to keep what they had conquered.”12 This was a 
radical stance as the Israeli forces had occupied large areas that went far beyond the 
territory given to Israel by any of the UN plans. The Israeli delegates also made it 
clear that negotiations with Transjordan could only deal with the areas held by the 
Arab Legion, which at that point were the central and southern section of the West 
Bank as well as the southern corner of the Negev. The areas held by the Iraqi army in 
the northern West Bank were thus not to be under discussion.13 Furthermore a list of 
specific requirements/points on which the negotiations were to be based was 
exchanged. Al-Tel handed over three demands to the Israeli delegates, while the 
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Israeli delegates handed over no less than eleven points to al-Tel. From the Israeli side 
the most important of these were: Solution for Jerusalem (division); discussion of 
position at Latrun; exchange of prisoners of war; discussion of future political and 
economic relations; removal of Egyptian troops from the Bethlehem area; and 
extension of ceasefire lines.14 From the Transjordanian side the demands were: 
Inclusion of Lydda and Ramleh to the Arab area; return of Jaffa with corridor to 
Ramleh; and a discussion of Galilee and its future.15 This list of first draft demands is 
important to keep in mind when evaluating the relative success of the armistice talks 
for each side. The issue of Jerusalem was one matter on which the two parties seemed 
to agree, albeit on a purely pragmatic basis. After all both parties realized that the cost 
of attempting to capture the whole city would be insurmountable. Since both 
Transjordan and Israel agreed on partition, in principle if not in detail, the UN was 
perceived by both as the wrong medium through which to negotiate over the future of 
the city.16 The UN still supported internationalization of Jerusalem, as did the PCC 
and the US Government.17  
A further argument for avoiding UN mediation was what appeared to be an 
inter-UN power struggle of sorts. The UN mediation apparatus for Palestine was 
divided between Ralph Bunche and his negotiation team and the PCC. These two 
sectors of the apparatus seemed unable to agree on each others mandate and at times 
they perceived each other to be diplomatic opponents infringing on the other’s turf.18 
This kind of squabble probably increased both Israel’s and Transjordan’s distaste for 
the UN, especially in terms of the perception of the UN as an inefficient organization. 
Despite disliking the UN, however, King Abdullah realized that it was a useful tool in 
order to increase his own political manoeuvrability in the Arab world. Talks under the 
PCC or with the Acting Mediator functioned as de facto public statements of defeat 
by the Arab leaders, and hence an acceptance of the need for negotiations. As we have 
seen, the Arab states were militarily defeated and practically forced to the negotiation 
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table. Once they had made that move, and hence the implied statement of defeat, King 
Abdullah’s negotiations with Israel became much more politically legitimate.19     
5 January 1949 a new meeting was held in Jerusalem between Israel and 
Transjordan.20 In this meeting the Israeli delegates seemed to have a slightly more 
pragmatic approach towards Jerusalem and discussed the building of a joint Israeli-
Transjordanian port on the Red Sea.21 The main lines, based on the exchange of the 
lists of demands from 1 January, however, remained the same. The negotiations were 
to be based on the military situation on the ground, and not on any of the UN 
Resolutions. Furthermore, the Israeli delegates made it absolutely clear that Israel 
needed a Red Sea port.22 The Israeli team was given instructions by Ben-Gurion on 
how to treat the Transjordanian requirement issued at the previous meeting: No to the 
return of Ramleh and Jaffa; leave the issue of Lydda open; and avoid discussions on 
the Negev.23 Despite these instructions the main issue discussed at the meeting was 
the Negev, due to King Abdullah’s insistence. He had expressed that the Negev was 
an important area for several reasons. It was stated that the Negev was important 
because a line of communication was needed to Gaza and that the Negev bore a large 
Bedouin population. It was also clear that King Abdullah was both receiving support 
and pressure from the British Foreign Office on this point as they viewed the strip of 
land in the southern Negev as the most vital strategic asset in the Middle East. The 
refugee issue was once again brought up, but remained unsolved. Jerusalem was also 
discussed in great detail and suggestions for a practical division were laid forth.24   
The point concerning the Red Sea port must have been highly alarming for al-
Tel, since at that point in time the southernmost area of the Negev was patrolled by 
the Arab Legion. If the UN Partition Plan, in which the Negev was given to Israel, 
was not to be the basis for negotiations, but rather the presence of armed forces, then 
technically the southern tip of the Negev would befall Transjordan. The Israeli 
demand for a Red Sea port could therefore be interpreted as a threat towards the 
Transjordanian troops stationed in the southern Negev. Although the Israeli army had 
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been stopped in Egypt, their position in the Negev was somewhat unclear.25 There 
were also clear indications that President Truman was not willing to make the Negev 
an issue of contention between Israel and the US.26 This unwillingness came despite 
the fact that Truman had originally supported the inclusion of the Negev to 
Transjordan.27 This was an area of discord between Great Britain and the US, as Arab 
control over the southern tip of the Negev was one of the greatest British interest in 
the conflict.28 
The US Government was afraid of pressuring Israel for fear of pushing the 
country into the Soviet camp. This view was put forth to British representatives 
asking that British pressure on Israel was minimized. Such a view caused great anger 
in the Middle East Office in Cairo where the British representative argued “that it is 
futile to believe that we shall turn Israeli into a peace-loving Western-looking nation 
by paying Danegeld at Arab expense.”29 The British Government attempted to use a 
similar argument against the US by claiming that unless they could fulfil their treaty 
obligations with the threatened Arab states, these might easily succumb to internal 
turmoil and drift towards Soviet sympathies.30 The difference between the British and 
the US Government became evident. The US Government was theoretically able to 
apply pressure on Israel, but was not willing.31 The British Government, on the other 
hand, was willing to apply pressure, but unable to do so: “There seems to be only two 
ways in which we could help to weigh the scales more evenly. One is a warning that 
further Jewish aggression in Palestine would be resisted by our forces. This seems to 
be ruled out. Second is by releasing some arms to the Arabs.”32 The last option was 
ruled out time and again.33     
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Development of Talks 
 
After the meeting 5 January 1949 King Abdullah had asked that the next meeting 
between Transjordan and Israel should be held two weeks later. He explained that he 
needed to think the suggestions over. Transjordan took advantage of this respite to 
bring both the British and US Government up-to-date on the ongoing talks. King 
Abdullah obviously hoped that this could strengthen his hand.34 From the Israeli 
delegates’ standpoint the 5 January talks had led them to believe that these talks with 
Transjordanian representatives were pointless and they asked Ben-Gurion for 
permission to cut the ties. According to Dayan, Ben-Gurion disagreed, saying that 
“we must probe all possibilities for peace”.35 One should naturally be critical towards 
using Moshe Dayan as a source here as he would want to portray Ben-Gurion in a 
positive light. The differences between the two, however, serves to illustrate that it 
was not given that Israel should pursue talks with Transjordan.  
The next meeting was held 14 January between Abdullah al-Tal and Moshe 
Dayan, in which military issues, such as a Prisoner of War (POW) exchange, were 
discussed. The POW issue was rather particular in this case as Transjordan held 
several Israeli POWs, whilst Israel held none from Transjordan. The prisoner swap 
was therefore one which included a release of Egyptian POWs held by Israel. This 
prisoner exchange deal can be interpreted in several ways. Firstly, it could be seen as 
a snub against Egypt for its miserable war effort. Secondly, such a deal would 
increase the inter-Arab manoeuvrability of Transjordan by tying its gains to those of 
Egypt. Thirdly, this prisoner exchange would have increased the “moral high ground” 
Transjordan held over Egypt. The final details of the POW exchange were slightly 
postponed.  
16 January 1949 a meeting was held at King Abdullah’s palace at Shuneh. The 
meeting was attended by King Abdullah, Dr. Showkat es-Sati, Abdullah al-Tel, Elias 
Sasson and Moshe Dayan.36 Sasson and Dayan had evidently crossed the border 
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dressed as UN observers.37 The atmosphere of the meeting was soured even before the 
delegates had congregated. Moshe Dayan presented harsh demands to al-Tel in the car 
on the way to Shuneh, asking for the whole Negev. Al-Tel rejected this and suggested 
instead that Israel and Transjordan could “share” the port at Aqaba. The atmosphere 
did not improve upon arrival at the palace. King Abdullah expressed indignation at 
the fact that the pre-war arrangement was treated as nullified by the Israelis. He made 
a point of this when greeting Sasson: “Thus, my brother? By God I was never 
accustomed to such rough behaviour on your part.”38 After this unfriendly opening 
some points were discussed that were intended to drive the process forward. King 
Abdullah begged that Israel stay away from Aqaba in order for the Anglo-Israeli 
tension to quiet down. Furthermore, King Abdullah promised that he would have 
prepared a peace plan within two weeks, and he asked that Israel completely drive 
Egypt from Palestine. To this last request Israel responded that Egypt would probably 
get Gaza upon the signing of the armistice.39 It was as a response to this that King 
Abdullah made his infamous statement concerning Gaza: “[T]ake it yourselves, give it 
to the devil, but don’t let Egypt have it!”40 The only real development was on the 
POW issue. This was practically finalized, in the sense that it was agreed that it was 
simply a technical matter that could be solved between al-Tel and Dayan.41   
 Despite the fact that it was agreed that the POW issue was purely a technical 
matter it was solved, but not finalized during the next meeting between the two 
military leaders 19 January. The issue was then delayed further by King Abdullah, 
who had intervened at the last moment and insisted that the released POWs should 
first be handed over to Transjordan, and then handed over from Transjordan to Egypt. 
This merely delayed the POW issue and did not stall the rest of the talks, but it was 
symptomatic of the diplomatic relationship between the two states.42 This last minute 
action by King Abdullah corresponds well with the explanation that this particular 
prisoner exchange had political purposes relating more to the inter-Arab strife than it 
related to Israeli-Transjordanian relations. 
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 The next major meeting between the parties was held at Shuneh 30 January 
1949. The delegates discussed the big sticking points. As usual Israel brought up the 
problem of how the parties were to handle the Iraqi forces stationed on the northern 
West Bank, to which King Abdullah responded that he was working on the problem 
and that he would discuss it with the Iraqi regent. Relating to the Negev, Israel 
demanded freedom of movement as far south as the Red Sea, claiming that this was 
Israeli territory. The future of Gaza was brought up by King Abdullah who considered 
it vital that Gaza should not befall Egypt. He argued that Transjordan needed a port on 
the Mediterranean, and further that an Egyptian held Gaza strip would allow for the 
re-emergence of the All Palestine Government and the Mufti. King Abdullah 
therefore wanted an assurance from Israel that Gaza would not befall Egypt.43  
Transjordan lost ground on all these major issues in the ensuing phases of 
negotiations. The one demand where King Abdullah won out was his desire for direct 
and personal negotiations rather than talks hosted by the UN at Rhodes. The Israeli 
reasons for agreeing to such an approach were obvious enough. Israel’s military gains 
had been far greater than what had been stipulated in any of the UN Resolutions, 
Partition Plans and Bernadotte proposals. Negotiations based on any of these would 
therefore imply large Israeli concessions. King Abdullah, however, was clearly far too 
optimistic as to what such personal talks could obtain. His distrust of the UN 
combined with his trust in negotiations based on personal relations had to a certain 
extent made him blind towards the harsh realities on the ground. As he saw it Dayan 
and al-Tel should finalize an agreement that they should then merely present and sign 
at Rhodes.44 He originally stated that such formal talks would only be a “public 
confirmation of agreement.”45 This public confirmation would be legitimized by the 
UN and King Abdullah would be cleared of Arab criticism. What Transjordan faced 
in the final phases of the armistice talks, however, dramatically disproved his 
optimism.  
The Iraq Problem: Neither Negotiation, nor Withdrawal 
 
The Iraqi forces occupied the northern West Bank, which was an area that 
Transjordan was planning to annex after the war. From an Israeli perspective these 
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Iraqi forces remained the greatest logjam hindering Transjordan from engaging in 
fruitful armistice talks.46 By mid-January 1949 the Iraqi position had increasingly 
become a problem for King Abdullah. The Iraqi Government refused to recognize that 
as a warring party it also had to be a negotiating partner. The Iraqi premier stated 
unequivocally:  
 
It was for countries whose frontiers marched with Palestine namely Egypt, 
Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon to agree to the terms of a settlement in the first 
instance. Iraq would not object to any settlement approved by these four, but it was 
not for Iraq to enter into negotiations now.47  
 
This was obviously a problem for King Abdullah because this meant that Transjordan 
would have to negotiate on behalf of Iraq in order to legitimize the occupation of the 
northern West Bank. If King Abdullah was to negotiate on Iraq’s behalf, however, he 
was dependent on a right of attorney from Iraq. This was easier said than done. 
 The reasons for the Iraqi obstinacy can only be found if one investigates the 
complexities of the political situation in Iraq. Iraq had long been in political turmoil 
and the political leadership was pressed from several sides. Prior to the war in 
Palestine the leadership in Baghdad had been faced with a strong pan-Arab opposition 
and massive anti-British popular protests. Further there was a growing suspicion 
towards King Abdullah because he was the senior Hashemite. His younger cousin, 
Abd al-Ilah, sat on the throne in Baghdad and Hashemite family affairs were not 
always dominated by trust.  
These sentiments had been brewing for some time, but the war in Palestine 
had created a respite. The Iraqi leadership therefore invested large amounts of 
political capital in the war effort, contributing with the largest single Arab contingent. 
The propaganda that was fed to the Iraqi masses was one of military victories. As we 
know the realities on the ground were radically different. When the ceasefires had 
been signed in June and July 1948, therefore, many Iraqi’s were shocked and angered. 
The defeats in Palestine had brought down the Iraqi Government in January 1949, and 
there was an increasing suspicion that the Iraqi army was being used as a tool for 
King Abdullah so that he could enlarge his territory by annexing Palestine.48 These 
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things considered, it is no wonder that the Iraqi leadership hesitated to withdraw from 
Palestine.  
 The Iraqi Premier, Nuri al-Sa’id laid forth certain conditions which were to be 
pre-conditions for Arab negotiations with Israel. If these were met the Arab states 
could participate in talks under the PCC. The demands of the Iraqi Premier illustrated 
how removed the Iraqi leadership was from the political and military reality at the 
time. The demands contained four points: A unified Jerusalem under Arab control; 
Total disarmament of the Jews, except for a police force for internal security and a 
UN force to guarantee Israel’s borders; The return of all Palestinian refugees; and 
Haifa had to be placed under international control. This last point was made because 
one of the major Iraqi oil pipelines terminated in Haifa, and the Iraqi regime had no 
intention of allowing Israel to handle this transaction. In addition to the four demands 
the Iraqi Premier also stated that the PCC first should negotiate with Israel, and then, 
if all the Arab conditions were met, the PCC “should get in touch with the Arabs.”49 It 
was seen as extremely improbable that these four points could be accepted by the UN, 
and, in the unlikelihood of this occurring, Israel would never allow them to be 
implemented.50 These four points worried King Abdullah. It was clear that Iraq did 
not understand the gravity of the situation: “[T]hey were conditions which might be 
imposed by victors but did not fit in with existing conditions.”51  
 In early February 1949 King Abdullah looked to be making some headway 
with the Iraqis. In the first week of February 1949, King Abdullah visited Iraq and 
claimed to have obtained support from both the regent and Prime Minister. The 
agreement was one in which Iraq gave him permission to install a civil administration 
in the Iraqi controlled areas on the West Bank, and that he then be allowed to 
negotiate with Israel as if that area was under Legion control.52 By mid-February, 
however, it became clear that Iraq had never given any such authority.53  
Confusion also circulated concerning the chronological order of things. Were 
the Iraqi forces going to evacuate before, after or during the negotiations? The British 
analysis was that a premature Iraqi withdrawal would be extremely dangerous for 
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King Abdullah as this would leave him completely isolated.54 The Arab Legion had 
no capacity to fill the power vacuum that would be left after an Iraqi withdrawal. Such 
a move would therefore have left King Abdullah at the mercy of Israel.55 
 Iraq greatly feared an Israeli attack against their forces in Palestine and sought 
assurance against this.56 The British Foreign Office found itself unable to give any 
such guarantees.57 The Foreign Office realized that the only efficient way of doing so 
would have been US pressure. Such pressure, however, was not forthcoming and the 
Foreign Office was unwilling to keep nagging on the US, as this would most probably 
have been counterproductive.58  
With Iraq Undecided 
 
As the Iraq issue kept fluctuating the Israeli-Transjordanian talks continued along its 
bumpy road. Differences in procedure and opinion kept surfacing. In relation to 
Jerusalem, for instance, the Israeli stance was that the delineation of the city was an 
issue in itself, separate from the rest of the negotiation issues. The Transjordanian 
stance was that the issue of Jerusalem had to be linked with the rest of the issues on 
the table.59 This difference in approach was, rather ironically, a reversal of the 
difference in stance taken in early December 1948 when Transjordan had wanted to 
discuss singular issues, whilst Israel wanted a full comprehensive package. The 
reasons for this reversal is unclear. 
 By the second week of February 1949 Transjordanian Prime Minister Abul 
Huda was finally rallied in support of the negotiations.60 This happened after the King 
had exerted a great deal of pressure on his Premier.61 This inclusion was vital for the 
King because it gave him greater national legitimacy and it allowed him to counter the 
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Israeli claim that the negotiations with Transjordan were not governmental.62 In 
practice, however, not much changed in terms of how Transjordan operated in the 
negotiations: King Abdullah wrote the negotiation drafts and al-Tel presented them to 
Dayan.63  
 One such draft was handed to Dayan 14 February 1949, two weeks after the 
previous serious meeting. The main points in this draft were: Ceasefire lines with 
return of Lydda and Ramleh to Arabs; Divided Jerusalem; and Eilat and Haifa to be 
international ports with dual access.64 The Transjordanian armistice plan had, on the 
issues of Lydda, Ramleh and Jerusalem, not been altered since the proposition in early 
January. On the other issues it was clear that the developments on the ground had 
rendered some of the earlier claims impossible. The return of Jaffa had become 
completely unrealistic, and Eilat was clearly in danger of being taken over by the IDF. 
Hence the original claim for Jaffa was transformed into a proposal for shared control 
over both Haifa and Eilat. This would, if such a solution was agreed upon, have given 
Israel access to the Red Sea and Transjordan access to the Mediterranean. As the later 
negotiations were to show, Israel got both Haifa and Eilat and Transjordan got neither. 
 Dayan replied to this draft by making two demands that had to be followed 
were negotiations to continue: “a. an exact notation of the front line in the southern 
Negev. b. power-of-attorney from the government of Iraq to speak in its name.”65 
These two demands posed major problems for King Abdullah. As far as the Negev 
went, the situation was rather unclear and it would have been hard to draw exact lines. 
Of greater concern, however, was the Israeli demand that Transjordan obtain power-
of-attorney from Iraq. King Abdullah had been trying to obtain such a green light 
from Iraq since January, but had been unable to do so. In fact he was unable to obtain 
permission to negotiate on behalf of Iraq until as late as 20 March.66 
Egyptian Armistice 
 
24 February 1949 Egypt signed its armistice with Israel after a month and a half of 
negotiations at Rhodes, under the scrutiny of UN Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche. The 
length of time it had taken to conclude these negotiations had surprised Bunche. His 
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initial estimate was that the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation would be finished “within a 
matter of days.”67 The talks had sapped Bunche’s energy. His initial optimism was 
therefore lacking when he went into the Israeli-Transjordanian talks. 
Since Egypt had become the first Arab country to sign an armistice with Israel, 
Transjordan had finally obtained the moral high ground over Egypt, but the cost had 
been high.68 Egypt had obtained Gaza, and hence the Transjordanian dream of getting 
an outlet to the Mediterranean was all but dead.69 Further, the Arab Legion had 
become militarily isolated in Palestine. The Iraqi forces retained control over the 
northern West Bank, but these forces did not have the strength needed to offer any 
resistance if Israel launched an attack. The Israeli army could easily isolate 
Transjordan completely. 
Another consequence for Transjordan was an increase in the influx of 
Palestinian refugees. In early March the Palestinians in the “Faluja pocket”, which 
with the signing of the armistice had been evacuated of Egyptian forces, were 
expelled and sent to areas controlled by Transjordan.70 
Slow Show at Rhodes 
 
When Transjordan was invited to take part in armistice talks at Rhodes, King 
Abdullah made it clear that he only accepted this invitation because all the other Arab 
states had accepted theirs, but that he personally preferred direct bilateral 
negotiations.71 28 February 1949 Transjordan sent its delegation to Rhodes after a 
failed attempt by King Abdullah to host a preparatory meeting between the two 
delegations at his palace at Shuneh. The Transjordanian delegation at Rhodes was led 
by Colonel al-Jundi and composed of four Arab Legion officers, as well as a secretary 
and two representatives from the Transjordanian Foreign Office.72 The Israeli 
delegation, led by Reuven Shiloah, and with Moshe Dayan as his deputy, arrived the 
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next day.73 It was clear that the two countries viewed the Rhodes negotiations 
differently. Israel sent senior diplomats who had taken part in both prior negotiations 
with Transjordan, and the armistice negotiations with Egypt.74 Transjordan, on the 
other hand, sent representatives who had no prior experience in negotiating with the 
Israelis. 
 The Rhodes talks started off in an almost farcical manner. Ralph Bunche 
described the Transjordanian delegation as “unimpressive, timid, and not very bright 
[…] obviously on a string with rigid written instructions.”75 Elias Sasson was also 
dismayed at the lack of seniority amongst the Transjordanian delegation at Rhodes. 
Prime Minister Abul Huda replied that it was unheard of that one party nominate the 
delegation of the other.76 It is, however, unclear why King Abdullah sent a negotiation 
team of such junior rank to Rhodes. That he preferred personal negotiations and that 
he sought to move the talks away from Rhodes is obvious enough, but this does not 
adequately explain his choice of envoys. By sending high level expertise to Rhodes, 
Israel was thus much better at presenting its case than was Transjordan.77 
The combined lack of seniority and political manoeuvrability given to the 
Transjordanian delegation delayed the negotiations continuously. Every move had to 
be confirmed with Amman.78 When Bunche finally managed to call a joint meeting 4 
March the delegations entered the room, but the Transjordanian delegates refused to 
shake hands with the Israeli delegates. The atmosphere became tense and Bunche, as 
well as the Israeli delegates, was enraged by this misbehaviour. Bunche called the 
leaders of each of the delegations to his room later the same evening and it turned out 
that the whole thing was based on a misunderstanding.79 Despite this clarification the 
“handshake incident” gave the Rhodes negotiations an almost childish tint, illustrating 
Ralph Bunche’s aforementioned remark concerning the Transjordanian delegation.  
Adding trouble to the debacle over the authority of the delegations was the fact 
that King Abdullah still hadn’t obtained the right to negotiate on behalf of the Iraqi 
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forces. 3 March 1949 Transjordanian representatives told Ralph Bunche that “they are 
representing Iraq also.”80 Bunche then wired the Iraqi regent in an attempt to confirm 
this, but the Iraqi regent remained silent.81 In a meeting on Rhodes, four days later, the 
issue was still not clarified.82 As with all previous instances where Iraq allegedly had 
given Transjordan the right to negotiate on its behalf, King Abdullah had moved 
ahead of things. In early March there were no actual indications from Iraq that an 
agreement had been reached. The Iraqi Premier toyed with different options, however, 
none of these included allowing Transjordan to negotiate a dual armistice.83 
 The negotiations at Rhodes proved to be a slow affair. The Acting Mediator 
expressed that “conclusion of an armistice necessitated discussion of three points: (a) 
The definition of armistice zones. (b) Withdrawal of both armies and, (c) Reduction of 
forces.”84 According to a British source the Israelis refused to discuss any of the three 
points. Transjordan was not much more yielding. Transjordan was principally willing 
to reduce forces, but believed that “both sides should stand fast in their present 
positions.”85  
Ralph Bunche only managed to get the parties to agree on starting armistice 
talks based on the existing lines 7 March, a full week after the two delegations had 
arrived.86 Then after agreeing to hold such a joint meeting, it was not held until the 
evening 9 March. According to Bunche the meeting went better than expected, and the 
Transjordanian delegation leader expressed willingness to sign a ceasefire for all 
fronts the next day.87 10 March, however, was marred by an Israeli military move 
towards Aqaba, known as Operation Uvda (Fait Accompli), whereby the Israeli forces 
occupied the remaining section of the Negev, and hence changed the premises for the 
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negotiations. This operation was a clear breach of the truce. Despite this, the two sides 
managed to sign a ceasefire covering the Transjordanian lines 11 March, but not 
including the Iraqi lines of the northern West Bank. The Transjordanian tried to insist 
that the ceasefire had to cover that area as well, but the Israelis refused. Ralph Bunche 
managed to formulate a practical solution, Bunche’s trademark, on which both parties 
could agree. The ceasefire, according to Bunche’s suggestion, only applied to the 
Transjordanian front. Once Iraq had withdrawn, however, he “would call upon both 
parties to extend the agreement to any new Arab front occupied by Arab Legion”.88 
 Next on the agenda were the Jerusalem lines, which was another slow process. 
This stood as quite a contrast to the surprising ease with which Moshe Dayan and 
Abdullah al-Tel had negotiated the Jerusalem truce in late November the previous 
year. The UN had then been excluded and the two negotiators had solved the issue 
with relative ease and a friendly tone.89 At Rhodes, however, the parties seemed 
completely unable to move forward and both delegations asked Bunche to draw a 
proposal for Jerusalem that they could have as a starting point.90 This was easier said 
than done, and the experienced mediator considered the job to be “the toughest 
assignment possible.”91 After several days Ralph Bunche presented his Jerusalem 
proposal to the parties in a meeting on the evening 15 March 1949.92 The draft was 
then discussed with the two parties the following day. Transjordan agreed with the 
proposal on almost all points. The Israeli delegates initially rejected them, then 
accepted the main lines, and only ten minutes later launched a protest on certain of the 
lines concerning the Latrun sector, which is west of Jerusalem and on the vital Tel 
Aviv-Jerusalem highway. Despite the protest, however, the issue of Jerusalem was 
solved temporarily.93 
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 King Abdullah’s use of an unprofessional Transjordanian negotiation team 
that had been given little, or no, political manoeuvrability made it increasingly clear 
that King Abdullah wanted personal control over the talks. His intentions were to shift 
the weight of the negotiations to his palace at Shuneh where he could participate 
personally. The Israeli negotiation team seemed more than willing to keep playing 
both these two games simultaneously. This allowed them to use the UN when 
previous UN Resolutions stood to their benefit, while at the same time by-pass the UN 
when it was beneficial to base the negotiations on facts on the ground rather than on 
the UN Resolutions.   
Off to Shuneh 
 
As the negotiations at Rhodes developed, the atmosphere became tenser and some of 
the more contentious issues were discussed at King Abdullah’s palace at Shuneh 
rather than at Rhodes. Towards the end of March 1949 three secret bilateral meetings 
were held at Shuneh. It was there that the final details of the Israeli-Transjordanian 
armistice were finalized. King Abdullah was personally present in these meeting and 
the long winded procedures that marred the Rhodes talks were therefore avoided, but 
the cost of this efficiency, particularly for Transjordan, was high.  
The Israeli demands at Shuneh were more severe and direct than those put 
forth at Rhodes, and they often took the form of outright threats to which Transjordan 
mostly yielded. These specific cases need to be investigated in greater detail in order 
to fully grasp the effect the regional and international power relations had on the 
negotiations. Two issues stand out. The first such issue was the handling of the 
southern Negev, which Israel captured in the midst of the negotiations and then 
presented the new lines as facts on the ground. The second such issue was the 
handling of the Iraqi withdrawal. Since Iraq was unwilling to negotiate with Israel, 
Iraq unilaterally withdrew and handed the areas it had occupied to Transjordan. 
Rather than treating this as a step forward in the negotiations, Israel argued that this 
was a breach of the truce but that this could be ignored if Transjordan was willing to 
give up a sizeable portion of the West Bank.94 Both these cases are vivid examples of 
coercive diplomacy and, in a sense, represent the trends of the negotiations as a 
whole. 
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6. Coercion on Two Fronts  
March – April 1949 
 
After Egypt was out of the game, having signed the armistice with Israel 24 February 
1949, the Israeli Government had become cocksure, and with good reason. The day 
before Egypt signed its armistice with Israel, the US ambassador in Saudi Arabia 
commented:  
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[T]he crux of the problem in the future was whether or not the United States of 
America were or were not prepared to use sanctions to coerce the Jews, if they 
refused to obey the directions of the United Nations […] if the United States 
Government were not prepared for that, they might just as well throw the United 
Nations out of the window.1  
 
Israel had clearly become the dominant power on the ground. The balance of power 
had completely tipped in Israel’s favour, and the only way of reasserting some form of 
balance would have been through outside pressure. By March 1949 sanctions against 
Israel were miles off, as were most other forms of pressure. Such pressure had 
previously been available, but most such means had been squandered. The possibility 
that the US could threaten to block Israeli membership in the UN until concessions 
were made, for instance, was laid to waste when the US supported Israeli membership 
to the UN on 3 March 1949.2 Having thrown away these sticks, the only real option 
left in terms of applying pressure on Israel was by military means. However, this 
alternative was never really on the table. Considering the American public’s call of 
“bring our boys home” and the era of the Cold War dawning, with Europe being the 
main playing field, this option was out of the Truman administration’s grasp. There 
was some discussion whether one could contribute to a smaller police force ensuring 
the internationalisation of Jerusalem, but it was concluded that this would increase the 
danger of making the Middle East an arena for the Cold War. Included in this 
calculation was the fact that the setting up of an international police force in 
Jerusalem would imply the possibility of Soviet participation. This could be ill 
afforded.3 The approaching Cold War, and the fear thereof, made the US limit British 
pressure as well. This was based on an assumption that too much Western pressure 
could push Israel into the Soviet camp.    
 The US Government was not alone in squandering its available means of 
pressure. The British Government, since the war began, had wasted several chances of 
pressuring Israel. By March very few such options were left. Some of the available 
options were closed off as a result of the ongoing NATO negotiations.4 This was 
particular true in terms of the southern Negev. The British Government viewed the 
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southern Negev as one of its most vital assets in the Middle East both because the area 
connected Asia with Africa, but also because the access to the Suez was secured by 
holding this land belt. Despite this deep rooted interest in the southern Negev, Europe 
was Britain’s main concern as the Cold War was dawning. Hence finalizing the 
NATO agreement overrode all other international political decisions. If the US 
Government was not willing to apply pressure in the Negev, neither was Britain.5 
Interestingly, the Anglo-US relationship in terms of applying pressure (willing, but 
unable vs. able, but unwilling) was reflected in the relationship between the Foreign 
Office and the British representatives on the ground. Those on the ground were at 
times furious at the Foreign Office for what they perceived as breaking with the 
obligations Britain had with the Arab countries.6 
 The UN apparatus had also slowly been eroded on this point. As has been 
shown in recent research done on the Israeli-Egyptian armistice, the UN apparatus had 
favoured Israel over Egypt, and most of the concessions made in that armistice were 
Egyptian.7 Furthermore, the UN Observers were at times barred from the areas of 
fighting, and when they were present their reports rarely resulted in anything more 
concrete than that Ralph Bunche received the reports and handed these on to the 
involved parties.8   
The lack of foreign intervention was combined with the fact that the other 
Arab countries had either signed or were busy negotiating armistices with Israel. This 
left Transjordan isolated with Iraq as the last remaining Arab ally in Palestine. Iraq 
was more of a nuisance for Transjordan than it was an aid, however. In other words, a 
situation had been created in which Israel mastered the situation on the ground and 
could feel safe from outside pressure as long as certain lines were not crossed. As a 
result of this Israel was able to negotiate rather aggressively, using threats and by 
applying contradicting legalistic claims modelled to serve each case.9 The 
negotiations at Rhodes had almost reached a standstill and it had become clear that 
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King Abdullah wanted to return to the personalized negotiation style he had been 
using with a certain amount of success previously. Such a personalization of 
negotiations was perhaps perceived as advantageous because it could expedite 
matters, as the slow procedures and bureaucracy that was part of the UN apparatus 
could be skipped. On the other hand there was a real risk involved. Although the 
experience from the Israeli-Egyptian armistice was not the best example for an Arab 
statesman, such an UN administered negotiation could facilitate a certain amount of 
pressure that secret personal talks could not. Either way, at some point King Abdullah 
made the conscious decision that personal talks had the greatest advantages.  
Facts on the Ground in the Southern Negev 
 
The issue of Aqaba and Operation Uvda (Fait Accompli) had major implications for 
the armistice negotiations between Israel and Transjordan, and it was highly 
illustrative of how Israel completely dominated the military, political and diplomatic 
situation. Operation Uvda took place in the second week of March 1949, but Israel 
had been building up towards it for a long time by making sure that it could be 
completed without British or US intervention.  
Ever since British forces had landed at Aqaba in January 1949 the British 
military presence there had been an issue that kept coming to the fore in Anglo-
Israeli-Transjordanian relations. It was obvious that Israel perceived the British troops 
at Aqaba as a major problem. Israel had since then been sending various complaints 
directly to Britain, as well as to the US Government and the UN.10 The British 
Government, on its side, spent lots of time and energy defending its decision to send 
troops – a decision that from the outset was made in accordance with the Treaty of 
Alliance with Transjordan.11 
The official reason behind the Israeli Government’s perception of the British 
troops in Aqaba as a threat, was that the presence of this force was a breach of the 
truce, and that it therefore was a symbol of distrust and aggression.12 This does not 
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really clarify the issue. One possibility was that the Israeli Government really feared 
the British forces as had been the case in the summer of 1948 when fear of British 
military intervention was one of the reasons for not invading the West Bank.13 
Another possibility is that Israel wanted not only to reach the Gulf of Aqaba, but to 
attack Aqaba itself, and hence cut Transjordan off from the sea. There was, within the 
British ranks, some that feared that such an Israeli move might be made and 
preparations were made to defend Transjordan if this were to occur.14 The British 
Government had made it clear that that the force at Aqaba had no offensive purpose, 
but was placed there strictly in order to adhere to the Treaty of Alliance.15 To some 
extent Israel seemed unaware that the Treaty defined its obligations as confined 
within Transjordan’s borders.16 An Israeli representative even admitted: “If we had 
been sure that you would not fight us we would certainly have gone further towards 
Akaba”.17 
Israel kept postponing the signing of a complete ceasefire agreement with the 
argument that “no lines are defined in the southern sector.”18 In early March, as 
negotiations were going on at Rhodes, IDF troops started exploring areas of the 
Negev patrolled by the Arab Legion. The Israeli forces were originally driven back 
and complaints were handed to Ralph Bunche.19 The Transjordanian delegation at 
Rhodes had started arguing for Transjordan’s claim to the southern tip of the Negev 
based on the argument, applied on all other fronts by Israel, that negotiations were to 
be based on lines of defence, and not on UN plans.20 The British Ministry of Defence 
became alerted by these Israeli moves and reiterated its instructions to the commander 
at Aqaba. He was to return fire only if the Israeli army fired first, or crossed the 
border into Transjordan and disregarded the warnings that would be sent once the 
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border was crossed.21 This was of course within the obligations of the Treaty of 
Alliance, but it meant that as long as the IDF did not cross the red line, Transjordan 
could not lean on any form of British military pressure.  
Then, in the middle of negotiations Israel initiated Operation Uvda (Fait 
Accompli).  The operation was officially launched 10 March 1949 although parts of 
the operation occurred earlier.22 An Israeli column marched down the Negev, 
gambling that the Arab Legion would offer no resistance and retreat.23 The operation 
was a complete walkover.24 IDF troops reached the gulf of Aqaba in the morning on 
the same day as the operation was launched.25  
In response to the Israeli operation, the British Foreign Office issued a 
message concerning the Israeli movement of troops to Ralph Bunche and the US 
Government. The main content of this message was that the instructions that had 
previously been given to the British Commander at Aqaba were made clear to the 
Israeli Government, the Acting Mediator and the US Government. 26 Although 
releasing these military instructions was meant as an ultimatum to Israel, the effect 
must have been the opposite. Israel could finally confirm that Britain had no intention 
of engaging the IDF in Palestine. The US Government also issued a warning to Israel 
“of the dangerous consequences which may ensue from any aggression against 
Transjordan.”27 As with the British “threat” it was clear that the US had no intention 
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of intervening unless the international border was crossed. The IDF, in effect, had 
been able to test the British stance, found out exactly what they had hoped, and could 
therefore occupy the southern Negev without fear of British or US intervention as 
long as they did not cross the international frontier with Transjordan.28  
 The British army clearly feared that there was a looming possibility of the 
IDF launching an attack on Aqaba, and as a precautionary measure sent 
reinforcements shortly after Operation Uvda had been initiated.29 These 
reinforcements once again brought up the controversy surrounding the British troops 
in Aqaba.30 The issue had legalistic implications, and it was argued by Israel that they 
constituted a breach of the truce. Although Britain seemed to have certain sound 
arguments defending this troop movement, it was not a clear cut case.31 In a press 
statement Ralph Bunche declared that Transjordan, Israel and Great Britain had all 
violated the truce by their movement of troops in the Aqaba region.32 Although this 
did not clear Great Britain of the Israeli accusation, it did mean that it was harder for 
Israel to press the allegation further.33 
 When the issue of reduction of forces was brought up at Rhodes, the Israeli 
delegation argued that the British troops in Aqaba had to be included in the 
Transjordanian total.34 The argument was rejected by both Transjordan and Britain on 
the basis that these troops were in Aqaba for purely defensive reasons. Bunche also 
favoured this last interpretation, adding to the argument the fact that an armistice only 
included parties involved in Palestine, thus excluding the British troops.35 Towards 
the end of March 1949, however, the British Chiefs of Staff decided that the forces at 
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Aqaba could be reduced once the armistice was signed on the conditions that Israel 
made a similar reduction and that Transjordan accepted this reduction.36 Presence of 
UN observers was also added as a precondition.37 Since Transjordan never made the 
demand for British withdrawal, and since a reciprocal withdrawal of Israeli forces was 
not included in the Rhodes armistice, the British troops stationed at Aqaba were not 
reduced.38  
The launching of Operation Uvda had larger consequences for the negotiation 
than that of being a launch pad for a renewed debate over the British troops stationed 
in Aqaba. The Israeli military move had, after all, been launched as negotiations were 
in progress, and the success of the Israeli military move changed the premises for the 
negotiations. The southern Negev was instantly transformed from being a 
Transjordanian asset to being an Israeli “fact on the ground”.  
Ralph Bunche reacted to the Operation Uvda with sarcastic disgust: “smack in 
the midst of armistice negotiations with Transjordan. Good faith!”, and later “nice 
work while armistice negotiations are in progress. […] am thinking of resigning.”39 
Bunche turned on Moshe Dayan making it clear that he considered Operation Uvda to 
be a breach of the truce, and that if the matter came up to the Security Council the 
Israeli forces would have to withdraw or Bunche would resign.40 Resigning was, in 
other words, a threat that Bunche seriously contemplated. Such a termination of his 
mission would have landed the blame for the failure of the armistice on the Israelis. 
The threat of resignation was therefore a grave one. In negotiation theory it has been 
pointed out that one of the strongest hands a mediator controls is “to raise the cost of 
an uncompromising stand”.41 The threat of resignation was exactly that. In this case, 
however, Israel did not give in. The complaint concerning the breach of the truce 
never reached the Security Council, and yet Bunche did not resign. Ralph Bunche had 
perhaps not intended his threat to be a bluff, and I have found no sources that could 
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point in either direction here. The Israelis, however, treated Bunche’s threat as if it 
was a bluff. They gambled and pushed forward with their stance despite Bunche’s 
threat of resignation. Bunche did not resign. In a sense this confirmed the Israeli 
interpretation of the threat as an empty one. It should be noted that Ralph Bunche was 
not the only person who threatened to resign. Colonel Jundi, who was head of the 
Transjordanian delegation at Rhodes, threatened to break off the negotiations, but he 
was talked out of it by Ralph Bunche.42  
The importance of Operation Uvda and the effect it had on the armistice 
negotiations is grossly under-discussed in the existing literature covering the 1948 
War and its aftermath. Even Avi Shlaim, who has written the most comprehensive 
study of the Israeli-Transjordanian relationship,43 concludes that hostilities ended 7 
January 1949 – two months prior to Operation Uvda.44 There is little doubt that 
Operation Uvda was not a military clash in a classical sense, but, neither was it a mere 
movement of troops into unoccupied land, nor was it a redistribution of Israeli forces 
within Israel. It was clearly a hostile action and it resulted in an Israeli land grab that 
had to be dealt with in the negotiations as “facts on the ground”. Moshe Dayan 
claimed that “there had been no Israeli advance but, rather, a deployment of forces 
which replaced the previous Israeli control of the territory by reconnaissance, and that 
there had been no military clash with the Arab Legion.”45 The same stance was taken 
by Walter Eytan who argued that the whole move was in line with the Partition Plan.46 
Israeli representatives also argued that the Arab Legion should not have been in the 
Negev and that such a presence was, in itself, an offensive action.47 However, 
internally the operation is referred to as the “occupation southern Negev, diplomatic 
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warfare with Transjordan [and] United Kingdom.”48 King Abdullah and Prime 
Minister Abul Huda 
 were shocked by the Israeli stance and likened the Israeli attitude concerning 
the move to “Hitler after a successful coup.”49  
This Israeli argument that Operation Uvda had been a simple movement of 
troops within Israeli territory was not considered legitimate by Ralph Bunche who 
pointed out – even if there were no clashes, such an action was still a breach of the 
truce.50 Despite the gravity of the issue it seemed to ebb out as Transjordan did not 
make further formal complaints. Bunche was nothing less than astounded by this 
silence.51 Transjordan had, after all, in one day, lost what was perhaps their best 
bargaining chip in the talks.52 The silence was most probably due to the fact that King 
Abdullah was more worried about the situation on the so-called Iraqi front on the 
northern West Bank.53 He feared that complaints made through the UN would 
provoke Israel into attacking the Arab Legion on the West Bank. His analysis was that 
the best way of avoiding an Israeli offensive was by approaching them directly.54 11 
March, the day after Operation Uvda, the General Ceasefire was signed and the 
armistice negotiations continued.55 
Here one should recall the demands made by the parties in the negotiations in 
January and mid-February 1949, where Israeli access to the Red Sea was one of the 
most formidable demands made towards Transjordan. In return for Israeli access to 
the Red Sea, Transjordan had first demanded Jaffa and then later suggested shared 
access to both Haifa and Eilat.56 With the successful completion of Operation Uvda 
there was nothing left to negotiate in terms of Israeli access to the Red Sea. Israel had 
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obtained a major goal and Transjordan had lost a bartering position of great 
magnitude. Since neither the US nor the British Government reacted, and since there 
had been no battles, this alteration of the facts on the ground had been cost free for 
Israel.    
Blackmail on the Iraqi Front 
 
In early March the involved parties were still unable to come to an understanding as to 
how Iraq was to be represented at the talks, and how the Iraqi troops were going to 
withdraw from the northern section of the West Bank. These issues had, as we have 
seen, long been a thorn in the side for King Abdullah.57 A week into the Rhodes talks 
King Abdullah finally started making meaningful progress with the Iraqis. 7 March 
the solution on the table was that the Iraqi forces stationed at the front were going to 
withdraw to the areas surrounding Nablus and Jericho, giving control of the front to 
Transjordan.58  
At the second Joint Formal Meeting of the Israeli-Transjordan Armistice 
Negotiations, held at Rhodes 11 March, a ceasefire covering all fronts between 
Transjordan and Israel was signed. Ralph Bunche added, without protest from either 
of the delegations, a point stating:  
 
If and when Transjordan forces should take over any sectors of any Arab fronts not 
occupied by Transjordan forces at the time of the signing of this cease-fire 
agreement, I shall call upon both parties immediately to extend this cease-fire 
agreement in its present form to such new sectors or fronts, and I will expect each 
Delegation in these negotiations to act favourably on such call.59  
 
Walter Eytan sent a protest regarding the Transjordanian proposal for taking over the 
Iraqi lines as early as the 14 March, only three days after Bunche’s formula for the 
extension of the ceasefire lines had been agreed upon. Eytan’s argument was nothing 
but absurd: “The carrying out of such redeployment confers serious advantage on the 
other side”.60 It was obvious that Transjordan had no military advantage in such a 
takeover as its lines were already overstretched. Ralph Bunche was fully aware of the 
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absurdity, and his reply, a day later, seems to have been astute: “[I]nforming him 
[Eytan] I do no[t] accept his interpretations or conclusions.”61  
 Adding to the legalistic complaint that Eytan had sent to Ralph Bunche, the 
Israeli delegation at Rhodes sent a complaint directly to the Transjordanian delegation 
arguing that raids into Israel had taken place from the Iraqi held areas of the West 
Bank. This complaint was formulated as a “last ultimatum”, a formulation that 
convinced Glubb Pasha that an Israeli attack on the West Bank was imminent.62 
Glubb’s fears were well founded. Internal Israeli documents reveal that an attack on 
the West Bank was contemplated to a great extent. It was analysed in terms of what 
excuse was needed for such an operation, what the diplomatic cost would be, what the 
British reaction would be, etc. The discussion concluded that the risk was far higher 
than in the case of Aqaba and that there was no guarantee that Britain would not 
intervene.63  
Transjordan pointed out that the cross border raids by Arab irregulars was an 
Iraqi responsibility. Transjordan stated that these raids would cease when a takeover 
was completed, but that they needed guarantees to the effect that no Israeli attack 
would be launched once the Arab Legion had taken over the Iraqi front. Iraq also asked 
for the US Government to guarantee a safety period of 10-15 days during which the 
takeover was to take place. No such guarantees were forthcoming.64 
The British Foreign Office also clearly feared an attack on the weakened Arab 
Legion lines, and therefore urged Iraq to join the armistice negotiations rather than 
withdraw, as this withdrawal would place the Arab Legion in a precarious situation.65 
Besides urging the Iraqi forces to hold their positions, the Foreign Office urged the US 
Government to apply pressure on the Israelis in order that such an attack should not 
take place.66 It was also discussed whether one could threaten Israel by stating that any 
move on the West Bank would “seriously prejudice her prospect of election to the 
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United Nations.”67 Such a threat was never followed up on as both the US and British 
Government had in effect lent support to Israeli UN membership by granting it 
recognition.68 The final vote was held in the General Assembly May 1949, with both 
the US and UK supporting Israeli membership.69 
The US State Department shared the Foreign Office’s worries regarding the 
West Bank.70 However, apart from informing the Israeli Government of their stance on 
such an attack, which was negative, they apprised the British Government that they 
had very little influence over Israel, and had few means of applying pressure unless the 
case was as clear cut as it had been in the Egyptian case when Israel had breached an 
international frontier.71 The furthest the US Government seemed willing to go towards 
pressuring the Israeli Government was to “discourage […] firmly from taking any 
forceful action on Iraqi or any other front in Palestine.”72 The Foreign Office did not 
pursue the case further. There was an air of resignation within the Foreign Office 
when, in mid-March, the only aid they seemed able to give was to urge the 
Transjordanian and Iraqi Governments to publicize all Israeli threats.73  
It was on the issue of the Iraqi forces and their withdrawal from the northern 
West Bank that the first secret meeting at Shuneh took place. Head of the Israeli 
delegation Reuven Shiloah informed Bunche that there was going to be a conference 
on the issue at Shuneh, but said little else.74 The Iraqi issue had, as predicted, become 
one of the biggest deadlocks in the Rhodes negotiations.75 In fact, it was only as late as 
20 March that Bunche received confirmation from Iraq that Transjordan could 
negotiate on behalf of Iraq and that the Arab Legion would take over the Iraqi lines.76 
In view of previous Israeli complaints and threats, Iraq sought to ensure that no 
provocations were created in this withdrawal, and invited the UN to increase the 
number of observers present in the areas from which Iraq withdrew in the northern 
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West Bank.77 Just when the Iraq issue seemed to be solved, however, the Iraqi 
Government once again pulled the plug, stating in a cable to Ralph Bunche that the 
withdrawal was only a move to “rear positions” and that they were unwilling to be 
bound by an armistice signed by Transjordan.78 This infuriated Ralph Bunche. The 
Transjordanian delegation, however, thought that he was overreacting and that it was 
more rhetoric than it was a change of heart.79 This last view was also shared by the 
British representative in Baghdad.80 
This new, albeit pending, agreement with Iraq, was clearly perceived as a step 
forward for the involved parties, but along with the signing of the Israeli-Lebanese 
armistice on 23 March, Transjordan became increasingly isolated and hence more 
prone to Israeli pressure. In a sense all progress Transjordan made within an inter-Arab 
context was simultaneously a setback in terms of the Transjordanian-Israeli power 
balance. 
Israel had accepted the declaration Bunche had added to the ceasefire stating 
that once Transjordan had taken over the front form the Iraqi troops the parties would 
extend the ceasefire to include the strip of land previously held by the Iraqi forces.81 
When Iraqi was about to withdraw, however, Israel clearly broke with this common 
understanding by declaring, 18 March 1949, that the upcoming Iraqi withdrawal was a 
breach of the truce.82 Legalistically Israel had a point, since troop movement on the 
front could be considered a breach of the truce. The Iraqi withdrawal, however, was 
beneficial for Israel as it enabled a hostile army to be replaced with a force that was 
interested in negotiating. Despite this, Israel attempted to further benefit from the 
situation by claiming that the truce was breached. It was in relation to this complaint 
that the greatest Israeli threat took place. In a secret meeting between Abdullah al-Tel 
and Moshe Dayan in Jerusalem 18 March, Dayan informed al-Tel that Israel could be 
willing to ignore the fact that Transjordan had broken the truce if, in return, 
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Transjordan was willing to concede territory to Israel.83 This was clearly coercive 
diplomacy.  
The British representative in Amman commented on the issue: “Another 
meeting is arranged for this evening when the exact amount of this particular instance 
of blackmail is to be named.”84 When King Abdullah met Dayan at Shuneh the barter 
was not much more specific. Dayan only made it clear that Transjordan would have to 
concede “certain unspecified “high points””.85 On the 22 March, in a meeting in 
Jerusalem, the term “high points” was defined as “a general withdrawal of the Arab 
Legion for 15 kilometres along the front opposite the coastal plain.”86 Transjordan was 
given 24 hours in which to agree “or Israel would withdraw its agreement to Arab 
Legion taking over from Iraqis.” Dayan was even reported to have said “that if 
rectification not made by agreement, Israel would make them anyway.”87 With this last 
statement it became clear that the Israeli demand was nothing less than blackmail. 
Transjordan could either concede territory voluntarily or Israel would launch an attack 
and take that land anyway. The British Foreign Office was shocked by this threat, but 
was incapable of doing anything about it apart from urging the US State Department to 
exert pressure on Israel. The State Department urged Israel to stop issuing such 
demands, but little real pressure was applied.88  
23 March 1949, during a long and hard round of negotiations at Shuneh, the 
size of the demanded area was slightly reduced.89 It was to be a “belt about 5 
kilometres deep stretching from just east of Lydda to the north of Jenin along a front of 
60 kilometres.” Glubb Pasha estimated that this area included “about 15 [Palestinian] 
villages and approximately 12,000 inhabitants.”90 The land in question was also 
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described as “some of the best agricultural land now remaining in Arab hands”.91 If 
there was any doubt as to whether there was a threat involved, the Israeli negotiators, 
Walter Eytan and Yigal Yadin, “demanded acceptance by 1900 hours this evening […] 
in the event of refusal Transjordan “would soon see” what would happen.”92 These 
two, Eytan and Yadin, later expressed moral qualms as to the demands:  
 
We were, after all, discussing the future of villages which were wholly Arab in 
population and situated in territory under Arab control. […] In spite of all guarantees 
and fine phrases, it was as clear to the Transjordanians as to us that the people of 
these villages were likely to become refugees as soon as the Iraqis withdrew, and 
possibly even before.93  
 
Professional negotiators as they were, neither Eytan nor Yadin let these moral qualms 
get to them, however, and the demand was held forth. 
King Abdullah was convinced that a refusal would result in an all-out Israeli 
attack and he arranged for a meeting the same evening.94 Glubb Pasha, however, was 
convinced that it would be possible to slightly postpone the agreement in an attempt to 
obtain some form of US pressure.95 There was some optimism in terms of getting such 
US pressure, and it was believed that the reduction in the size of the strip of land 
demanded by Israeli was the result of some degree of US involvement.96 I have been 
unable to find any evidence supporting this. 
Convinced by Glubb Pasha’s argument of the availability of US pressure, King 
Abdullah managed to postpone the signing of the Shuneh agreement by a full week. He 
used the argument that the Prime Minister personally had to sign it.  
He was in Lebanon at the time, and Israel gave him a week in which to return 
and sign the agreement which was then to be incorporated in the Rhodes agreement.97 
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Prime Minister Abul Huda, not surprisingly, was uncomfortable with this solution and 
was highly pessimistic. In his view it was unlikely that US pressure of any significance 
was going to be forthcoming, and he was convinced that Israel was going to take over 
the rest of Palestine if the agreement was not signed.98 By this point Abul Huda, who 
had previously been pro-UN, had, in light of the developments of the negotiations, 
become convinced that Ralph Bunche was biased in a pro-Israeli direction, stating that 
“no trust should be put either in the Acting Mediator or in the [PCC] or in the Security 
Council.” He clearly perceived Bunche to be partially responsible for the fact that 
Israel was able to make harsh demands from Transjordan without facing any 
international pressure of significance.99 
The armistice text, which was finalized, but not signed, at Shuneh 23 March, 
included a clause stating that “Israel […] has made similar changes for the benefit of 
the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom in other areas.” This clause did not match well with 
reality, as there were no “similar changes”. It was inserted purely for the sake of 
helping Transjordan save face in case the concessions leaked.100 Israel had no 
intentions of bartering land apart from a minute, purely symbolic modification. It was 
first suggested that Transjordan be compensated in the Tulkarem region, but the 
minuscule change was finally made in the Hebron area and in the northeast.101 The 
strip of land handed over to Israel in this agreement is geographically small. In relative 
terms it is around 1% of historical Palestine and roughly the same size as the Gaza 
strip.102  
The week King Abdullah had managed to buy himself was spent in a last ditch 
attempt at obtaining US pressure against Israel. King Abdullah personally sent a letter 
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to President Truman urging him to apply pressure on Israel so that an armistice could 
successfully be signed without loss of further land and hence with reduced risk of 
renewed fighting.103 In line with this the British representatives in Amman were 
instructed to increase the flow of information to their US counterparts so that the extent 
of the blackmail could become fully apparent to the US.104 Two days before the 
deadline ran out the Israeli delegates at Rhodes tried to persuade Ralph Bunche to 
threaten Transjordan into expediting matters regarding the Shuneh agreement 
concerning the Iraqi front on the northern West Bank.105 Whether the reason for 
Israel’s sudden demand for haste was due to fear of possible US pressure is uncertain. I 
have not been able to find any conclusive evidence. 
Israel, however, had nothing to fear. As far as the US State Department was 
concerned, the concessions demanded of Transjordan were small (5x60km) and not 
permanent as it was an armistice that was being negotiated and not a peace 
agreement.106 Truman responded personally to King Abdullah’s letter stating, in a 
“very non-committal” manner that “the Jews should eventually give compensation for 
all territory they get in excess of the 1947 partition.”107 “Eventually” was understood 
as “an ultimate political settlement between the Parties”, i.e. a final peace treaty.108 
This meant that the American stance – that King Abdullah must accept the concessions 
– was the standing politic. This was shocking news to the British Foreign Office. The 
feeling of hopelessness created by US passivity was, by the representative in 
Jerusalem, set into the context of cooperation in Europe: “[This] seems to augur very 
ill for prospects of effective co-operation between us and the United States in Europe, 
where we shall be face with opposition far more powerful and determined than the 
Israeli Government can put up.”109 This made the Foreign Office realize that no 
pressure was going to materialize and found itself forced to advise King Abdullah to 
sign while there was still time.110 King Abdullah reacted to the letter in a similar 
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fashion, stating “now no other course of action left open but to accept Israel’s 
demands”.111  
What was striking in relation to the Israeli blackmail was not only the nature of 
the threat in itself, but also the fact that the Israeli delegates at Rhodes informed Ralph 
Bunche that no such demands were going to take place.112 King Abdullah felt that 
Transjordan had a clear interest in making sure that such concessions were made in 
utmost secrecy. The handover of the demanded area was planned as a gradual event 
taking place over four months so as to reduce unwanted publicity.113 Surrendering such 
a large area of land that was under Arab Legion control, and that had been given to the 
Arabs by the Partition Plan, was a highly controversial issue. Given the extent of such 
a controversy, it had to be discussed it utmost secrecy. Talks at Shuneh could offer 
this, whereas Rhodes talks could not.114 Prime Minister Abul Huda was of a different 
opinion and wanted the agreement to be included openly in the armistice that was to be 
signed at Rhodes.115 This was a view also held by the Foreign Office.116  
The Shuneh agreement was signed at the last moment, 30 March, after a long 
winded last meeting lasting until 5 a.m. at the King’s palace. The stance of Prime 
Minister Abul Huda won out, and the clause stating that the deal was to be kept secret 
was removed. The parties agreed that the Shuneh agreement was to be included in the 
armistice at Rhodes.117 After the signing of the Shuneh agreement both delegations 
arrived at Rhodes with the same instructions. Ralph Bunche was clearly satisfied that 
the case could be closed, but he was aggrieved at the details: “Another deal and as 
usual the Palestine Arabs lose.”118  
The Signing at Rhodes 
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The two cases of coercive diplomacy, in the southern Negev and on the Iraqi front, 
were ones in which the Israelis won through with surprising ease. In the first, Israel 
launched a successful land grab that had to be treated as facts on the ground. In the 
second, Israel threatened to launch a large scale attack unless Transjordan willingly 
surrendered a strip of land.  
Once Prime Minister Abul Huda signed the Shuneh agreement with 
amendments 30 March 1949 these were forwarded to Rhodes where they formed the 
basis for the Rhodes armistice. This was signed 3 April 1949 by Israel and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the new name given to Transjordan as its borders now 
encompassed land on both sides of the Jordan River. The issues of the temporary 
division of Jerusalem, the temporary armistice lines and the release of POWs were all 
adequately addressed, but the main issues were postponed. These issues were: The 
Palestinian refugees, which were to be granted their right of return; The final borders, 
which were to be based on the Partition Plan with equal land swaps; and The final 
status for Jerusalem, which was, according to the UN, to be internationalized. The 
postponed issues were all those that really mattered to the Palestinians. The real 
victims of the war were therefore, in a sense, negated from the armistice negotiations. 
With the armistice treaty finalized Jordan could start the annexation of the West Bank. 
King Abdullah had laid the political groundwork for this with the First Palestinian 
Congress (October 1948) and the Jericho Conference (December 1948). When these 
had been held, however, King Abdullah’s claim was based almost exclusively on the 
military presence the Arab Legion had in the West Bank. With the armistice this 
presence was granted international legitimacy. King Abdullah knew that such an 
annexation was a controversial matter and decided to postpone the issue. The West 
Bank was formally annexed to Jordan in April 1950, a full year after the armistice was 
signed.119    
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7. Rhodes vs. Shuneh: Analyzing the Diplomatic Preference 
 
In order to fully comprehend the relationship between the Shuneh and the Rhodes 
negotiations there are three perspectives that have to be investigated. The perspectives of 
King Abdullah, the Israeli Government and Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche. What view 
did these three hold on the use of Shuneh as the location for the negotiations? 
The Israeli Perspective 
 
Given the political, military and diplomatic balance of power, the Israeli perspective is 
rather self evident. Israel was in a position to make harsher demands in direct secret talks 
than they would have been able to make in official UN monitored talks. As we have seen 
the Israeli demands relating to the southern Negev and the northern section of the West 
Bank were met with little resistance. Israel’s tactic had long been that of isolating the Arab 
states, taking them on one by one. In a sense the Shuneh talks were the culmination of 
such a policy. Not only was Israel able to completely isolate Transjordan from the rest of 
the Arab world, but by negotiating through a secret bilateral channel Israel also managed 
to isolate Transjordan from almost all other forms of outside interference.  
King Abdullah’s Perspective 
 
The most logical choice for Transjordan would have been to negotiate at Rhodes through 
the mediation of Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche. At Rhodes it would presumably have 
been harder for Israel to make the harsh demands and outright threats that were made in 
Shuneh. Under the scrutiny of the UN such coercive diplomacy would have been more 
difficult. It would also have been far easier for Britain to put weight behind Transjordan if 
talks were official, and the US position on the Partition Plan could possibly also have been 
made more visible. Talks under the UN would have made the Arab world’s position 
towards Transjordan less hostile. These arguments, however, rest on the luxury of 
hindsight. What we must seek to understand is not whether King Abdullah made the right 
choice, but rather why he made that choice. 
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 We have already investigated King Abdullah’s distrust of the UN. This was based 
on several assessments. King Abdullah was vehemently anti-communist and feared Soviet 
involvement if the UN apparatus was used. Further he disliked the slow bureaucratic 
nature of the organization. He also disagreed with the UN position on Jerusalem, which 
was that of internationalization. The Old City had been Transjordan’s greatest gain in the 
1948 War, and it had been a hard fought battle. Israel and Transjordan had a shared view 
on Jerusalem (division), and this was contrary to the UN stance. Last, but not least, King 
Abdullah’s dislike of the UN must have been heavily influenced by the fact Transjordan 
was not officially recognized as an independent country by the UN. 
 King Abdullah had had good experiences with personal diplomacy in the past. 
These experiences bore merits. He had established a close relationship with the Israeli 
Arabist Elias Sasson and had obtained the controversial pre-war agreement between 
himself and the Zionists. Beyond that, the Jerusalem truce that had been negotiated on a 
personal basis in November 1948, without UN interference, was perceived as a great 
success. The establishment of a direct phone line between Dayan and al-Tel had served 
both parties well. The successful exchange of POWs had also been completed through 
personal negotiations that had excluded the UN.  
 From King Abdullah’s standpoint, the advantage of negotiating under the UN 
because of available outside pressure was an invalid argument. It had become clear that 
such outside pressure was not forthcoming.. Britain could not even supply the Arab 
Legion with ammunition and the US was almost shockingly uninvolved. Such outside 
pressure, it was clear, would only manifest itself if the international border was crossed. 
Even then, as was evident when Egypt proper was attacked in December 1948, the US and 
British reaction was limited and slow. Elias Sasson, towards the end of March 1949, 
seemed close on target when he made the comment that “the King is anxious to conclude 
an armistice with us at any cost and that the British are not giving him much backing.”1 
Beyond that, the other Arab states that had functioned as limiting force on King Abdullah 
were all but outmanoeuvred. Most of them had already made concessions to Israel and 
their ability to exert pressure on the Hashemite regent was depleted. The implication of 
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this was that King Abdullah no longer was under any pressure to negotiate under UN 
scrutiny. 
 A last factor, and one not explored previously, was the fact that King Abdullah, 
unlike the other Arab leaders, was authentically interested in negotiating peace with 
Israel.2 His choice of personal negotiations must also be considered in light of this. If his 
long term goal was to further his diplomatic relationship with Israel, then fostering their 
personal relationship was perhaps of equal importance as minimizing the concessions 
made in the armistice. 
Ralph Bunche’s Perspective 
 
Some of the studies that have focused on the armistice negotiations have investigated the 
power vested in Ralph Bunche in his role as mediator.3 This is a highly valuable approach 
when looking at the Israeli-Egyptian armistice talks, but at best such an analysis is 
complementary when investigating the Israeli-Transjordanian armistice.4 The reason for 
this is that few of the major decisions were made at Rhodes, and even Bunche’s 
perception of the relationship between the two negotiation forums, Rhodes and Shuneh, is 
somewhat unclear. 
 There has been some debate as to whether Ralph Bunche had any knowledge of 
the Shuneh negotiations. Although most researchers who have investigated the armistice 
negotiations discuss the Shuneh negotiations in one way or another, there has mainly 
been three works that have seriously delved into the question of whether Ralph Bunche 
knew or not. These three are Brian Urquhart’s Ralph Bunche: An American Life; Avi 
Shlaim’s Collusion Across the Jordan and Saadia Touval’s The Peace Brokers.5 Both 
Shlaim and Urquhart conclude that Ralph Bunche knew about the Shuneh negotiations,6 
whilst Touval comments: “Much of the negotiations between Jordan and Israel were 
conducted in direct talks without Bunche’s presence – perhaps without his knowledge.”7 
A series of other authors who also touch in on this theme to a greater or lesser extent 
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seem to disagree on this question.8 The issue is further confused since the Israeli 
negotiator Walter Eytan, who participated in both these negotiations, states in his 
autobiography that the Shuneh negotiations were the “real negotiations [and] should be 
conducted in secret […] Only the King’s closest confidants were to know; the rest of the 
world was to go on watching the show at Rhodes.”9 In another article he notes that 
“[King Abdullah] insisted on absolute secrecy […] even vis-á-vis his own delegates at 
Rhodes.”10 Both British and US sources from as late as 25 March 1949 seem sure that 
Bunche did not know.11 The decision to inform him of the Shuneh talks was made as late 
as 26 March.12  
 Upon reviewing the only source that in truth can confirm or disprove the existing 
theories – Ralph Bunche’s diary from the period of negotiations13 – one can close the 
discussion around the simple question: Did he know about the Shuneh talks? The answer 
in all simplicity is yes. Given a series of comments in his diary it becomes evident that 
he was well aware of the secret Shuneh talks. His first comment about these talks was 
made as early as 16 March. However, it is not completely clear what importance Bunche 
placed in the Shuneh discussions.14 One viable theory would be that he viewed these as 
complementary to the “real” negotiations at Rhodes. More precisely, he perceived the 
Shuneh talks as a forum where problems that arose at Rhodes were straightened out in 
direct consultations with King Abdullah. A series of comments from the diaries would 
support this theory.15 A close look at Bunche’s comment from 24 March is revealing: 
 
Jundi [Head of the Transjordanian delegation], who had earlier said he was unprepared to 
discuss the supposedly highly controversial issue of armistice lines in sector south of Dead 
Sea (Aqaba), stated that he was prepared to accept Shiloah’s proposal that armistice line 
follow international frontier in this area! Thus a big hurdle was taken. Later this evening, 
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in chat with Shiloah, he told me Israeli’s were now prepared to take up question of 
extending agreement to Iraqi front and would ask for little or no modification in the lines 
there. If this proves true we are about out of the woods on the Transjordan agreement.16 
 
At this point Bunche was well aware of the Shuneh talks.17 Bunche seems to have been 
elevated rather than disturbed since both the Israeli and Transjordanian delegates agreed 
on continuing negotiations on these points at Rhodes. In another instance he commented: 
“Iraqis are supposed to move out. I hope they will. It looks as though we will have 
agreement quickly, but one can never be sure. I’m sick of this business. Both Delegations 
are now supposed to have similar instructions.”18 
He seems to have felt that these “consultations” had the simple function of taking 
a burden off his back. He allowed this undermining of his mandate to continue because 
he had reached a breaking point where the only thing that mattered was expediting his 
mission. Bunche wanted to finish the whole business and go home. He was exhausted. He 
had first spent a month and a half negotiating an armistice between Israel and Egypt. 
When that was finished, he initiated the new round of negotiations, which was wrought 
by political bickering, lack of professionalism in the Transjordanian delegation, late 
nights, early mornings and bouts of disease.19 Illustrative of the effect this had on him is 
the fact that he was unwilling to attend the Syrian armistice talks, preferring to send his 
envoys Henri Vigier, who had previously mediated the Lebanon armistice on behalf of 
Bunche, and General William Riley, chief of staff of the Truce Supervision 
Organization.20 
Perhaps the clearest indication of Ralph Bunche’s state of mind is found in a letter 
he sent to his wife Ruth:  
 
You can’t imagine what it takes to hold these monkeys together long enough to squeeze 
agreement out of them. And such trickery, deceit and downright dishonesty you have never 
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seen. I swear by all that’s Holy, I will never come anywhere near the Palestine problem once 
I liberate myself from this trap21   
 
The Shuneh talks allowed him to get out of that trap with greater haste and less work than 
would have been possible if the talks only took place at Rhodes. Bunche may not have 
agreed with the outcome, but at least an agreement had been squeezed out of the parties. 
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8. Armistice – From Temporary Solution to Permanent Non-
Solution 
 
The negotiations that led to the finalized Rhodes armistice between Israel and Transjordan 
were held on two fronts. Officially all the negotiations took place at Rhodes under the 
auspices of Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche. Unofficially, however, most of the talks of 
substance took place in secret at King Abdullah’s palace at Shuneh or in no-man’s land in 
Jerusalem. The final armistice was signed at Rhodes 3 April 1949 and all the issues that 
were agreed upon in the unofficial negotiations at Shuneh were integrated into the 
document. For the first time in an official international document the signatory was the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as Transjordan was henceforth known. The unofficial 
negotiations were known to Ralph Bunche, and although these negotiations were classical 
cases of coercive diplomacy that undermined his authority as a negotiator, he allowed 
these to take place. He was disappointed in the outcome of the Shuneh talks, but was 
mentally and physically exhausted. Ralph Bunche had reached the conclusion that any 
solution was better than one that could only be reached after further longwinded 
negotiations. King Abdullah too accepted the coercions because he had no other choice. 
The reality was that no matter where or how King Abdullah chose to negotiate, 
Transjordan was practically unarmed and isolated. The British Government was unable to 
provide aid, and the US Government was uninterested.1  
The Israeli-Transjordan armistice was the second to last armistice to be signed 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The Syrian negotiations were long-winded, and 
the armistice between Israel and Syria was not signed until 20 July 1949, after almost four 
months of negotiating. With that the war was over and peace negotiations began.2 As with 
armistice talks, the peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan was a two-track affair. 
Together with the other Arab states Jordan participated in the Lausanne Peace Conference 
hosted by the PCC. Additionally, Jordan held secret negotiations with Israel up until King 
Abdullah’s death in 1951.3 In the end both these tracks collapsed, and the armistice 
became official policy. 
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Evaluating the Armistice 
 
The British Minister in Amman, Alec Kirkbride, was furious at both the Israeli behaviour 
and the British lack of (re)action. In a starch warning to the Foreign Office in early March 
1949 he made clear his views. They were ominous: “[T]he Israeli forces can go where 
they want, pretty well when they want to and unless some greater degree of diplomatic 
support is given to the Arabs the use of the term “negotiations” in connexion with a 
settlement is a mistake.”4  
 There has long been a common misunderstanding that the truce lines are equitable 
with the armistice lines.5 This was not the case. Territory was gained by Israel on several 
fronts after the truce and during negotiations. The most manifest instances of such gains 
were Operation Uvda, whereby the southern tip of the Negev was taken in the midst of the 
negotiations, and the blackmail on the Iraqi front, whereby Israel demanded (and 
acquired) a strip of land as the price Transjordan had to pay in order to avoid an outright 
attack.  
 An evaluation of the armistice must take into consideration the following two 
questions: Who were the interested parties? And to what extent did these interested parties 
obtain their demands? The answer to the first question is: Israel, Jordan and the 
Palestinians. The answer to the second question is more complex as each party must be 
analysed separately. 
 It takes two to tango. No more, no less. Both Transjordan and Israel were 
unwilling to let the Palestinian in on the dance. Despite the fact that the war was in 
Palestine and that the main victims of the war was the Palestinian people, there was an 
enormous disparity in the relationship victim – representation. Israel for one, had taken 
care to rid its annexed area of the Palestinians.6 Transjordan, for its part, was key in 
strangling the All Palestine Government at birth, taking all necessary steps to ensure that 
Transjordan, and not the Palestinians, would negotiate over the land held by the Arab 
                                                
4
 FO 11 March 1949, FO371/75381, Amman to FO, Cypher 146. 
5
 It has been standard reference in historical maps to have the same lines for “areas captured by Israel by 
January 1949” and “armistice lines”. See e.g. Gilbert, Martin: The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Its History in 
Maps. London 1985, p. 46. Interestingly even Avi Shlaim seems to confuse these terms. See e.g. Shlaim 
2001, pp. 56-57. 
6
 Morris 2004; Palumbo 1987; Pappe 2007. 
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Legion. The Hashemite Kingdom also sought, and to a certain extent managed to gain, 
legitimacy from sectors of the Palestinian society to represent the Palestinians.7 From a 
Palestinian perspective the armistice negotiations was therefore a double defeat. By 
postponing the refugee issue the armistice cemented the Palestinian exodus. Further, since 
the Palestinians were not represented as a party, the armistice negated the Palestinians as a 
political and national entity. In both the armistices and the Lausanne Peace Conference, no 
Palestinian delegation was present. In a sense, colonialism had gone full circle. The Arab 
states' attitude towards the Palestinians was much in tune with Marx' view of the 
colonized: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.”8 
 From a Jordanian perspective the armistice was a mixed success. From a purely 
geopolitical standpoint, Jordan was a highly successful participant in the war. Jordan, after 
all, managed to acquire 22% of mandatory Palestine including East Jerusalem. These areas 
were even annexed by Jordan and remained integral parts of the Kingdom from 1950 until 
the 1967 war. However, if one evaluates the armistice in terms of the initial 
Transjordanian demands as well as the areas of land actually held by Transjordan at the 
outset of the negotiations, we get a very different picture. Seen in such a light Transjordan 
lost the southern section of the Negev as well as 300 square kilometres of the northern 
West Bank. Further, the suggested barter that Transjordan and Israel could share Eilat and 
Haifa was abandoned as a result of Transjordan having lost Eilat due to Operation Uvda.       
   From an Israeli perspective the armistice was a great success. Based purely on a 
comparison with the UN Partition Plan, Israel was able to increase its size from 56% to 
77% of the whole.9 Although most of these gains were made during the war and not 
during the armistices, the armistice functioned as a legitimization of those gains. Beyond 
acquiring land, Israel was able to postpone vital issues such as the Palestinian refugee 
issue. By international law the refugees had the right to return. Likewise, by UN 
standards, Israel should have either handed back areas that were occupied in excess of the 
Partition Plan, or traded these for areas of equal size. Since both the refugee issue and 
such territorial trade offs were postponed to negotiations for a final peace settlement, an 
awkward situation was created whereby the armistices gave Israel enormous gains of 
                                                
7
 See Chapter 3. 
8
 Quoted in Said, Edward W.: Orientalism. London 2003, p. xxvii. 
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which almost all would be lost in a peace treaty. The incentives this gave Israel to work 
towards a peace settlement were low at best. Despite this, the Israeli Government faced 
harsh opposition in the Knesset for the armistice with Jordan. Especially the maximalist 
Herut party was furious because Israel had given away large areas of Jewish land. For 
them the West Bank and East Jerusalem were integral parts of the historical Jewish 
homeland and could not be given away. Despite two calls for non-confidence, however, 
the more moderate Ben-Gurion line managed to win through.10     
The Lausanne Peace Conference and the Abdullah Channel 
 
It has not been the aim of this study to investigate the negotiations that took place after 
the signing of the armistice. However, some notes on these developments are in order. It 
is, after all, due to the collapse of these that the armistice became the standing situation. 
If the peace talks had been able to create any solution these would have taken precedent 
over the armistices. Since no such solution materialized the armistice stood.  
 The Palestine Conciliation Commission convened the Lausanne Peace Conference 
in April 1949. Here all the involved Arab states and Israel held a series of meetings until 
the debacle closed inconclusively in September the same year. The Conference was 
attended on radically different premises by the two parties. In terms of procedure Israel 
preferred to face off the Arab states one at a time by negotiating bilaterally. The Arab 
states, on the other hand, agreed with the PCC’s approach. From an Arab perspective it 
was seen as vital that they face off Israel as a collective bloc, thus enhancing their 
strength. In terms of contents the parties were also at loggerheads. The Arab League 
rallied around the UN Partition Plan, yet added two changes. The first was that Israel 
could make territorial swaps if they wanted to keep areas of land they had occupied. The 
second was that if Israel was unwilling to settle the refugees in the areas they originally 
came from, Israel would have to relinquish areas of a size that could accommodate the 
refugees. Israel for its part claimed that the refugees were not their responsibility and that 
                                                                                                                                            
9
 Thomas 1999, p. 89. 
10
 Shlaim 2001, pp. 54-55. 
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negotiations had to be held on the basis of the armistice lines and not on the Partition 
Plan.11  
 Both the UN and the US Government seemed to agree with the Arab approach, 
and for Israel the whole conference was therefore an exercise in constructive nay-saying. 
It would have been a heavy burden for Israel if it was perceived as responsible for the 
collapse of Lausanne. Israel therefore put forth solutions that were unacceptable to the 
Arabs, but that still could be argued as considerable concessions. The most infamous of 
these was the offer to accept 100,000 Palestinian refugees. The offer was presented as a 
large one, but it was well known that no Arab state could accept such an offer.12 What, 
after all, would have been the fate of the remaining 650,000 refugees?  
 United by their stance on Jerusalem, which was that of partition rather than 
internationalisation, Jordan and Israel once again found each other. Secret meetings took 
place at Shuneh in the period from November 1949 until King Abdullah’s assasination in 
July 1951. The secret talks had its breakthroughs, but every one of these was met with an 
equally large disagreement. King Abdullah needed Israeli concessions if he was to be 
able to present peace to the Arab world. If Ben-Gurion understood this, he seemed not to 
appreciate it. Israel did, at times, suggest certain concessions, but these were never in the 
vicinity of the size that would be needed by King Abdullah. Avi Shlaim concludes that 
these talks collapsed “because Israel was too strong and inflexible while Abdullah was 
too weak and isolated.” The negotiations ended abruptly when King Abdullah was 
murdered and an era of Middle Eastern diplomacy followed him to the grave.13     
Setting the Stage for the Future  
 
When the armistice was signed between Israel and Jordan 3 April 1949 the war was 
terminated, but the final borders were not set. It was commonly understood that these 
could only be made official upon the signing of a final peace treaty. Such a final peace 
treaty was never signed and until 1967 the temporary borders were seemingly permanent. 
With Israel’s astounding victory in the 1967 war, the 1949 borders suddenly turned into 
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 Shlaim 2001, pp. 57-58. 
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 Shlaim 2001, pp. 58-59. 
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 Shlaim 2001, pp. 62-67. 
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the 1967 borders and the western half of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan became the 
Occupied Territories. In July 1988 Jordan relinquished its claim over the West Bank, and 
in November the same year PLO relinquished its claim for all of historical Palestine, 
making it clear that a Palestinian State would be founded on the Occupied Territories – the 
West Bank and Gaza.14 The historical irony here is that the 1949 borders were completely 
unacceptable as a final solution for any of the Arab states in 1949. This view was shared 
by the international community and Israel was well aware that if the country wanted peace 
treaties with the Arab states, large areas of land had to be given back and hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinian refugees would have had to be allowed to return. Although a 
peace treaty would have been beneficial in terms of security, the Israeli view was that the 
balance sheet showed that the price for peace was too high. The hard fought gains of the 
1948 War and the armistice talks would have to be relinquished. International law was 
perhaps on the side of the Arabs, but the balance of power was on Israel’s. Who was going 
to pressure Israel to make concessions? As time passed and no concessions were made, the 
armistice lines gradually became what was on the table. These armistice lines had 
enlarged the Israeli holdings in Palestine from 56% to 77% of the whole.15 The US 
Government had made it clear that in a final peace treaty there would have to be territorial 
trades whereby all land grabbed in excess of the Partition Plan had to be compensated 
elsewhere.16 Over time this demand waned. By the time Resolution 242 was written in 
1967, it had become clear that the term Occupied Territories did not include those areas 
that Israel had occupied beyond the Partition Plan in 1948-1949. The temporary borders of 
1949 had become the permanent borders of 1967. Seen in this light the armistices were 
extremely beneficial for Israel. The fait accomplis presented at the negotiation table, with 
time, became forgotten occupation, and without peace negotiation this developed into 
accepted annexation.  
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 Robins 2004, pp. 163-164; Shlaim 2001, p. 466. 
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16
 Karp 2004, p. 32. 
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Lessons Learned 
 
From the outset one of the questions this thesis attempted to answer was – Why did the 
armistice talks not lead to a peace treaty? It is rather evident that Israel managed to obtain 
most of its goals in the armistices – Israel acquired large areas of land and obtained and 
retained a Jewish minority. These gains would most probably have been lost in peace 
negotiations. Land would have to be given back to the Arabs and large numbers of 
Palestinians would have to be granted the right of return. These were unwelcome 
concessions and hence Israel did not have the greatest incentives to complete such 
negotiations. A lack of outside pressure was prevalent and Israel’s position as victor was 
secured. From this it would seem obvious that to create a successful setting for 
negotiations the mediator should strive to obtain a certain balance of power. In cases, such 
as in the Israel-Arab context, where one part is militarily more powerful and 
simultaneously holds most of the cards, outside pressure must be applied towards the 
strong part to even out the playing field. 
 Further this particular case illustrates that there is a certain danger in working 
towards temporary solutions that are too beneficial for one part. If the temporary solution 
is perceived as more beneficial than a permanent solution, there is a certain risk that the 
process stagnates in its first phase as the beneficiary part will have a real interest in halting 
progress towards a solution. 
 Perhaps the gravest error made during these early negotiations was the belief that 
one could have a peace process that excluded one of the parties. This endemic failure to 
include the Palestinians in the negotiations was carried on into further negotiation rounds. 
It is a paradox that the Palestinians were the greatest victims of the conflict, while these 
same victims were excluded from the peace process. Such a paradox is not a recipe for a 
lasting peace.  
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Appendix 1: Maps 
1: UN Partition Plan 1 
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 Louis 2006 (a), p. 494. 
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2: Arab Invasion2 
 
                                                
2
 Morris 2001, p. 216. Note: Dates on picture are based on US system. 5.15 for instance is 5 May. 
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3: Operation Uvda3 
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 Freundlich, (Ed.) 1983. 
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4. Strip of land given to Israel on Northern West Bank4  
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5. Armistice lines5 
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Appendix 2: 
Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, 3 April 19496 
 
Preamble 
The Parties to the present Agreement, 
Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling 
upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of 
the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce 
to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice; 
Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship 
concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 
1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and 
conclude an Armistice Agreement; 
The undersigned representatives of their respective Governments, having 
exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed 
upon the following provisions: 
 
Article I 
With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in 
recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the 
future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be 
fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed: 
1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the 
settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected 
by both Parties; 
2. No aggressive action by the armed forces - land, sea, or air - of either Party 
shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed 
forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term planned in this 
context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military 
organisations; 
3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the 
armed forces of the other shall be fully respected; 
                                                
6 The Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement of 3rd April 1949: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Israel-
Jordan+Armistice+Agreement.htm (12.09.07). 
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4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties 
is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and 
the restoration of peace in Palestine. 
 
Article II 
With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security 
Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are 
affirmed: 
1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the 
truce ordered by the Security Council is recognised; 
2. It is also recognised that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way 
prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate 
peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement 
being dictated exclusively by military considerations. 
 
Article III 
1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security 
Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of 
the two Parties - land, sea and air - is hereby established. 
2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either 
Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act 
against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians 
in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over 
for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines set forth in articles 
V and VI of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the 
other Party. 
3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by 
one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party. 
 
Article IV 
1. The lines described in articles V and VI of this Agreement shall be designated 
as the Armistice Demarcation Lines and are delineated in pursuance of the 
purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 
1948. 
2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Lines is to delineate the lines 
beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move. 
3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit 
civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, 
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shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the 
Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI. 
 
Article V 
1. The Armistice Demarcation Lines for all sectors other than the sector now held 
by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on the maps in annex I to this Agreement, 
and shall be defined as follows: 
(a) In the sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the 
lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem 
area, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall follow the truce lines as certified by 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation; 
(b) In the Jerusalem sector, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall correspond to 
the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the 
Jerusalem area; 
(c) In the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as 
delineated on map 1 and marked B in annex I to this Agreement; 
(d) In the sector from a point on the Dead Sea (MR 1925-0958) to the 
southernmost tip of Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be 
determined by existing military positions as surveyed in March 1949 by United 
Nations observers, and shall run from north to south as delineated on map 1 in 
annex I to this Agreement. 
 
Article VI 
1. It is agreed that the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom shall replace the 
forces of Iraq in the sector now held by the latter forces, the intention of the 
Government of Iraq in this regard having been communicated to the Acting 
Mediator in the message of 20 March from the Foreign Minister of Iraq 
authorising the delegation of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom to negotiate for the 
Iraqi forces and stating that those forces would be withdrawn. 
2. The Armistice Demarcation Line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall 
be as delineated on map 1 in annex I to this Agreement and marked A. 
3. The Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall 
be established in stages as follows, pending which the existing military lines may 
be maintained: 
(a) In the area west of the road from Baqa to Jaljulia, and thence to the east of 
Kafr Qasim: within five weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is 
signed; 
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(b) In the area of Wadi Ara north of the line from Baqa to Zubeiba: within seven 
weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed; 
(c) In all other areas of the Iraqi sector: within fifteen weeks of the date on which 
this Armistice Agreement is signed. 
4. The Armistice Demarcation Line in the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, referred to in 
paragraph (c) of article V of this Agreement and marked B on map 1 in annex I, 
which involves substantial deviation from the existing military lines in favour of 
the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, is designated to offset the 
modifications of the existing military lilies in the Iraqi sector set forth in paragraph 
3 of this article. 
5. In compensation for the road acquired between Tulkarem and Qalqiliya, the 
Government of Israel agrees to pay to the Government of the Hashemite Jordan 
Kingdom the cost of constructing twenty kilometres of first-class new road. 
6. Wherever villages may be affected by the establishment of the Armistice 
Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, the inhabitants of 
such villages shall be entitled to maintain, and shall be protected in, their full 
rights -of residence, property and freedom. In the event any of the inhabitants 
should decide to leave their villages, they shall be entitled to take with them their 
livestock and other movable property, and to receive without delay full 
compensation for the land which they have left. It shall be prohibited for Israeli 
forces to enter or to be stationed in such villages, in which locally recruited Arab 
police shall be organised and stationed for internal security purposes. 
7. The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom accepts responsibility for all Iraqi forces in 
Palestine. 
8. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as prejudicing, in any 
sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties to this Agreement. 
9. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this 
Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial 
settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto. 
10. Except where otherwise provided, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be 
established, including such withdrawal of forces as may be necessary for this 
purpose, within ten days from the date on which this Agreement is signed. 
11. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this article and in article V shall 
be subject to such rectification as may be agreed upon by the Parties to this 
Agreement, and all such rectifications shall have the same force and effect as if 
they had been incorporated in full in this General Armistice Agreement. 
 
Article VII 
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1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to 
defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the 
Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make 
this impractical, as at the southernmost tip of Palestine and the coastal strip. 
Defensive forces permissible in each sector shall be as defined in annex II to this 
Agreement. In the sector now held by Iraqi forces, calculations on the reduction 
of forces shall include the number of Iraqi forces in this sector. 
2. Reduction of forces to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the establishment of the 
Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this Agreement. In the same way the 
removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the 
transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party, 
shall be completed within the same period. 
3. The strength of the forces which may be maintained by the Parties on each 
side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be subject to periodical review with 
a view toward further reduction of such forces by mutual agreement of the 
Parties. 
 
Article VIII 
1. A Special Committee, composed of two representatives of each Party 
designated by the respective Governments, shall be established for the purpose 
of formulating agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of 
this Agreement and to effect improvements in its application. 
2. The Special Committee shall be organised immediately following the coming 
into effect of this Agreement and shall direct its attention to the formulation of 
agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either Party may submit to it, 
which, in any case, shall include the following, on which agreement in principle 
already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem 
and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural 
and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free 
access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the 
Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision 
of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to 
Jerusalem. 
3. The Special Committee shall have exclusive competence over such matters as 
may be referred to it. Agreed plans and arrangements formulated by it may 
provide for the exercise of supervisory functions by the Mixed Armistice 
Commission established in article XI. 
 
Article IX 
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Agreements reached between the Parties subsequent to the signing of this 
Armistice Agreement relating to such matters as further reduction of forces as 
contemplated in paragraph 3 of article VII, future adjustments of the Armistice 
Demarcation Lines, and plans and arrangements formulated by the Special 
Committee established in article VIII, shall have the same force and effect as the 
provisions of this Agreement and shall be equally binding upon the Parties. 
 
Article X 
An exchange of prisoners of war having been effected by special arrangement 
between the Parties prior to the signing of this Agreement, no further 
arrangements on this matter are required except that the Mixed Armistice 
Commission shall undertake to re-examine whether there may be any prisoners 
of war belonging to either Party which were not included in the previous 
exchange. In the event that prisoners of war shall be found to exist, the Mixed 
Armistice Commission shall arrange for all early exchange of such prisoners. The 
Parties to this Agreement undertake to afford full co-operation to the Mixed 
Armistice Commission in its discharge of this responsibility. 
 
Article XI 
1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement, with the exception of such 
matters as fall within the exclusive competence of the Special Committee 
established in article VIII, shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission 
composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall 
designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of 
the Truce Supervision Organisation or a senior officer from the observer 
personnel of that organisation designated by him following consultation with both 
Parties to this Agreement. 
2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at Jerusalem 
and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem 
necessary for the effective conduct of its work. 
3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the 
United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation not later than 
one week following the signing of this Agreement. 
4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be 
based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall 
be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and 
voting. 
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. 
Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. 
The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members. 
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6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from 
among the military organisations of the Parties or from the military personnel of 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, or from both, in such 
numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In 
the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain 
under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision 
Organisation. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations 
observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to 
approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on 
the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman. 
7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of 
this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission 
through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims 
or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may 
deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement. 
8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this 
Agreement, other than the preamble and articles I and II, is at issue, the 
Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and 
as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties 
modifications in the provisions of this Agreement. 
9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its 
activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report 
shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for 
transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations. 
10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such 
freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the 
Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions 
of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only 
shall be employed. 
11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations 
observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this 
Agreement. 
 
Article XII 
1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force 
immediately upon being signed. 
2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the 
resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the 
establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in 
Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent 
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peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the 
Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article. 
3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement 
or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles I and 
III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has 
been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may 
call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference 
of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or 
suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles I and III. 
Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties. 
4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in 
an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before 
the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds 
that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action 
toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine. 
5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained 
by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the United Nations Acting 
Mediator on Palestine. 
Done at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the third of April one thousand 
nine hundred and forty-nine in the presence of the United Nations Acting 
Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce 
Supervision Organisation. 
 
For and on behalf of the Government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom 
Signed: 
Colonel Ahmed Sudki El-Jundi 
Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Maayte 
For and on behalf of the Government of Israel 
Signed: 
Reuven Shiloah 
Lieutenant-Colonel Moshe Dayan 
 
Annex I 
Maps Delineating Armistice Demarcation Lines 
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[These maps follow annex II, and are explained in the note by the Secretariat to 
article V of the Agreement] 
  
Annex II 
Definition of Defensive Forces 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement defensive forces shall be defined as 
follows: 
1. Land forces 
(a) A standard battalion to consist of not more than 800 officers and other ranks, 
and to be composed of not more than: 
(i) Four rifle companies with ordinary infantry equipment; rifles, LMG's, SMG's, 
light mortars, anti-tank rifles and PIAT. 
The light mortars shall not be heavier than 2 inch. 
The following number of weapons per battalion shall not be exceeded: 48 LMG's, 
16 mortars 2 inch, 8 PIAT's; 
(ii) One support company with not more than six MMG's, six mortars not heavier 
than 3 inch, four anti-tank guns not heavier than six-pounders; 
(iii) One headquarters company; 
(b) The artillery and anti-aircraft artillery to be allotted to the defensive forces 
shall consist of the following type of weapons: field guns not heavier than twenty-
five pounders, the anti-aircraft guns not heavier than forty millimetres. 
2. The following are excluded from the term "defensive forces": 
(a) Armour, such as tanks of all types, armoured cars, Bren gun carriers, 
halftracks, armoured vehicles or load carriers, or any other armoured vehicles; 
(b) All support arms and units other than those specified in paragraphs I (a) i and 
ii, and I (b) above; 
(c) Service units to be agreed upon. 
3. Air forces 
In the areas where defensive forces only are permitted airfields, airstrips, landing 
fields and other installations, and military aircraft shall be employed for defensive 
and normal supply purposes only.  
11. The defensive forces which may be maintained by each Party in the areas 
extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, as 
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provided in paragraph I of article VI, shall be as follows for the sectors described 
in article V, paragraph 1: 
1. Sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines 
defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area: 
one battalion each. 
2. Jerusalem sector: two battalions each. 
3. Hebron-Dead Sea sector: one battalion each. 
4. Sector Engeddi to Eylat: three battalions each. In addition, each side will be 
allowed one squadron of light armoured cars consisting of not more than 13 light 
armoured cars or half tracks. The weapons permissible on these vehicles will be 
determined by the Mixed Armistice Commission. 
5. Sector now held by Iraqi forces: five battalions each, and one squadron of 
armoured cars each. 
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